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Russia: Yakutia President Voices Support for Yeltsin

LD1504134296 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1234 GMT 15 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yakutsk, April 15 (Interfax-Eurasia) — President of Yakutia, a Russian Siberian republic, Mikhail Nikolayev voiced his support to Boris Yeltsin in the upcoming presidential elections.

The future of Russia depends on results of the presidential elections, Nikolayev told heads of regional administrations in Yakutsk Monday. "We will be either trapped by ideology or have further reforms," said the president.

The communist ideology "did no good for Yakutia in the past and does not bode well in the future," noted Nikolayev.

Russia: Yeltsin's Campaign Visit to Khimki Noted

MM1504133596 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 13 Apr 96 p 2

[Report by Aleksandr Gamov under the general heading "Idols Roaming Our Great Country in Blusterous Crowds": "Applause and Flowers for Yeltsin in Khimki...."]

[FBIS Translated Text] Traveling around Russia on the campaign trail, after the "red" city of Belgorod, Boris Yeltsin had good reason to choose Khimki near Moscow, or to be more precise the "Energomash" Science and Production Association, where he arrived last Thursday [11 April] toward evening.

Accompanying the president on his visit were about 20 of the most prominent "defense industry moguls." Boris Nikolayevich, of course, took the opportunity here to enlist their support at the forthcoming elections. True, "not without giving something in return": In return the defense industry officials demanded and obtained from the president his support for their complex ("you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours).

But there was one other reason for the visit. "Energomash," whose booster rockets put spaceships into orbit around the earth, has suddenly had its program wound down. And this is not all.

"How much do you earn a month?" the president inquired in the assembly shop.

"About 210,000-290,000 rubles."

"Including bonuses?"

"Without bonuses."

"Well, I don't agree with such wages," Boris Nikolayevich said in an offended tone, as if they had been offered to him. "Such wages are only just enough to make ends meet. They should pay you a million for what you do! But do you want a return to communism?"

"No, we've already been there and had enough of it!" the "Energomash" workers, with only sufficient wages to make ends meet and portraits of the young Yeltsin in overalls, replied in unison.

It seems that this touched the president very much. He began to reassure his supporters:

"Don't worry, life will improve from this year onward. We will get back on our feet. But only if we don't receive a setback 16 June. Then there will be...bloodshed. An awful business!"

"This is why we do not want to go back."

"This cannot be allowed," Yeltsin agreed. "Especially as the president is tall and trim. In good physical shape. You see on television how the president speaks — it sends a tingle down your spine...."

In general Boris Nikolayevich was happy, witty, and assertive in Khimki, and there was much applause and armfuls of roses and carnations for him: "You give me flowers and I'll give you money."

The only thing that slightly spoiled the effect was the "ceremonial" carpeted road at the entrance of one of the shops. As well as the unceremonious behavior of several of the president's bodyguards. Unlike their colleagues, whose recent work in Belgorod where the president met with thousands of people was excellent, the "Moscow shift" conducted themselves nervously. One bodyguard even attempted to rip off the sleeve of the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent's new raincoat: "Get near to the president once more and you'll lose your press pass."

Russia: 'No Particular Enthusiasm' for Zyuganov in Voronezh

MM1504151396 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 13 Apr 96 p 2

[Report by Vladimir Serdyuk under the general heading "Idols Roaming our Great Country in Blusterous Crowds": "...Zyuganov Hissed in Voronezh"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Gennadiy Zyuganov's tour of cities in the "red belt" should seemingly have been a triumph for him, as communist sympathies here are traditionally strong and the economic situation is extremely grave. Moreover, Cosmonaut Svetlana Savitskaya and former Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoy agreed to help Zyuganov in these regions. The latter even boasted of his contacts among the local population.

But the paradox was that no particular enthusiasm was shown about the CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation] secretary's arrival. What is more, in Voronezh he was met by anticommunist pickets in Station Square itself, was whistled, and people chanted at him: "Down with communism!" The situation was similar in other localities visited by the presidential candidate.

The "red" city of Voronezh had, perhaps, not seen the like before and many observers regarded this meeting as symbolic of a change in mood in Russia's central oblasts.

During his visit the communist leader came up with no surprises: It was the same old meetings with the proletariat and party comrades from local party cells, and the standard slogans and promises to radically change the country's economic policy if they came to power. However, Zyuganov simply did not make public his blueprint for an economic policy, promising to do so closer to the elections.

It seems that the CPRF secretary's current outing to the Russian provinces is unlikely to score him any points in the battle for the presidency. There has been no great enthusiasm at Zyuganov's meetings with voters and it is with good reason that he described the feelings toward himself and his party as "flat," in other words without any particular partiality for them. "The people are as yet still looking to see who would be a worthy choice out of the candidates," Gennadiy Andreyevich explained to journalists.

The fact that a number of political leaders of oblasts that are considered to be "red" declined to meet with the communist leader can be considered as a serious blow to Zyuganov. This probably happened as a result of the recent visit to the region by Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin who managed to get in before his main opponent and win over the leaders of the "Chernozemye" Association which is headed by one of the most popular politicians in Central Russia — Federation Council Chairman Yegor Stroyev. Further evidence for this hypothesis lies in the fact that Aleksandr Ryabov, head of the most communist of oblasts — Tambov Oblast (who was elected on a communist ticket), noted that after Boris Yeltsin's visit a "warming in relations between the president and inhabitants of the cities and villages of the 'red belt' may begin." Be that as it may, Zyuganov's visit has showed that feelings in the Russian provinces are not as clear-cut as the Communists are trying to make out.

Russia: Zyuganov Draws Crowds in Samara, Stresses Thrift

MK1604093896 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 16 Apr 96 p 2

[Report by Viktor Khamrayev: "Gennadiy Zyuganov Prepares His Rivals for Defeat. The CPRF Leader Seeks To Convince Voters That the Country Will Be Saved by the Communists' Thrift"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Those who lose the election will have to submit to the will of the majority of the citizens, Gennadiy Zyuganov told yesterday the residents of Samara City and Oblast, where the number one candidate spent all Monday [15 April] in electioneering tours. Mr. Zyuganov indicated that the losers' obligations are provided for in a draft law on the continuity of power, which the Communist Party faction is going to submit to the State Duma for discussion.

Judging by his yesterday's mood, Mr. Zyuganov sees his as a win-win candidacy because he represents not only the Communists but also "people's patriotic" forces, which managed to unite in a bloc ahead of the election. True, only Communist electorate showed up at the meeting with the presidential contender in Samara: People the same age as the CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation] leader and elderly pensioners. Moreover, the city of Novokuybyshevskiy, where a large petrochemical plant is located, was not chosen accidentally either: In the 1995 elections CPRF candidate Valeriy Romanov, the last first secretary of the Samara Oblast CPSU committee, carried that one-seat constituency.

Mr. Zyuganov stressed that the "forces that have nearly completed the unification process" will stay together also after their election victory so as "peacefully and quietly to reverse the situation for the better." There are resources for making a "reversal" in the country, says Mr. Zyuganov, citing foreign sources that estimate the sum of money that "fled" the country at $300 billion. Furthermore, the contender believes, it will be necessary to dispose in a "rational" way of revenues from the sale of liquor, which, according to Zyuganov, will be enough to pay wages to teachers and doctors, student stipends and pensions and even pay the military if "a basically new budget is drawn up." In addition to the liquor item, the presidential aspirant hopes to raise funds for budgetary expenditures through a "thrifty" use of precious metals, the fuel and energy complex, and the textile industry. He especially stressed "production facilities using state-of-the-art technology," which, according to the Communist leader, "will be raking in hard currency for the country by filling foreign orders." All of this, according to Gennadiy Zyuganov, will enable him to deliver on his main election promises: "return to the citizens what was taken away from them": normal prices, free education and health care, and so forth.

At the same time, Mr. Zyuganov, as an "etatist," assured his followers that victory in the election will mean, not "reward, but responsible work to restore the semiruined country." In this context the Samara residents were told that the economic concept of Mr. Zyuganov's economic team is nearly ready. At present a foreign policy concept is being worked out, and then they will produce a program of social support, in particular, for the military.

Gennadiy Zyuganov also had some requests to make to his supporters. In the context of the "sociopsychological and informational war," waged by the ruling regime, Mr. Zyuganov asked the people of Samara to help him in his preelection campaign: "from door to door," from "mouth to mouth," and "from eye to eye" tell what they hear at the meeting and also subscribe to SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA.

Meetings with the candidate at local community centers were packed. Those who could not see their leader could hear him through public address systems, installed in the lobbies and at the entrance, out in the street. In addition to the leader's speeches, Communist followers listened to songs in the rendition of a well-known actor, Aristarkh Livanov. His repertoire included a ballad by Bulat Okudzhava: "[Oh Lord] let him who lusts power rule to his heart's content... and do not forget about me."

Russia: Zyuganov's Political Philosophy Examined

MM1504112296 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 11 Apr 96 p 3

[Article by political scientist Aleksey Kiva: "Portrait of a Contender. Zyuganov Is Not as Simple as He Is Painted"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Gennadiy Zyuganov is, in his own way, a large-scale, colorful figure in the Russian communist movement and on the political stage. Whatever people may say about him, he has accomplished a revolutionary change in "Russified Marxism," that is, Bolshevism, just as Vladimir Ulyanov-Lenin accomplished a change in "European Marxism." And the lack of comparability in the scale of their personalities and the consequences of the innovations is not the point. The point is the purposefulness of activity and the ability to adapt to circumstances.

Indeed, Marxism, which was created for developed countries, could, in a peasant country like Russia, have shared the fate of many other doctrines and currents in political thinking which have died out and disappeared as suddenly as they appeared. Or else continued to live their own life far away from the midst of the people. Like, for instance, Marxism in the United States or Britain, Denmark, or the Netherlands.

But Lenin simplified a doctrine that had sprung up in advanced Europe for an advanced proletariat, bringing it down to a level where it could be understood by the heroes of Platonov's "The Foundation Pit" ["Kotlovan"; a novel set in the period of collectivization of agriculture in which the would-be builders of a utopian commune turn out to be digging a mass grave for mankind] and at the same time transforming it into a material force. True, the edifice that was built on this theoretical foundation in an individual country, mainly by people of a prebourgeois level of civilization, eventually collapsed. But how impressive it looked, for many years!...

Let us return to Gennadiy Andreyevich. He has succeeded in something that no other communist leader in any former country of real socialism — Mongolia included — has pulled off. In virtually all those countries the communist parties as such have either turned into something else, most often social democratic parties, or else have lost mass support or even retreated to the sidelines of public life and disappeared. But Russia's Communists, under Zyuganov's leadership, have not only recovered from the paralysis that followed the failure of the putsch in August 1991, but have restructured themselves in such a way that they made a fairly successful debut in the December 1993 parliamentary elections, doubled their representation in the State Duma as a result of the December 1995 elections, and, along with their allies, have become the parliamentary majority. And they have come to believe in their own popularity to such an extent that they have decided to nominate as a presidential candidate Zyuganov, the leader of the CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation], who had been regarded by even the most unbiased analysts as an absolute "no-hoper" because of his lack of personal charm (charisma) and clear capabilities.

Communist Or Social Democrat?

The theory followed by Gennadiy Zyuganov has been beyond me for a long time. Although, like him, I am a graduate of that forge of Marxist theorists — the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences; I worked for several more years in the "temple of bolshevism" — the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism; and I spent many years teaching "brothers in the struggle against the hydra of imperialism" to build socialism in the jungles and deserts out of the human material of a tribal society. I had no great difficulty mastering the theoretical legacy of all the classical and neoclassical writers put together. Including even the dissident theorists.

Many of our democratic mass media, and individual intellectuals like Nizhniy Novgorod Governor Boris Nemtsov, as if in collusion, have begun talking about the CPRF leader's "social democratic leanings." I remember how Boris Fedorov cast in Zyuganov's face the "devastating" remark: "You're just a social democrat!" Apparently Boris Grigoryevich wanted to expose Gennadiy Andreyevich in the eyes of his supporters by accusing him of trimming, of chameleonism.

And so the myth of Zyuganov's being a social democrat set off on its travels "far and wide through great Russia." Some of my colleagues from the institute, who openly declare their commitment to Marxism and communism, have also been talking — obviously as a result of these assertions — about the CPRF leader's "leanings to the right." He recognizes private ownership, they say, he expresses readiness to cooperate with Western monopoly capital, etc., etc. At this point, admittedly, I remembered China, where by this logic the entire communist leadership, at all levels, are out-and-out social democrats.

So who is he, our Gennadiy Andreyevich? A communist or a social democrat? Or maybe neither the one nor the other? Let me remind you that communists and social democrats (with the possible exception of the British and certain others) sprang from the same nest — the Marxist nest. Both are generally committed to a materialist understanding of history: the understanding that socialism (Marxist or social democratic) can grow only from within developed capitalism. Lenin's words in his letter to Gorkiy, that there can be no movement toward socialism other than via capitalism, stick in the minds of all who have studied Marxism at all seriously.

For a long time communists and social democrats probably had more in common than they had differences. But the dividing line has always run through the attitude to democracy and methods of coming to power. Also, the attitude to ownership could not be as barbarous for social democrats as for the Bolsheviks. Steal, then share out — and by no means equally, as is generally believed, since the leaders, as we know, got their hands on as much as possible and on all the best things.

For a long time the social democrats did not entirely renounce Marxism and entertained the illusion of the need for the dominance of public ownership, and more than once, as in Britain, they resorted to selective nationalization (in the form of purchase, naturally) of the means of production. The result always turned out the same. Production efficiency or the standard of services fell drastically, and the social democrats were defeated in the next elections. And not infrequently this was the start of a phase of profound crisis, as in Britain.

As they accumulated experience in state administration, the social democrats came to the conclusion that only an economy based on private ownership can be efficient. Without an efficient economy, the prosperity that the social democrats sought when in power in many countries is simply inconceivable. Therefore the most important principle of world social democracy, apart from democracy, social justice, and commitment to humanist values in domestic and foreign policy, is the principle of an efficient economy, with the dominant role for private ownership and with respect for any other form.

But when I open Zyuganov's book "Beyond the Horizon" ["Za Gorizontom"], written quite recently, this is what I read — and I cannot believe my eyes: "Strictly speaking, the prerequisites for the Russian revolution had long been developing consistently, being in equal degree the consequence of the Russian Government's mistakes in domestic policy and of the external, demoralizing influence of Western civilization."

We are talking about the 20th century.

Excuse me, but is Marxism not a product of Western civilization?

Let us go on. "The Russian revolutions showed," the CPRF leader goes on to write, "that the main bulk of Russian society was dissatisfied not with 'unfinished' capitalism, which was developing rapidly in the country after the peasant reform of 1861, but specifically with the capitalist system itself, which encroached on the communal-collectivist, spiritual, and moral principles of the people's life."

But, first, this assertion is contrary to what Lenin said repeatedly. Before the revolution: that we suffer not so much because of capitalism, as because of its underdevelopment. After the revolution: that the building of socialism, every step it takes, comes up against the underdevelopment of capitalism.

Second, where would the proletariat have come from if capitalism had not "encroached" on communal-collectivist principles? I have seen these "principles" many times in Africa and other parts of the world and I am ready to agree with Marx that in themselves they generate nothing but decay. The [19th-century] Russian Populists tried to take up these "principles," but nothing came of it.

Zyuganov's book "The Strong State" ["Derzhava"], which came out a year earlier, only strengthens the conviction that Zyuganov's views can hardly be regarded as Marxist or, if you like, Marxist-Leninist, even if you stretch a point. When he claims, for instance, that "the 'Russian idea' is essentially a profoundly socialist idea," it reminds me of the African ideologists of primitive communal socialism who used to claim that pre-colonial Africa had socialism. Socialism is a scientific and historical term, while the "Russian idea" is more a way of looking at the world than any specific concept.

If Zyuganov is not entirely a communist, is he perhaps a social democrat? Let us talk about that too. Social democratism is tested first and foremost against the touchstone of democracy, humanism, humanity. But if Zyuganov does not recognize the historical necessity to break with bloodthirsty Stalinism, which perpetrated genocide against its own people, what kind of magnifying glass must we look through to see social democratism? Yet that is the impression you get when you read in "The Strong State," and also in the book "Beyond the Horizon," things like this: "Stalin...needed to live for another five to seven years to make his 'ideological restructuring' irreversible." Or this: "The body of the leader had hardly grown cold in the Mausoleum when his successors had dramatically reversed the ideological course. The entire 'civilized' West loudly welcomed this maneuver: while preserving a modest silence about the efforts this had cost its politicians, diplomats, special services, and 'agents of influence.'"

Frankly, I am embarrassed to read such things. Embarrassed not so much for the Russian Communists' leader, as for those people in the democratic camp who, while making unfounded accusations against Yeltsin of being insufficiently democratic, are quick to number Zyuganov among the social democrats. Naturally, they are doing this to spite Yeltsin — let us hope they don't do more harm to themselves in the process!

But to return to the substance of the matter, this "maneuver" took place against the background of a terrible tragedy that had been revealed to the world: On the day of the "butcher-leader's" death there were more than 10 million people in camps and prisons. Millions of the best people had been done to death for no reason at all. And both Malenkov, and Khrushchev, and all the others who stood alongside the dictator for many years were up to their elbows in blood. And Khrushchev, who took a bold and fateful step in the cause of exposing the monstrous crimes of Stalinism in order to avoid a repetition of them in future, himself remained a Stalinist Communist. He cold-bloodedly drowned Hungary's 1956 democratic revolution in blood and threatened to do the same in Poland if events there took a turn that was undesirable to the Kremlin rulers. He equally cold-bloodedly ordered the suppression of starving workers in Novocherkassk in 1962 with tanks. He crushed new trends in literature, art, and so forth. What "agents of influence"? Stalin is dead, but Stalinism lives on.

But perhaps the main question is this: What did Stalin not live long enough to do? Exile the Jews to Siberia? Or maybe the Ukrainians, who openly hated him, because they could not forgive the unprecedented, artificially created death by famine in the early thirties? Or, after cybernetics, did the dictator, who was losing his reason, not find time to stamp out all new scientific trends and finally annihilate everyone who was capable of inventing anything or displaying independence of thought and action?

But, all else aside, the country under Stalin had already begun to suffocate in isolation and was drawing nearer to nuclear disaster every year. Khrushchev's service to the country and history is that in the nuclear age he proposed to the West that contentious issues should not be resolved by military means, but that they should demonstrate their superiority in the peaceful field, bringing into circulation the concept of "peaceful coexistence." Under Khrushchev our antediluvian engineering and technology in peaceful spheres received a powerful boost to development.

Modern social democracy is characterized by openness to the world and condemnation of any form of xenophobia, great-power chauvinism, or incitement to distrust, whether against the West or against the East. Suffice it to say that Scandinavian social democracy, as an integral part of Western social democracy, actively supported the national liberation struggle of the peoples of colonies and semicolonies even in the "Cold War" years. Just as the USSR did. Social democracy does not accept militarism or confrontation.

If you take Zyuganov's books, speeches, and interviews, you will find the kind of revelations and expressions there that can be found only in extreme right-wing radical circles or in the pages of publications like ZAVTRA. They are simply not possible among socialists or among communists, because they involve either setting East against West, or lauding the policy of violence, imperial expansion, and confrontation.

What is Zyuganov the "social democrat" fighting against? Against "liberal democratic ideology," against everything associated with the humanization of social and international relations. And also against the values and forms of existence that are generated by contemporary post-industrial civilization and the internationalization of social relations.

The Objective — To Seize Power

At a recent "roundtable" on CPRF policy and ideology its leaders' views were characterized — in particular by

Sergey Yushenkov — as a form of national socialism. "Mr. Zyuganov," he stated, "is a consistent anticommunist of a national-socialist orientation." I think, however, that the question is much more complex than that. The doctrine of the CPRF and of Zyuganov remains, in its main features, the same as it was in Stalin's time. True, Zyuganov dissociates himself from internationalism, militant atheism, and a number of other things that were characteristic of bolshevism in its early stages. But even the later Stalin changed his attitude to religion and was more a great-power chauvinist than an internationalist. His anti-Semitism is common knowledge, as are the monstrously cruel repressions against entire peoples. As for his successors, for them internationalism was merely an instrument of imperial policy. And virtually every communist leader in countries that had not known democracy was a nationalist. Mao Zedong, Kim Il-Song, Ceausescu, Zhivkov, and the rest.

I would tentatively call Zyuganov a "communist of the new type." By analogy with the bolshevist party of the new type that was created by Lenin, with the aim of seizing power and holding onto it. For the Bolsheviks, with their principle of "revolutionary expediency," to paraphrase the well-known dictum of an English figure, there are no permanent principles, only a permanent aim. In the 1917 Bolshevik revolution the outlying areas and national minorities played a huge role. At that time, internationalism was necessary. So that the Bolsheviks could hold onto power with the support of international forces. The situation changed — and internationalism was relegated to the garbage heap.

Zyuganov has in general correctly assessed the situation: to count on victory today on the basis of Marxist ideology alone would be naive to put it mildly. It is another matter that the breakup of the USSR, which directly or indirectly affected the interests of many millions of people, caused a split in the democratic camp and generated a powerful anti-reform wave of a nationalist, great-power, conservative, and Slavophile orientation. Zyuganov promptly establishes alliance relations with those whom the communists had fought against for decades — the nationalists. And he not only establishes, but becomes one of the leaders of the extremely aggressive National Salvation Front, which was openly preparing the country for civil war.

Zyuganov and his entourage and think tank must be given their due: They correctly assessed the situation both during and after the events of October 1993. Zyuganov formally remained aloof. The National Salvation Front, having played the most active part in the putsch, in effect came to an end there and then. What did Zyuganov want with allies like that? The Communist Party, rehabilitated by Zorkin's Constitutional Court, goes into the elections autonomously, and to many people's surprise, maybe even to the surprise of its own leaders, achieves notable successes.

Gennadiy Andreyevich is indeed an unusual personality. He has many faces, he plays several roles. Before his own public he is an uncompromising bolshevik, an "ardent revolutionary." He is slightly milder when addressing a broader public and in the pages of the noncommunist press. In speeches to the educated public, at universities and so forth, Zyuganov does not forget that he has a doctor of sciences degree. Abroad or in meetings with foreigners Zyuganov is simply unrecognizable. He is polite, civilized, in short he is the leader of the biggest parliamentary party faction, a serious contender for the Russian Federation presidency, a man you can do business with.

Three Far From Life-Giving Springs

The figure of the "communist of the new type" cannot just spring from nowhere. Neither national socialism, as many liberals think, nor national bolshevism, as many social democrats and "orthodox Marxists" believe, conveys Gennadiy Andreyevich's views in full. Marxism, after all, gave the world many currents. There is Leninism, Trotskiyism, Stalinism, "Kautskyism," "Bernsteinism," "Browderism," and so forth. Why not another one — "Zyuganovism."

The sources from which it springs: It is, as the classical author would have said, the product of the disintegration of the former system and the former statehood. The product of the decay of the bolshevik version of Marxism which began soon after Lenin's death and which continued in spite of the efforts of Khrushchev and Gorbachev. Incidentally, world experience has shown that nobody can breathe new life into Marxism, which sprang up in order to tackle the tasks of a past era. Communists acquire historical prospects for the future, in effect, only when they overcome Marxism and become post-communists, that is, social democrats. The Italian Communist Party, the strongest in the world in terms of its creative potential, tried to find a future through "Euro-communism." Through the recognition of economic and political pluralism and democratic values in the universal sense, through the renunciation of Leninism. The result, however, was that it turned from a communist into a post-communist party — the Union of the Left.

And another source. In the bolshevik version of Marxism, for all the poverty of its theoretical basis, alongside the dominant dogmatic current there was also a creative current. This was suppressed and trampled on, but it still existed. Let us assume that Zyuganov was right. If

Stalin had lived another five to seven years and launched a new round of terror, his "ideological restructuring" would have led to the extermination of every thinking element in society. There would have been no room for the growth of Khrushchev's "thaw" or of the "sixties movement" which produced new shoots in the eighties. Be that as it may, with the appearance of Nina Andreyeva's celebrated letter "I Cannot Waive Principles," it became clear that a third current had also appeared — "excessive Marxism." Or more accurately, a caricature of Marxism. No changes, no renewal, not even for the sake of saving the system. Back to Stalinism! "A Word to the People," of which Zyuganov was a signatory, was written in precisely the spirit of N. Andreyeva's letter.

The CPRF Leader's Rejectionist "Principles"

First, an extremely debased form of Marxism. Rejection of the historical principle, of the formal approach to social development, in favor of a highly simplified, civilized approach.

Rejection of the most important principle in Marxism — that experience is the criterion of truth.

Rejection of internationalism; this is essentially contrary to Marxism's fundamental idea of socialism and communism as the product of the collective efforts of the working class in the developed countries.

Rejection of the Marxist view of the need to overcome national isolationism, the view of the beneficial nature of the trend toward worldwide rapprochement through the formation of a world market, the internationalization of social relations and cultures, rapprochement among nations and peoples, etc.

Rejection of Marxist dialectics in the perception of the movement of history, the identification of causal connections, etc.

The movement of history, according to Zyuganov, is the work of "conspirators," "traitors," "anti-patriots," "cosmopolitans," international capital, the criminal world, and so forth. Real socialism collapsed in the USSR — a conspiracy. Let us assume it was. But what about the fact that it collapsed in approximately 10 more countries and in approximately 15 countries that were geared toward socialism? Also a conspiracy?

The USSR disintegrated — conspiracy plus treason, by Gorbachev and Co. Let us assume that is also true. But what about the breakup of Yugoslavia, even though the party, the army, and the present leader in Belgrade did everything to prevent it? What is more, Czechoslovakia broke up too. I wonder, can "conspiracy theory" be used to explain the breakup of the Roman Empire, or, say, the Austro-Hungarian or the Ottoman empire, the downfall of the totalitarian regimes in Spain and Portugal, and so forth?

Or: How can one continue to assert the advantages of real socialism over countries with a different social system, when the divided countries proved the exact opposite? The GDR and the FRG, North Korea and South Korea, China and Taiwan and Hong Kong? To say nothing of how we lived under socialism and how countries with a comparable level of development lived under a different system.

This is something that cannot be conveyed by a single term. Nationalism? Not entirely. Because that is a concept of bourgeois society. Zyuganov appeals to pre-bourgeois values. To "Byzantinism" and the most conservative current in Slavophilism. He appeals to what you could call the archaic, whether it be a question of social relations, religions, and so forth. To deplore "religious indifference" is to refuse to recognize ecumenicalism or religious tolerance. It is to adhere to the positions of the very remote past. But at the same time the CPRF leader's views also contain great-power principles, xenophobia, and more besides.

It is hardly advisable for a politician who lays claim to the presidency to adopt the position of N. Danilevskiy and his pupil K. Leontyev on the supremacy of young nations over old. That path could lead a long way. After all, in response people could cite the number of discoveries made in the 20th century by "old" and "young" nations, and the corresponding number of Nobel prize winners. They could also point out that in Germany national socialism started with the "German idea." We know what happened next.

Third, Gennadiy Zyuganov is an active supporter of the methods of political struggle described by the Englishman Orwell in the anti-utopia "1984." This means the active use of substitutes, weasel words, and deliberate dupery. It means, to put it in plain language, calling black white, shifting the blame, and creating "Potemkin [show] villages" even more determinediy than Count Potemkin himself. According to Zyuganov, it transpires that it was not the communists, but the democrats — and in only just over four years — who finally drained the country dry with the arms race, built a totally idiotic economy that works not for people but for itself, and poisoned the environment, resulting in a drastic deterioration in the nation's health, a reduction in life expectancy, and much else. According to Zyuganov, it transpires that it was not the Bolsheviks, but other people who destroyed the most effective section of the nation, including entrepreneurs and traders, Cossacks and scientists, and exterminated the most active and enterprising section of the peasantry, using, among other things, gas against them, as in Tambov Oblast. And wrecked the churches and plundered them, wiping out the priests in the process. But who was it? The mythical "masons," perhaps? It was supposedly the reformers again, and not the communists, who dismembered Russia into nationality-based formations, something that literally turned into a time bomb and ultimately — again, not without efforts on the part of the communists — in August 1991, blew the country apart.

It is downright staggering: The Communists admit no blame themselves, they shift it all onto others. (Failing to recognize their predecessors' guilt carries the danger of a repetition of everything that happened before, if the Communists find themselves in power again.) They do not even admit the obvious fact that mass corruption and organized crime began to flourish luxuriantly as long ago as the Brezhnev years, as is attested by the vast "cotton affair" and large-scale machinations in foreign and domestic trade.

We constantly hear from Gennadiy Andreyevich words like "occupying forces." Who are they? Give us the address or the direction in which to look for them. Or else people who have not lost their historical memory will recall how the Bolsheviks, having seized power in 1917, rally did behave like occupying forces in relation to their own people, particularly the peasantry and clergy.

Or this: "a regime of national betrayal and national treason." Again, clarification is needed. Because many people will say that that refers to the Stalinist regime, on whose conscience are millions of ruined lives of our compatriots, two huge famines, and a dire blow against the nation's gene pool. Or else they could mention the regime that was to blame for the putsch in August 1991, which finally put paid to the USSR.

...A certain lady from Columbia University once asked me to comment on one of Zyuganov's speeches. She said something like this: "Your country is still a nuclear superpower and Bill Clinton, responding to accusations from the Republican camp that the president was devoting unjustified attention to Russia, noted that it is the only country in the world that theoretically could destroy the United States. Many people are still afraid of Russia, both in the West and in the former republics of the former USSR. Some people are actually talking about a revival of imperial principles in Russia. In this light, what is the meaning of Mr. Zyuganov's words, as leader of the CPRF, about the 'need to restore Russia's political independence'?" I replied: You see, the language of Zyuganov the Communist is a kind of Orwellian "newspeak." It is not an accurate reflection of the realities, quite the contrary. Its aim is to arouse distrust among the population in the democratic authorities and the reforms. What else could be the meaning of this remark of his: "We want to rid ourselves of a trouble that has proved worse than [Mongol Khan] Batu, Napoleon, and Hitler put together"?

Let us leave Napoleon aside. Batu ravaged and conquered Rus [Russia], as a result of which we were in slavery for some 300 years. Hitler built the gas chambers, exterminated 6 million Jews alone, and set the goal of enslaving all the Slav peoples. But Yeltsin's "anti-people regime" liberated the people of Russia from communist totalitarianism. That is "newspeak" for you: "truth is lies," and "freedom is slavery."

What Can Be Expected of the Helmsman?

Probably neither I, nor anyone else, not even Zyuganov himself, can answer that. Apart from Zyuganov, there is also the Communist Party leadership. Zyuganov the Communist, whoever he may be, is obliged to fulfill party decisions, unless, of course, he is a dictator like Stalin. The election platform of Zyuganov the presidential candidate is constructed in such a way as to frighten neither his voters nor his allies. It contains many promises, but does not indicate the ways and methods of fulfilling them. The CPRF program adopted in 1995, however, is entirely in the Communists' traditional spirit, with the possible exception of such "innovations" as the "Russian idea" and so forth. But it seems that there is also a secret party program, a maximum program, so to speak, as General Varennikov declared. We do not know what it is, we can only speculate: Communist revanche, with secret "blacklists." There are leaked reports that such lists are being compiled, for instance, on journalists. From what Zyuganov himself has said, what is written in the party's program documents, what its prominent personalities are saying, and finally, what the Communists are doing in parliament, one can compile a very realistic impression of the possible actions of Zyuganov the president and of the CPRF as a whole. There will most likely be an attempt to restore real socialism. After all, the Communists make no secret of the fact that they want to abolish the post of president, bring back the soviets, revive the USSR, restore the supremacy of state ownership in the economy, establish a monopoly of foreign trade, and so on and so forth. (Although one wonders whether what they say can be 100 percent trusted when, while rejecting the post of president, they put forward A. Tuleyev for the post of vice president.)

Naturally, the first thing they will do is to try to gain control of the power structures and the mass media and abolish the Constitution. They will not be able to hold onto power without restoring the Communist Party's previous role and destroying the democratic institutions (the multiparty system, the free press, free elections, the principle of the separation of powers).

But whether the Communists will have the determination to try to implement their plans is still a big question. They might be afraid to go all out for it without knowing in advance how it could all end. So I would not venture to say for sure which of the programs (the minimum or the maximum) the Communists will choose to implement. But I am definitely prepared to assert that an attempt at restoration could result in a terrible disaster for the country. Only fools can fail to realize that you cannot bring back the past! That, by issuing an open challenge to the world community, Russia will drive itself into a corner. And today, to find ourselves in international isolation would be fatal. It means finally exhausting ourselves, lagging still further behind the leading countries, losing our place as a great country and as a great nation. It is stupid even to dream that we could, by turning toward the East, restore a bipolar world. Today the East means first and foremost China, which has its own interests and its own strategy. By turning our backs on the West we could find ourselves caught between the hammer and the anvil.

I am also prepared to assert that if the Communists had the determination and strength to embark in practice on fulfilling the promises made to voters and implementing their program, the following processes would begin immediately:

a) a "brain drain," that is, a mass exodus of highly skilled specialists to the West;

b) flight of capital, also to the West;

c) disruption of the system of vital services up to and including famine, as happened in Georgia after Gamsakhurdia's rule;

d) resistance to acts of seizure of private property.

And here one of two things could happen: Either the Communists will suffer a crushing defeat which could even go as far as a subsequent ban on their activity, or else they will save the situation by resorting to mass terror. After all, the Bolsheviks did not plan the terror beforehand, either. Having seized power easily, they were certain that things would continue in the same way. But when they found themselves facing the onset of famine in the city and growing resistance to their hunger policy, or in broader terms, facing a choice between the loss of power or terror, they chose terror. They had not been prepared for "war communism" either, but they resorted to it as events developed.

Our simple-hearted older citizens, in voting for the Communists, expect them to restore to them the comparative prosperity of Brezhnev's time. Where is it going to come from? The former wealth that came to our aid does not exist now — by and large it was bled dry back then, as the price for the "masses' tranquillity"; nor do we have our former allies, who used to supply us with food and consumer goods as if to order, in exchange for our military equipment. Things will be worse than they are now. Military expenditure will increase. There will also be an increase in the flow of resources out of Russia for the benefit of the members of the "new Union," and imports will fall. The shelves of the stores will grow empty. In Brezhnev's time and later, we used to import about one-third of our food, and even now we import quite a lot. One can say for sure that in the event of the appearance of a Communist president in Russia the West will automatically cease financial aid to us and demand the repayment of debts, of which the lion's share accumulated back in Soviet times.

Things are not easy now for many of us. But the worst is behind us. Life has already begun to improve, and this improvement must be consolidated and built on, instead of destroying what has been achieved in recent years and starting everything over again. It is no use bringing down trouble on ourselves by cutting ourselves off from the rest of the world and once again turning aside from the main stream of world progress, in order to return to less than nothing and really deserve the reputation of a bankrupt nation.

It Is Not a Matter of Definitions, Messrs. Comrades!

After all that has been said, let us sum up. What is presidential contender Gennadiy Andreyevich Zyuganov's outlook on life, in fact? I have called him a "communist of the new type." A communist of the era of disintegration of the world socialist system, of the obvious collapse of the Marxist-Leninist utopia. A communist of the post-socialist era.

What is left of socialism? Cuba and North Korea, languishing in poverty. A rapidly developing China, and Vietnam following in its footsteps. But not, alas, according to their own socialist logic, but, let us say tentatively, according to the capitalist logic of development. Or to be more precise, the logic of the development of state capitalism. And who knows whether this is a phase on the path to that self-same utopian socialism, or a gentle, "velvet" parting with it in the English fashion. More likely the latter, in the end.

Those who claim that Zyuganov is a national communist will be right in their way, and so will those who say that he can be described as a national socialist.

A colleague of mine says: "Gennadiy Zyuganov is terribly undiscriminating in his remarks. I sometimes think that in spite of his doctorate he lacks an elementary general historical and sociological education. Hence his political provincialism and social retrogressiveness. His career was too meteoric: the village of Mymrino, Orel pedagogical institute, a rural teacher, teacher at an institute, secretary of the rayon komsomol committee, then the city and oblast committee, then section chief at the oblast party committee. His efforts were noted — in 1983 he was transferred to the CPSU Central Committee Ideological Department as an instructor. It is quite possible that he would have stayed in that post until he retired, if Gorbachev had not started perestroyka. When Gorbachev was asked about Zyuganov recently, he said that the first time he heard his name was after the appearance of 'A Word to the People.' It's an ill wind that blows nobody any good, as the saying goes."

But it depends on the viewpoint from which you look at the matter and at Zyuganov's actual strategy. From the viewpoint of a communist, or a social democrat, or of civilized forms of life in general, what Zyuganov talks about cannot but be surprising. In effect, it is an apology for Stalinism, expatiations with dangerous historical analogies on the "Russian people's national liberation struggle" and on the "Russian idea" (the nature of which nobody has yet managed to reveal, unless you count the meaningless phrases), slippery remarks about "patriotic" and "cosmopolitan" currents in Bolshevism, and so forth. Is this a platform for a presidential candidate from the Communists?

But, on the other hand, could Zyuganov now have rallied to his flag nationalists of the Prokhanov type, people like Sergey Baburin, the "hurricane of great-power supporters," monarchists, and people of frankly right-wing radical hue, if he had adopted, so to speak, tried and tested Marxist-Leninist positions?! In the face of the presidential elections, Zyuganov has in effect revived, in an updated form, the alliance that used to be called the "left-wing/right-wing opposition." There is now, in effect, no really noteworthy autonomous force remaining on the radical nationalist flank. As for Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia], it has always stood in isolation.

At the same time, among his own supporters Zyuganov can always cite the need for flexible tactical methods for the sake of such a crucial objective as winning power, and can also cite Lenin as an example. Varennikov's words to the effect that Zyuganov is not a social democrat and not an opportunist but a flexible tactician and that there is a 100-percent communist program which is being kept secret for the time being, are clearly intended for a broader public. The majority of CPRF supporters will most likely continue to support the Communists through inertia, without taking much notice of what they say, still less what they write.

So our Gennadiy Andreyevich is not as simple as he may look. And clearly what matters is not to give accurate definitions of the positions he holds. It is far more important to work out beforehand what might happen in the country and in its relations with the rest of the world if Zyuganov became president.

Russia: Potential Electoral Falsification Viewed

964F1778A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 15 Mar 96 p 5

[Article by Mikhail Shneyder of the For Fair Elections movement: "Are There Guarantees of Fair Elections?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Talk about vote-rigging occurs in the newspapers with enviable regularity. But both the power structures—those that adopt the laws and issue directives—and democratic organizations, which, in fact, are required, excuse the tautology, to organize the requisite supervision, on each occasion doggedly step on the same rake, naively believing up to the elections that this time the situation is fully controlled, and are subsequently astonished at the reports from the polling stations.

Yet the contemporary Russian history of election campaigns and referendums testifies otherwise. Everyone who has taken part in them could cite dozens of examples of the most flagrant violations—from campaigning on election day through the local administration's interference in the vote-counting procedure. In the absolute majority of cases these violations have gone unpunished.

Is it possible to objectively assess the scale of potential fraud? Yes, if we have so-called exit-poll data.

This goes something like this. On polling day you are approached near the polling station by a person who, introducing himself as an employee of an independent service for the study of public opinion, asks: "For which party (candidate) have you just voted?" Your answer (or refusal to answer) is recorded. That, generally, is all. This method is employed extensively in world practice since it makes it possible long before the announcement of the official results to obtain a rough idea of the results this party or the other may expect. Thanks to the commission of a number of international organizations, it was conducted with us for the first time in 1993.

On 17 December of last year an exit poll in 15 regions of the Russian Federation was organized by the For Fair Elections movement. It was conducted in the daytime at urban polling stations over approximately two hours. The list of cities where it was conducted: Makhachkala, Cherkessk, Vladikavkaz, Stavropol, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy, Vladivostok, Smolensk, Gatchina, Yaroslavl, Vladimir, Vologda, Syktyvkar, Perm, Kurgan, and Tyumen, gives an idea of the geography of the poll.

It is incredibly interesting to compare the poll data with the final figures. Russia's Democratic Choice was the unluckiest. It turns out that, contrary to all the laws of statistics, the vote for it in 13 of the 15 cities was several times worse than expected from the poll (by factors of 10 and 12 in Vladivostok and Cherkessk!). The hitherto dispassionate science took a dislike also to Yabloko, the Congress of Russian Communities, and Our Home. They were out of luck in eight, seven, and three cities respectively. Are there, you will ask, parties in the face of which the statistics did not stand up? Of course. And I am sure that you know their names. These are the parties of Zhirinovskiy and Zyuganov. In 10 out of the 15 cities there were 1.5-3 times more votes for the LDPR than had been produced by the poll. The same was the case with the CPRF in four cities.

Everything was as it should have been, as was to have been expected, only with Women of Russia.

I am far from thinking about the existence in Russia or outside of some secret center issuing instructions as to where and how many votes should be rigged and in whose favor. Could the results of the ballot have been falsified at the "local" level, so to speak? Yes. And quite easily, since that same Russia's Democratic Choice and Yabloko (as distinct from the Communists and the Zhirinovskiyites) were unable to organize proper supervision at the polling stations. The author of a recent article in IZVESTIYA distinguished four types of fraud. I cannot help citing a further couple of ways with which I became familiar as an observer at the 1989 elections. Both are simple in execution, but tracking them is quite difficult. The first way: A bundle of ballots completed in advance is tossed into the ballot box. The second: A member of the precinct commission who wants to "help" his candidate places in one and the same pile during the counting of the vote ballots for him and for his competitors. I do not believe that the performers of these stunts have lost their skills in the several years since then.

Can it be claimed that at the Duma elections on 17 December 1995 such vote-rigging assumed general proportions? As one with some connection with the exact sciences, I declare that it cannot. More telling evidence is required.

At the same time it is obvious to me that it is the direct duty of public organizations to request of the Central Election Commission that it undertake a sample recount of the vote at polling stations of the 15 cities in question. If the check confirms doubts about the results of the ballot, there will be grounds for demanding a recount per an all-Russia sample (checking 2-3 percent of precincts is sufficient).

What if, God forbid, the worst fears are confirmed here also? In this case the answer should be given by the Constitutional Court. Let us make clear immediately that the Constitution of the Russian Federation makes no provision for the option of dissolution of the Duma in the event of electoral fraud.

I do not believe that the deputies should be worried particularly. A check would most likely uncover only "individual shortcomings." The Central Election Commission should have its say here. The most effective move, in my view, would be the disbandment of the pertinent election commissions with the simultaneous punishment of the guilty parties in accordance with the law.

At the same time, on the other hand, the reform groups and factions of the Duma should try as soon as possible to once again sponsor consideration of the draft law on public supervision of elections which was buried, incidentally, in the former Duma by the votes of the CPRF, the LDPR, and Women of Russia, and the democratic parties should get together right now and reach agreement on the distribution of precinct observers.

The presidential elections will be held shortly. It is the job of the authorities and society to do everything to ensure that they are fair.

Russia: Poll Shows Zyuganov With Clear Lead in Tver

MK1604081196 Tver POZITSIYA in Russian No. 16, 10-16 Apr 96 p 2

[Report by the Tver Center for the Study of Public Opinion (TverTsIOM): "The Election — Advantage Zyuganov"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The political mood in the city of Tver, measured by the Tver Center for the Study of Public Opinion ("TverTsIOM"), looks as follows for March:

1. G. Zyuganov	31 percent	2. G. Yavlinskiy	15 percent
3. B. Yeltsin	12 percent	4. V. Chernomyrdin	11 percent
5. V. Zhirinovskiy	8 percent	6. Sv. Fedorov	4 percent
7. A. Lebed	3 percent	8. A. Tuleyev	3 percent
9. M. Gorbachev	3 percent	10. Other or no opinion	10 percent

It turns out that, in the event that G. Zyuganov and B. Yeltsin make it to a second round, 51 percent of voters in the city of Tver would today cast their votes for Zyuganov, 36 percent for Yeltsin, and 13 percent would vote against both.

The most uncertain situation would emerge in the event that G. Zyuganov and G. Yavlinskiy make it to a second round. The CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation] leader's majority would not be as assured as against B. Yeltsin. The actual figures are as follows: Zyuganov — 45 percent; Yavlinskiy — 40 percent; against all — 15 percent.

We should note that our data at the moment are also close to the results of other serious (and unbiased) social research in Russia.

Russia: Poll Preferences Noted in Stavropol

LD1504184096 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1730 GMT 15 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] STAVROPOL, April 15 (Interfax) — Of 1,100 people polled in the Stavropol territory in southern Russia, 24 percent said they will vote for Communist candidate Gennadiy Zyuganov in the presidential elections next June. The poll was carried out by a local humanitarian research center.

Zyuganov is followed by incumbent President Boris Yeltsin and Alexander Lebed, with 12 percent each; LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia] leader Vladimir Zhirinovski, 9 percent; Yabloko leader Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, 8 percent; eye-surgeon Svyatoslav Fedorov, 7 percent; and ex-USSR leader Mikhail Gorbachev, 4 percent. Twenty-four percent were undecided.

Over 50 percent of those polled said they firmly intend to vote on election day.

CIS: ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 16 Apr

LD1604055496 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0510 GMT 16 Apr 96

["Press Review" — ITAR-TASS headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW April 16 (Itar-Tass) — Follows a review of Tuesday's Moscow-based Russian newspapers dated April 16.

ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI on the forthcoming G8 summit in Moscow.

In view of the forthcoming meeting of the leaders of G7 countries and Russia in Moscow on April 19 and 20 to discuss nuclear safety issues, the newspaper carries an interview with Viktor Mikhailov, Russian Minister of Nuclear Energy.

"At the present stage of technological progress, nuclear safety enhancement matters cannot be settled within the framework of national programmes alone," the Minister said.

"It is precisely in reference to nuclear safety issues that it is important that archaic, confrontational-in-their-essence stereotypes of rivalry on the world market of nuclear services be discarded and partnership be sought jointly," the Minisiter pointed out.

Russia already takes specific steps to join the Vienna processing of 500 Convention on Responsibility for Nuclear Damage. In addition, the Russian Federation has unilaterllay taken an unprecedented step, announcing the tonnes of high-enriched weapons-grade uranium, which were in excess of national defence purposes, into fuel for nuclear power stations, Mikhailov said.

OBSHCHAYA GAZETA on new details of the murder of correspondent Nadezhda Chaikova in Chechnya.

A staff member of the Military Prosecutor's Office, who has just returned form Chechnya has told the Argumenty I Fakty-Novosti news agency about details of the murder.

Investigators look into several leads concerning the murder. Forensic medical examination has revealed that Chaikova was killed on the night from March 20 to 30 by a shot from a Makarov pistol in the back of her head. Numerous hematomas caused by heavy beating can be seen on the 33-year-old woman's body.

Chaikova's body was found on the outskirts of Gekhi village. Since no combat operations were conducted in the area at the end of March and there were no Federal troops in the vicinity while the correspndent was on good terms with authorittative field commanders, a supposition came to the fore that Chaikova was killed by teenagers. Lately adults increasingly often draw 14-16 year-old boys into their affairs. Special paramilitary groups of young militants devoted to Dzhokhar Dudayev are being formed in some villages, in Goiskoye, for example.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on the first phase of withdrawal of Federal units from Chechnya.

The first phase of the withdrawal of Federal troops in Chechnya began in April 15. Meanwhile, over the past 24 hours, Russian Defence Ministry units remained on their position in base areas. No combat operations were conducted. Bandit groups continued to fire on the positions of Federal troops in the areas of Stary Achkhoi, Goiskoye, Orekhovo, and Tsa-Vedeno. On Sunday afternoon, several small groups of militants opened fire from small arms on units deployed to the east of Batut. The troops returned the fire and scattered the militant groups who retreated into the mountains.

IZVESTIYA on a state of finances from the viewpoint of economic security.

At a request of Russia's Security Council, the Finance Academy to the Russian government has prepared a study analysing the state of finances from the viewpoint of economic security. One of the conclusion drawn by one of the analysts is that the existing level of the deficit of capital necessary for getting out of the crisis is of danger to Russia.

"According to the estimates of the Ministry of Economics, approximately 150,000 million U.S. dollars were needed at the end of 1995 for a steady economic upsurge to began, whereas only about one-third of the amount is available at best," the study pounts out.

IZVESTIYA on the resignation of the President of the Norilsky Nikel joint-stock company.

Viktor Chernomyrdin has accepted the resignation of O. Filatov, President of the Russian Norilsky Nikel joint-stock company. In a letter sent to the Russian government, prior to resignation, Filatov suggested that either the State reassert its control over the Norilsk company and leave the company's Board of Directors intact or accept its resignation and form a new Board of Directors, taking into account the wishes of ONEKSIM Bank, holder of the pledge of the controlling interest. The government chose the latter option. Filatov is to be superseded by V. Generalov, First Deputy Chairman of the Russian Committee for Metallurgy.

CIS: Chernomyrdin Opens CIS Government Heads Forum

MM1504134596 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 13 Apr 96 p 5

[Report by Aleksandr Shinkin: "Commonwealth Strengthening"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A session of the CIS heads of Government Council was held in Moscow yesterday. There were around 30 points on the agenda of vital importance for the Commonwealth's economy and security.

Speaking at the opening of the session, Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin said: "I would consider it expedient in 1996 for long-term forecasts for the development of trade and economic relations between the CIS countries to be drawn up and agreed. With a view to drawing up on that basis joint comprehensive targeted programs for trade and economic cooperation between Commonwealth participants. They could include business plans for major financial-industrial groups and joint ventures. The prerequisites could thus be created for ensuring that the process of the regulated expansion of trade and economic relations between all our states is begun on a fundamentally new basis."

According to predictions by our specialists, Viktor Chernomyrdin noted, total trade turnover in 1996 compared with last year between Russia and the CIS states will increase by approximately 6 percent, and by more than 15 percent in 1997. This will make it possible to ensure a worthy and appropriate place for the Commonwealth countries in Russia's trade turnover.

CIS: Recent Treaties' Impact on CIS Viewed

MM1504150296 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Apr 96 p 2

[Article by Boris Vinogradov: "'Russian Doll Effect' in the CIS Is No Barrier to Integration"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The conference of CIS prime ministers held in Moscow 12 April has been described as "special." Its uniqueness is underlined by the fact that it was the first meeting of the heads of government since the recent creation of new formations within the Commonwealth — the "Union of the Four" and the "Community of the Two" — by which is meant the signing of the treaty among Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan 31 March and the treaty between Russia and Belarus 2 April. The question of what has changed in relations among the partners since has concerned journalists more than the actual agenda. True, there was the reminder here that a "triple union" also existed in the shape of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, which was concluded last year, but efforts had been made to avoid noticing it.

Fortuitously or not, the black limousines carrying the prime ministers also drew up to the main entrance of the President Hotel not on their own but in a kind of special order — in pairs or threes. The symbolism of the present moment came to the fore: Gentle integration based on group interests is under way within the integrated area of the CIS. Individual clubs and branches are emerging within the single 12-strong team of states.

The certain vagueness caused by these latest innovations within the CIS was articulated in the off-the-cuff remarks of certain delegation members whom I talked to in the lobbies.

"It is difficult to say what the result of this will be," one of the participants told me. "It is impossible to know who is ahead of whom. It is odd."

Others spoke of a "Russian doll effect," having discovered that the new structure of the CIS was akin to the old Russian toy — the more surprises it holds, the more intricate the work involved. Others compared the Commonwealth to a growing organism whose cells multiply by division: Single-cell organisms do not survive. Yet others saw the influence of election preoccupations in Russia in all this. One member of the Ukrainian delegation summed up what was happening in terms of the proverb about dumplings, the idea being that everyone is the architect of his own fate. However, everything fell into its proper place once the participants took their seats in alphabetical order.

In his opening remarks, Viktor Chernomyrdin described the treaties of "the four" and the "two" as events of historic importance and as a serious step toward deepening the integration of the peoples. He stressed that these documents "fit organically" into the overall concept of building an economic union. This specifically involves the creation of a "common market" in the CIS and entry into the realm of "the four degrees of freedom" — the freedom of movement of people, goods, services, and capital.

Strictly speaking, the Russian premier remarked, the two treaties have enshrined the CIS countries' different degrees of readiness for and political will in favor of consolidation and accelerated integration as opposed to a desire for isolation and opposition.

The CIS will soon celebrate its fifth anniversary. The results of the first five years are not particularly gratifying. Exports within the Commonwealth amounted to only 25 percent in 1995, compared with 31 percent in 1994, The import of goods from other countries of the world is growing faster than trade within the CIS. It is clear, our prime minister pointed out, that we all need hard currency, but if we declare priorities in our reciprocal trade, they must be observed.

Everyone agreed to observe the priorities by confirming the forward-looking draft plan for integrated development for 1996-1997. It is planned to increase commodity turnover by 21 percent during that period. The customs union is the CIS' pride and joy and its greatest success. For the time being its members are the same five states that signed the recent treaties. But it is expected that Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and possibly Turkmenistan and Georgia will soon join.

There are far more problems with other unions — the payments and currency unions. The majority of experts agree that such unions are inconceivable in the absence of mutual payments. In Russia alone it is estimated that only 50 percent of payment transactions are actually effected. Moreover, not a single CIS parliament has yet ratified the payments union agreement, which was signed over two years ago.

Among other things, the prime ministers approved measures on coordinated policy in the transit of oil and gas along main pipelines and the rail transport support program. They also agreed to cooperate in the fight against economic crime by exercising joint monitoring in the banking, credit, and financial systems.

As far as the military sphere is concerned, here the participants in the session manifested the maximum unanimity. First and foremost, they agreed to pool their efforts to restore the common air defense system and to collaborate in the matter of jointly safeguarding CIS borders and clearing up crisis situations on the external borders if such arise.

The agreed documents on these and other questions will be submitted for examination and signature by the CIS heads of states, who will be assembling in Moscow in a month's time.

Baltics: Baltic Assembly Continues, Lithuanian Officials Comment

WS1504131396 Tallinn BNS in English 1300 GMT 15 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vilnius, Apr 15, BNS — European security and stability and the Baltics' integration into the European Union were the themes receiving most attention at the joint session of the Baltic Assembly and the Nordic Council in Vilnius on Monday.

Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas noted that the Nordic Council was a model of cooperation which should be copied by the Baltic governments. "Only coordinated policy will help overcome the difficulties of integration into the EU and NATO," the Lithuanian president said.

Brazauskas once again repeated Lithuania's stance that all candidates for EU membership should be offered equal conditions at the start of negotiations. It would then be each individual country's concern how soon the negotiations can be concluded, he said.

Lithuanian parliamentary Vice Speaker Egidijus Bickauskas said that the political situation had changed since the treaty between the Baltic Assembly and the Nordic Council was signed in 1992. He said the treaty should therefore be renewed.

He suggested that more attention be devoted to the creation of new forms of regional security, closer analysis of European integration processes, adjustment of legislation of the Baltic countries and expansion of economic ties between them.

The chairman of the Nordic Council, Danish MP Knud Enggaard, said parliamentarians of the Nordic countries would do everything to help the Baltics' EU aspiration successfully reach its goal. According to Enggaard, the Nordic Council is prepared to review its treaty with the Baltic Assembly.

Ole Norrback, chairman of the Nordic Council of Ministers, said Nordic countries would support the Baltics in seeking membership in the European Union. At the same time he directed attention to the possibility that when membership negotiations begin, one country or another could remain behind if it fails to meets the requirements set by the EU.

On Tuesday it is planned to adopt a joint statement outlining prospects for cooperation between the Baltic and the Nordic countries in the region and in the European context.

Baltics: Temporary Pact Reached on Estonian-Latvian Fishing Dispute

WS1504131296 Tallinn BNS in English 1011 GMT 15 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tallinn, Apr 15, BNS — The prime ministers of Estonia and Latvia have reached an agreement to allow Latvian fishers to catch fish until Aug. 1 in the disputed waters Estonia regards as its own.

According to the terms of the agreement, both countries will have access to the waters near the island of Ruhnu in the Gulf of Riga and have agreed not to hinder each other's fishing boats.

"We decided to establish from today until August 1 a special regulation for fishing in (the disputed) area, the coordinates of which were agreed," a statement by Estonian Prime Minister Tiit Vahi and Latvian Prime Minister Andris Skele said.

The statement was released in Vilnius where Baltic statesmen were meeting at the Baltic Assembly on Sunday.

The agreement also says the two countries must have completed their talks on the sea border and fixed the borderline by the Aug. 1 deadline, a government spokesperson in Tallinn told BNS.

"The 12-mile territorial waters zone will be naturally under our control and only fishing boats from Latvia will be allowed to enter it until August 1," the spokesperson said.

The prime ministers set down their stance on the point the talks between the two countries were in and agreed on the procedures for resolving the remaining differences.

"It seems that the old disputes have ended and we have reached an agreement on the principles of the sea borders and fishing rights in the Gulf of Riga for this year and the next," Vahi said in his comments to BNS later.

"Latvia accepted in principle the Estonian proposals regarding the sea border; our compromise was in conceding the fish reserves in return for a sound border," the government spokesperson in Tallinn said. "Estonia certainly has to be content with this solution."

The spokesperson said Estonia and Latvia would conclude a separate agreement on fishing in the future.

The countries have been arguing for several years over where to mark their sea border in the Gulf of Riga in a dispute over access to rich fishing grounds.

The potential for conflict emerged recently when Latvia declared it would protect its fishing vessels up to a line on the map that Estonia said was partly in its territorial waters.

Russia: Russia Said Playing Up Nuclear Summit's Significance

MK1304072596 Moscow THE MOSCOW TIMES in English 13 Apr 96 pp 1-2

[Report by Patrick Henry: "U.S. Expects Little Result At Summit In Moscow"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] U.S. officials poured cold water on expectations for any big breakthroughs at next week's summit on nuclear safety, which will bring the heads of the Group of Seven leading industrialized nations and President Boris Yeltsin together in Moscow.

"In my sense, there are no problems that will be solved at the summit," Joseph Pilat, a U.S. negotiator and scientist from the Los Alamos Laboratory, said at a news conference Friday [12 April].

"I expect no major treaties or initiatives to arise from the summit to be held here in Moscow," he said in remarks reported by the Federal News Service.

But Pilat said a "strong political endorsement for the need to solve these problems" was likely to emerge from the summit, which will include leaders of Canada, Britain, France, Italy, Germany and Japan as well as Russia and the United States.

The Yeltsin administration, facing a tough presidential election challenge in June from the Communists, is doing its best to play up the summit's significance. Routinely referring to it as a meeting of the /vos'myorka/ [word within slantlines printed in italics] — or G-8 — officials clearly see it as a chance for Yeltsin to perform on the world stage in Moscow.

Yeltsin has been invited to the last four G-7 summits as an informal participant in political discussion but not on the economic side. He has increasingly pushed for full membership in the elite club. The U.S. Embassy is referring to the meeting as the "P-8 Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security," with the "P" standing for political.

"The future of nuclear power depends to a great extent on this summit," said Yeltsin's top adviser on international affairs, Dmitriy Ryurikov, in an interview published Friday in the daily NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA.

"Decisions will be made on problems of nuclear power that concern the participants of the G-8 and the whole world," Ryurikov said.

Apart from the summit, Yeltsin will hold one-on-one meetings with each of the leaders, including a special "working visit" with U.S. President Bill Clinton on April 21, Ryurikov said. Both Yeltsin and Clinton are running for re-election this year, and Ryurikov said the visit would benefit their election chances.

Michael Newlin, an ambassador who is currently an adviser to the U.S. energy secretary, said Friday that a series of issues related to nuclear safety would be discussed at the summit, including nuclear-waste management, reform of the energy sector and conversion of nuclear-weapons material. "All of these topics are important," he said. "In my own view, I think the smuggling and nuclear-materials accountability topics are the most important."

A deal has been signed under which the United States would buy about 500 tons of highly enriched uranium from Russia, removing it from the threat of diversion. But Pilat said negotiations on final details had not yet produced an agreement.

The eight leaders could turn their attention to international agreements on nuclear weapons, including SALT-II and the comprehensive test ban treaty, as well as the expansion of NATO.

Top Russian officials, including Yeltsin, have repeatedly said that a compromise remains possible on NATO's plan to admit countries from the former Warsaw Pact as long as the alliance did not move its military infrastructure toward Russia's borders.

But Ryurikov bluntly dismissed this. "It is true, Russia very firmly and decisively opposes the expansion of NATO," he said, adding that Russia was particularly insistent there be "no case in which the military machine of NATO moved toward Russia's borders, no movement of troops, infrastructure or nuclear weapons."

Pilat said the summit could "create a climate and a framework for addressing these difficult issues. All the signs now suggest that it will be a successful summit in this sense."

Russia: Yeltsin, Chirac Discuss Upcoming G-8 Nuclear Summit

LD1504120096 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1142 GMT 15 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 15 (Itar-Tass) — President Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Federation and President Jacques Chirac of France had a telephone conversation on Monday, the Presidential Press Service has announced here.

The two presidents, who will co-chair the Moscow G8 summit on nuclear security issues, discussed practical matters connected with the holding of the forthcoming summit. They also touched upon some aspects of bilateral relations in the light of a planned meeting of the two presidents in Moscow, the Press Service announcement said.

Russia: Yeltsin Receives UNESCO Chief in Moscow

LD1504144796 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1411 GMT 15 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 15 Apr (ITAR-TASS) — Federico Mayor, the UN director-general for education, science and culture (UNESCO), who took part in the festivities marking the 100th birthday of Nobel prize winner, Academician Nikolay Semenov, paid a working visit to Moscow yesterday and today.

According to the president's press service, during the visit he was received by Russian President Boris Yeltsin. They discussed improving the cooperation between Russia and UNESCO. Boris Yeltsin thanked Mayor for UNESCO's participation in the restoration of the Bolshoy Theater, the Hermitage museum, and for assistance in the preservation of Russia's natural and cultural heritage.

The two sides also discussed the holding of a third peace conference in 1999, which Boris Yeltsin proposed.

For his part, on behalf of UNESCO and the world's intellectual community, Federico Mayor expressed his support for the democratic reforms which are being implemented by Russia's current leadership.

Russia: Issues at Nuclear Summit in Moscow Previewed

LD1504210496 Moscow NTV in Russian 1800 GMT 15 Apr 96

[From the "Segodnya" program]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] When the president comes back to Moscow, he will receive guests himself, the heads of the seven leading countries of the West.

The G-8 meeting at the end of this week in the Russian capital will decide nuclear security questions. Problems of nuclear terrorism and the use of radioactive waste is in the foreground today. Our own correspondent Petr Orlov reports from Washington.

[Orlov] Economically, Russia is not able to join the group of highly industrialized states of the world. [passage omitted]

Yeltsin has now invited the members of the G-7 to Moscow and they are coming.

Nuclear safety will be discussed in Moscow, and what will be discussed for the first time at such a high level is not how many people can be killed by missiles and bombs, but how one can avoid a quiet death from radioactive waste, an explosion at a nuclear power station, or a terrorist act in which just one atomic bomb is used.

Over the past few weeks, the United States has finally determined who presents the greatest threat to U.S. national security after the end of confrontation with Moscow. From what members of the Clinton Administration's Cabinet say, that is a terrorist organization, either from the Near East or one like the Japanese sect Aum Sinriko, which has obtained a small amount of plutonium or uranium and built its own bomb, either with the help of publications or instructions on the Internet. [passage omitted: an expert thinks one of the 90 sites where nuclear components are stored on the territory of Russia may be a source of such material; she thinks serious leakage of such material cannot be ruled out; the United States is ready to provide technology to Russia to improve security at nuclear plants; Senator Sam Nunn thinks there is still too much bureaucracy in the way of such assistance]

Europe is much more worried by proposals about the operation of reactors like the Chernobyl one. That is a very sensitive topic for Moscow because the operation of Soviet reactors abroad is a source of survival for the Russian nuclear industry and science.

However, on the eve of the meeting, contradictions are not in the foreground although they do exist — both inside the G-7 itself, between Moscow and the G-7, and between G-8 and other countries, for instance — it seems the treaty on the complete and universal ban on nuclear tests is entangled in quarrels.

Nevertheless, the initiative of Moscow, which it took in its own hands this time, is exceptionally important because nuclear security still remains in the realm of particular secrecy.

Whether such a meeting is the last will be decided in June.

Russia: Yeltsin To Stop in Almaty on Return From China

LD1504135996 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1345 GMT 15 Apr 96

[By Vladimir Akimov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] ALMATY, April 15 (Itar-Tass) — Prospects for deepening and widening integration will be in the focus of talks between the Presidents of Kazakhstan and Russia when they meet in Almaty on April 27.

Russian President Boris Yeltsin is scheduled to make a stop-over in the capital of Kazakhstan en route home after a visit to China from April 24-26.

Informed sources in the staff of the President of Kazakhstan told Itar-Tass that Nursultan Nazarbayev and Boris Yeltsin "will not transcend the framework of the agreement reached in Moscow at the end of March by Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia."

In this context, the same sources made clear that no sensational surprises should be awaited from the coming meeting of the two presidents.

Russia: Russia Loses Nothing in PRC Border Demarcation

LD1504165196 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1514 GMT 15 Apr 96

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 15 (Interfax) - From the strategic point of view Russia will lose nothing as a result of the Russian-Chinese border's demarcation, Deputy Director of the Russian Federal Border Guard Service, Lt. Gen. Aleksandr Manilov said at a news conference in Moscow last weekend.

Under the existing agreements, China will receive five islands in the Amur river (Yevrasikha, Lugovskoy, Nizhnepetrovsky, Popov and Savelyev) with a total area of 47 square kilometers. Three islands in the Amur river and a number of islands in other rivers on the border with a total area of 114.33 square kilometers will go to Russia, Manilov said.

The ownership of the islands of Bolshoy Ussuriyisky, Tarabarov (in the vicinity of the Russian town of Khabarovsk) and Bolshoy (in the Argun river) remains unsettled, Manilov said. "The future of the 175 square kilometer island of Menkeseliy in the Argun river is now being decided," he said.

There are no disputed land territories on the Russian-Chinese border, Manilov said. Under the existing agreements, China will receive "insignificant sections" of land which should belong to China in line with the Russian-Chinese agreements dating back to the 19th century but were actually owned by Russia, he said.

The demarcation of the 55 kilometer-long western (land) section of the border is slated for 1997. The present demarcation operation on the Russian-Chinese border will completely resolve the problem from the legal point of view so that there will be no territorial claims in this section of the Russian borders in the future, Manilov said.

Russia: Moscow Seeks Comprehensive Settlement of DMZ Situation

LD1504114596 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1122 GMT 15 Apr 96

[By Andrey Kirillov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 15 (Itar-Tass) — Russia foresaw the current aggravation of relations between North and South Korea over the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ), for one should not approach normalising the situation on the Korean peninsula on a bilateral basis but must tackle the problem comprehensively with the participation of all the sides concerned, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Panov told Itar-Tass on Monday.

"Divergences of opinion, which manifested themselves at the Russian-North Korean consultations in Pyongyang on April 10-12, are not so much in an estimate of the situation that has developed on the peninsula as in approaches to settling it," Panov pointed out in comment on the results of talks held in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) within the framework of the official visit of a Russian delegation led by Vice-Premier Vitaliy Ignatenko.

The diplomat emphasised that to normalise the situation on the Korean peninsula is a complicated and intricate problem and that it is impossible to settle nuclear security issues separately from the maintenance of truce.

"The nuclear problem was settled through bilateral contacts between the DPRK and the United States, but then the DMZ issue arose immediately," Panov recalled.

"We foresaw that, stating the need to tackle issues in their aggregate and inviting all the sides concerned to participate in the effort. Even a temporary solution, which may be achieved between the United States and the DPRK on DMZ, would not settle the problem and a crisis would re-emerge in one year's time. The way to settle the situation by bringing it to a head is counterproductive," the Deputy Minister said.

The Russian diplomat called for the convocation of an international conference with the participation of all the sides concerned — the two Korean states, the U.S., Japan, Russia, China, the United Nations, and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

"Our position in this respect has not been taken in so far," the Deputy Minister lamented. "North Korea believes that, once it has managed to settle the nuclear problem through one-on-one negotiations with the U.S., other problems can be settled likewise," Panov said, pointing out that such an approach may lead to an exacerbation of the situation, "a way out of which will be hard to find".

The North Korean side, Panov said, has declared in favour of Russia's participation in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO), in which South Korea, the U.S., and Japan play the main roles.

Moscow awaits the arrival of KEDO's Executive Secretary who is expected to discuss specific matters concerning Russia's participation in that organisation.

Russia: U.S. Admiral Boorda Visits Northern, Baltic Fleets

MK1604090096 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 16 Mar 96 p 2

[Report by Yuriy Golotyuk: "Russia's Navy Commander in Chief Meets With His American Counterpart"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday, Admiral Jeremy Boorda, chief of staff of the U.S. Navy, in Russia for an official visit, went to the Northern Fleet headquarters in Murmansk. Your SEGODNYA correspondent was told at the Russian Federation Navy press center that Mr. Boorda met with the Northern Fleet commander, Admiral Oleg Yerofeyev, went aboard the Russian heavy nuclear-propelled guided-missile cruiser Admiral Nakhimov and the aircraft-carrying cruiser Admiral Kuznetsov, and visited the compounds of seamen's units of the polar region.

The chief of American naval forces arrived in Russia on 13 April at the invitation of Admiral Feliks Gromov, commander in chief of the Russian Federation Navy. His is a fact-finding trip: according to information from military sources, no signing of any documents was planned. Over the past weekend, the American visitor held a working meeting with Admiral Yegorov, commander of the Baltic Fleet, and visited the Naval Academy and the Higher Naval School in St. Petersburg. The visit of the chief of staff of the U.S. Navy is not accompanied by American combat ships' calling at Russian ports: Mr. Boorda arrived in Russia on board a special Navy plane.

Today, Mr. Boorda is coming to Moscow, where he will meet with Mr. Gromov. The contents of the talks have not been revealed thus far. However, experts recall in this connection that Jeremy Boorda, who has held the position of chief of staff of the U.S. Navy since March 1994, is known in the United States as one of the "military commander-reformers." At the present time, U.S. naval forces are forming a Fifth Fleet, reorganizing the Atlantic Fleet, and creating a special naval "Group for the Western Hemisphere."

At the Main Staff of the Russian Federation Navy they found it hard to say whether there will soon follow a return visit to the United States by Admiral Gromov, saying "this is for us at the present time not so much a political as a financial question."

Russia: Details of RD-180 Rocket Engine Deal With United States

MM1504104396 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 12 Apr 96 p 1

[Report by Yelena Ishkova: "The World's Best Rocket Engines Are Made in Moscow"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday, on the eve of Space Exploration Day, the Russian Federation president visited the "Energomash" Science and Production Association in the city of Khimki, where he met with the leaders of defense industry enterprises.

This enterprise is well known because it recently brilliantly demonstrated that our space industry is the "planet leader." For the first time ever U.S. rockets will fly into space with Russian engines, the RD-180 engines produced by this science and production association.

The story is as follows: In 1955 Lockheed Martin Astronautics announced a competition with the aim of choosing a suitable engine for its new Atlas rocket launcher. Such competitions are held once every 20-25 years. Foreign scientists, including Russian scientists, particularly those from the "Energomash" Science and Production Association located on the outskirts of Moscow, were involved in such a design tender for the first time ever.

This science and production association's engines have taken Soviet rockets into space since 1957. It was thanks to them that the first sputnik was put into orbit and Yuriy Gagarin accomplished his exploit. The Soyuzes, Protons, Energiyas, and Zenits and all the manned stations owed their entry into near-Earth space to "Energomash" motors. It is responsible for 100 percent of the engines for the first stages of rocket launchers produced by the country and 70 percent of the engines for the second stages, including the most powerful in the world — the RD-170.

However, the Atlas requires a less powerful engine, with a thrust of around 400 tonnes. The "Energomash" specialists proposed the RD-180 engine conceived by them as suitable for this rocket in terms of its parameters and characteristics.

Together with its partner, Pratt and Whitney, the designers formulated proposals to manufacture RD-180 engines and submitted them to tender. The chances of winning were high from the very outset. The RD-180 is the latest engine, and the prospects for its utilization stretch far into the 21st Century. And indeed Lockheed Martin did announce that the tender had been won by the team of Russian designers at Khimki. Feliks Chelkis has been appointed chief designer of the project. And the whole collective of the association will take part in its implementation. It is planned to start production of the RD-180 in July 1996. And the first test of the base of the engine is planned for as early as November.

"Today we can gain access to the outside market only with the latest, unique developments," Yevgeniy Shlenov, deputy chief of the "Energomash" Science and Production Association Information Department, said, commenting on this event. "And our RD-180 has proven just such a competitive product. We will sell the engines to the Americans, but the technology will remain Russian property. Our designers will be devising a lot of new things while the engines are being developed, so the Americans are unlikely to be able to catch up with us. There can be no question of our selling off our country's intellectual property here. The RD-180 will be working not just for the Americans, it will also be used in Russia's space programs such as the Angara Program. Thanks to the advantageous contract with the Americans, our science and production association will obtain a good financial boost, and this is very important today as the size of the state order shrinks."

Russia: Liberia: U.S. Craft Evacuate Russians to Freetown

MM1504162096 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Apr 96 p 3

[Report by Vladimir Mikheyev and Gennadiy Charodeyev: "Novgorod Pilots Rescued by U.S. Assault Troops, But Dozens of Russians Remain in Danger in Liberia"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Despite the constant mass disturbances in the capital of Liberia, accompanied by rocket and mortar fire and pillage, U.S. assault troops are continuing to evacuate foreign citizens who have sought refuge in the grounds of the U.S. Embassy. To the hundreds of those already saved, we can now, in all probability, add nine Russian pilots from Novgorod.

According to information which IZVESTIYA has obtained from the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia (the telephone line is in working order), the Novgorod pilots rescued by U.S. Air Force helicopters, have been transported to the outskirts of Freetown — the capital of neighboring Sierra Leone. According to witnesses, the Yaks [type of aircraft] (which they had flown in West Africa) were shot up by "hooligan elements" using grenade launchers at point-blank range.

By a U.S. presidential directive, around 300 people in all, including citizens of the United States, Britain, Canada, Egypt, Australia, France, Guinea, and Greece, have already been evacuated from Liberia.

Russian citizens, whose exact number is as yet unknown to the Russian Foreign Ministry, also still remain behind the high walls of the embassy or in the UN mission building. Only the crews of Russian airliners working in Liberia under UN mandate (see IZVESTIYA No. 68) are managing to keep in contact with Moscow by roundabout routes, including via the United States. The latest report from them makes clear that all 19 of them are alive and well. "Problems with drinking water and food have arisen," IZVESTIYA has been informed form Monrovia.

Our air crews have not abandoned attempts to break through the city at war to the airport, where their aircraft and three helicopters should be waiting. If they do manage to get the aircraft into the air, UN representatives have already made the decision to relocate these craft to nearby military bases or in neighboring countries. [passage omitted]

Russia: Duma Statement Welcomes Russian-Belarusian Treaty

MM1604085896 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 16 Apr 96 p 6

["State Duma Statement in Connection With the Signing of the Treaty Between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus on the Formation of the Community," dated Moscow, 5 April 1996 and adopted by State Duma Decree 219-II — from the 'Documents' section]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Russian Federation Federal Assembly State Duma welcomes the signing of the Treaty Between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus on the Formation of the Community by the president of the Russian Federation and the president of the Republic of Belarus in the city of Moscow 2 April 1996. The signed treaty is based on the historically evolved community of the destinies of the peoples of Russia and Belarus, is underpinned by their will for further rapprochement, and is regarded as substantial progress along the path of the CIS member states' integration and as clear evidence of our peoples' desire to restore mutual relations on a new state basis.

State Duma deputies note with satisfaction that the treaty between Russia and Belarus is the logical continuation and development of the integration initiatives of the Russian and Belarusian peoples, of the presidents and parliaments, and of sociopolitical parties and movements.

The State Duma voices confidence that the implementation of the provisions of the said treaty by the organs of state power of Russia and Belarus will justify our peoples' aspirations for speedy and effective rapprochement in all spheres of economic, social, political, and cultural life and will serve the formation of a Russian-Belarusian union.

The State Duma appeals to the presidents, parliaments, and governments of all CIS member states to support the process of Russian-Belarusian rapprochement and to examine the question of subscribing to the Treaty on the Formation of the Community in forms acceptable to them.

[Dated] Moscow, 5 April 1996.

Russia: Black Sea Fleet Starts Six-Month Exercise

MK1604105096 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 16 Apr 96 p 3

[NEGA report: "Ukraine"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the Black Sea Fleet press center, over the weekend Black Sea Fleet ships and vessels continued to leave the Sevastopol base to take part in a six-month exercise with the participation of 50 ships and vessels, air force, and coastal units of the Black Sea Fleet. Admiral Viktor Kravchenko, Black Sea Fleet commander, said that these actions should demonstrate the fleet's combat efficiency and vitality. The ships have long been unable to put to sea for lack of fuel, and therefore priority was given to base training. The training cruise will be used to rehearse elements of attaining various levels of combat readiness; organized and secret deployment of ships in a target area; the repelling of an "enemy" attack from the air, the sea surface, or from under water; and amphibious landing operation and landing force actions ashore in cooperation with aviation and land forces.

According to Rear Admiral Aleksandr Grinko, head of an administration at the Black Sea Fleet headquarters, the situation in Transcaucasia and Chechnya "is worrying the Black Sea Fleet command, and, therefore, the training will include tasks on navigation protection and the fulfillment of peacekeeping missions near the Caucasus seashore."

Russia: Former Azerbaijan Premier Rushed to Moscow Hospital

LD1504184496 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1730 GMT 15 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Apr 15 (Interfax) — Former Azerbaijani President Ayaz Mutalibov who had been detained by Moscow police the other day has been rushed to hospital Monday after he had a heart attack.

Armed guards allow only authorized persons and his family to see him in the hospital.

Meanwhile, Ragim Gaziyev, former Azerbaijani defense minister, is still in police custody in Moscow.

Both men are accused by the Baku government of numerous grave crimes, notably coup attempts in Azerbaijan.

Interfax's sources say that no decision has been made by the Russian authorities about extradition of Mutalibov and Gaziyev to Azerbaijan.

Russia: Moscow 'Regrets' Estonian Refusal To Answer Memorandum

LD1504134696 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1234 GMT 15 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 15 (Interfax) — Russia regrets the Estonian reaction to its memorandum asking for compensation for the losses incurred in Estonia's 1992 currency reforms, deputy director of the second European Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry Aleksandr Udaltsov told Interfax Monday.

Estonian Foreign Minister Siim Kallas told journalists Saturday that Estonia would issue no official response to the April 2 memorandum.

Estonia must return Russia the 2.26 billion rubles (plus inflation) it seized from internal circulation, according to a June 20, 1992, agreement. Estonia, however, sold the rubles through an intermediary in 1993, possibly, according to experts, to Chechnya.

Estonia's position in this matter "shows clearly how much we can rely on them as a partner, including in carrying out responsibilities from already signed bilateral agreements," Udaltsov said.

"Estonia must carry out the terms of the 1992 intergovernmental agreement," he said. "Otherwise, the question begs itself: Why did they sign this agreement if they weren't going to go through with it?"

Political Issues

Russia: Yeltsin, Primakov Discuss Nuclear Summit Preparations

MM1504195496 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 16 Apr 96 p 1

[Unattributed report from the "President" column: "Kremlin Preparing for Summit"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Preparations for the Moscow summit on nuclear safety issues was the subject of yesterday's meeting between President Boris Yeltsin and Russian Federation Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov. In the course of the conversation the Russian head of state also discussed with Yevgeniy Primakov questions relating to the preparation of bilateral meetings with the leaders of the leading world powers, which are expected to be held on the first day of the summit. The summit meeting involving the leaders of the G-8 states will take place in Moscow 19-20 April. Russian-American talks will be held separately 21 April.

Russia: Yeltsin Signs Edict on Agricultural Reform

LD1604104296 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1009 GMT 16 Apr 96

[By Andrey Surzhanskiy, Viktor Zhilyakov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW April 16 (Itar-Tass) — Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed on Tuesday a decree on measures for the stabilisation of the economic situation and development of reform in the agrarian complex. The ceremony of the signing of this important document took place in Novomyshastovskaya village of the Krasnodar territory where the agricultural firm Rossiya is situated. The President said the decree is aimed at supporting rural producers regardless of the form of production, including farmers.

Commenting on the document, Aleksandr Zaveryukha, the Deputy Prime Minister, accompanying the President on his visit to the Krasnodar territory, said that it is planned to implement measures for supplying peasants and farmers with equipment within two years.

The decree makes rural producers exempt from the payment of debt and envisages the allocation of goods credit of 5,100 billion roubles. In addition, the decree proposes the deferment of penalty on debts of rural producers. The decree also envisages the allocation of 800 billion roubles for the purchase of plots of land. Rural producers are offered a rebate in the pay for electricity as of May 1.

Russia: Yeltsin Signs Edict on Law-Making, Relations With Parliament

LD1504180396 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1326 GMT 15 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 15 Apr (Itar-Tass) — By his edict, Russian President Boris Yeltsin has approved the provision on the procedure for interaction between the Russian president and the Russian Federal Assembly's chambers in the process of law-making. The presidential press service's report received by ITAR-TASS today, says that the provision defines the procedure for the head of state's implementing his right to legislative initiative and his participation in the law-making process while adopting federal laws.

The document defines the procedural sequence and the functions of various subsections of the Russian presidential administration, the plenipotentiary presidential representative in the Federal Assembly, the bodies of executive authority a.o. in the process of law-making activity such as preparing draft laws submitted by the president within the framework of legislative initiative, examining draft laws submitted to the president for judgement, and signing.

Russia: Yeltsin Increases Compensation to Poorest Pensioners

LD1504123596 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1221 GMT 15 Apr 96

[By Liliya Kuznetsova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW April 15 (Itar-Tass) — President Boris Yeltsin decreed on Monday to increase compensations to pensioners from May 1 and the total expenses would amount to 1.7 trillion roubles (340 million US dollars [USD]) a month, according to Aleksandr Livshits, the economic aide of the Russian leader.

The compensations for inflation will double for 3.7 million poorest pensioners and will increase from 75,000 to 150,000 roubles a month, Livshits told a press conference adding that the minimal pension will thus comprise 213,250 roubles (over 42 USD).

The compensation would be smaller for those receiving bigger pensions and the most highly-paid pensioners will receive 85,000 roubles of compensation.

Besides, the government was instructed to draft a lawbill to index all pensions by 1.1 times from May 1 and submit it to the State Duma.

"The president has made the first step and helped the poorest, while the State Duma has to help everybody", Livshits commented.

He stressed that "we have the sources" to finance the pension increase, but did not name them.

Livshits admitted that some pensioners, especially those receiving high pensions, may not be satisfied with such a diversified compensation which actually brings them closer to the poorest.

"We can only ask the Russians to remember about mercy and understand how important the addition to the pension is for those people who currently receive a little more than 138 thousand roubles (27 USD)", Livshits said.

Russia: Yeltsin Appoints Governor of Saratov Region

LD1504150296 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1445 GMT 15 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 15 Apr (ITAR-TASS) — Russian President Boris Yeltsin issued an edict appointing Dmitriy Fedorovich Ayatskov as head of the administration of Saratov region on the recommendation of the Russian prime minister.

ITAR-TASS was informed about this by the president's press service.

Russia: Democrats' Attitude to Yeltsin Viewed

MM1504143096 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA ("Home and Homeland" section) in Russian 13 Apr 96 p 1

[Article by Tamara Zamyatina: "Without 'We Approve'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The goal of a second term as president made public by Boris Yeltsin create a real basis for uniting healthy forces: Legal and military reform, peace in Chechnya and civil peace in Russia, and the struggle against poverty on the basis of economic growth. It is not a case of an obsequious "we approve:" The Russian liberal public will not accept this style of dealing with the authorities and will hardly step back from a critical analysis of the policy which is being pursued. I am saying that the role of exacting supporters of the country's incumbent leader for fulfilling the outlined aims can hardly be a humiliating one for anybody.

The most vulnerable spots in Yeltsin's five-year presidency have been the war in Chechnya and the massive violations of civil rights in connection with it. On this Rubicon many public figures have parted with the president. In January this year in connection with the events in Kizlyar and Pervomayskoye and the personnel "purge" in the president's entourage a real threat arose that the democratic forces would go into opposition against Yeltsin.

Now let us look at what has happened in recent months. In February Russia entered the Council of Europe, undertaking to follow all the norms for observing civil rights recognized in the civilized world. On 31 March Yeltsin came out with a peace program for settling the crisis in Chechnya. He thus made a step toward meeting others including his fundamental opponents like Yegor Gaydar, Sergey Kovalev, and Grigoriy Yavlinskiy. Since then remaining in opposition to Yeltsin means reducing the likelihood of positive processes.

Moreover, the fundamental obstinacy of Yeltsin's democratic opponents is pushing him into the clutches of bureaucrats (I do not even mention the indirect aid to the Communists — that is already a commonplace). Thus the departure of the human rights campaigner Sergey Kovalev from the post of leader of the human rights commission rapidly helped apparatchik Andrey Voykov to become first deputy leader of the head of state's main administration for questions of constitutional guarantees for civil rights. He began his activity with encroachments on the powers of the president's commission on questions of granting pardons in an attempt to ensure that it was not the writer and humanist Anatoliy Pristavkin and not the poet Bulat Okudzhava but a bureaucratic apparatus who answered to the Council of Europe regarding Russia's commitments in the human rights sphere. The result of his zeal was not slow in coming: Leni Fischer, chairman of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, expressed anxiety in concern with the fact that, according to her information, "last month in Russia there were 18 executions."

In the past the democrats "surrendered" Mikhail Gorbachev to the bureaucrats. He himself complained to me that he simply had no one on whom to rely under the blows from his own camp. So should we with our heads raised proudly release space for the new voluntarists?

In this connection in an interview with the author of these lines Aleksandr Yakovlev, the "patriarch" of the Russian liberals, advised those who think like him to "leave the search for an abstract ideal of democracy in our sticky soil."

Here Anatoliy Yakovlev particularly noted that after 16 June the Social-Democratic Party he heads will move into opposition to the president in order to seek from him a consistently liberal course: "But we shall take him to task after his victory at the elections, after we have, through our joint efforts, created conditions for continuing reforms in the political, economic, and legal sphere."

Russia: Glazyev Criticizes Yeltsin Address, Reform Plans

964F1781A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 29 Mar 96 p 5

[Article by Sergey Glazyev: "A Russia That Has Been Deceived: Thoughts on the President's Latest Message to the Federal Assembly"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [begin box] Sergey Yuryevich Glazyev was born in 1961 in Zaporozhye. A doctor of economic sciences. From December 1992 through September 1993 he was minister of foreign economic relations of the Russian Federation. In the last State Duma he was head of the Economic Policy Committee. Since December 1994 he has been chairman of the Democratic Party of Russia National Committee. [end box]

As distinct from previous presidential messages, the present one has gone virtually unnoticed by the Russian political and business elite. Because, probably, the previous two went unfulfilled on almost all the main points, and no one bore responsibility for this. Life has developed in entirely different directions, and the priorities expressed by the president had little in common with the actual priorities of the Russian executive which acquired visible embodiment in the federal budget and government decisions.

Reality mocked the political will here, as it were—the main failures have been in precisely the areas that were officially proclaimed priorities. In 1994, despite the assurances of the need to preserve the scientific and industrial potential and ensure macroeconomic stabilization, there was a record decline in industrial potential, the volume of mechanical engineering output and science-intensive industries declined by a factor of almost two, and Black Tuesday devalued all the sacrifices of the IMF's planning of the money supply at an artificially understated level, which were excessive and useless as it was. In 1995, following solemn assurances of the need for an upturn in investment activity and effective social protection, there was for the first time a sharp decline in the two main indicators of national income—real wages and capital investments in production—simultaneously. Even in such seemingly manageable processes as tax reform or budgetary discipline, everything turned out contrary to the promises—instead of tax reform for the purpose of a lessening of the tax burden, there was in reality an increase, and instead of elementary order being brought to bear in the sphere of budget revenue, an astonishing insistence on the continuation of illegally granted privileges was displayed, and the main recipients of natural rent were officially exempted to the extent of almost 50 percent from the charge for the use of deposits of gas, oil, and other mineral resources.

Nonetheless, an analysis of the annual message of the president to the Federal Assembly is necessary if only to understand the extent to which the leadership of the state is informed about the country's real problems and the possibilities of their solution.

The first thing that you involuntarily notice is the amazingly complacent tone of the message. Instead of a dispassionate analysis of the fulfillment of the preceding messages, the year of 1995 is painted as one of great achievements with certain difficulties and shortcomings. And this despite the fact that practically no point of last year's message was fulfilled. Inflation constituted 7 percent a month, which was almost three times the planned value. The decline in production in manufacturing industry (particularly in the branches producing consumer goods and science-intensive industry) remained very high—from 5 to 30 percent in individual branches.

It is interesting that, in accordance with the old Bolshevik tradition, our past history is depicted in grotesque form in order to set off the "achievements" of recent years. Just as previously agitators of the CPSU Central Committee would intimidate the populace with selected horrors from the life of pre-revolution Russia, so the new propagandists inserted in the text of the message fear-inducing topics from the Soviet period of our history, of its last years particularly.

Of course, there were difficulties and problems enough—the country's growing technology lag, the intensifying structural disproportions of the economy, the stagnation of the living standard, and the deterioration in the population's health with the insupportable burden of military spending and wasteful "projects of the century." But it remains a fact also that on the eve of the implementation in Russia of the shock therapy policy the Russian authorities possessed the greatest property in the world and relied on highly developed scientific and industrial potential and huge sources of revenue in the form of natural rent from the world's richest deposits of natural gas, gemstones, and rare metals and also had as an ally a highly educated population inspired by the expectations of creative times. Today we have the world's largest public foreign debt, a domestic debt that has increased a thousandfold, public property that has diminished many times over, privatized sources of natural rent, production potential that has diminished twofold, and scientific potential, fourfold, and an impoverished and dying population.

The possibilities of the state have diminished incomparably, and the situation has objectively become far worse than it was before the start of the radical reforms according to IMF prescriptions. And it is not only a question of losses of available resources here. Current economic conditions are worse: The price structure is making for the unprofitability of a large proportion of the branches of material production; the prohibitive interest rate is making impossible an upturn in investments in production, the level of which is today even so four times below what it was four years ago; the criminalization of economic activity has plunged approximately half of business deals in the economy into the "shadows"; the sharply increased burden of service of the domestic and foreign public debt is a drag on the budget; the disenchantment of the public and the marked decline in the quality of education and health care have devalued the main—human—factor of reform.

Faced with the historic choice which the citizens of Russia are to make in June 1996, the national leadership should, it might have seemed, have given an honest answer to the main questions troubling everyone: What are the reasons for the failures, what are the possibilities of an improvement in the immediate future, where are the sources of our growth, how long will it take for a resolution of the main problems and the restoration of an acceptable living standard?

Instead of answers to these questions, the message offers the latest utopian scheme, which has to be taken on trust. Following the stages of liberalization and stabilization, which are, allegedly, inevitably accompanied by a deterioration in the economic situation, there also inevitably ensues "the third and final stage of the formation of the market economy—the stimulation of production and investments, an increase in efficiency, and the large-scale structural reorganization of the Russian economy." Thus does one sense the customary style of party agitators, who have once again, evidently, been pressed into service: Remember collectivization, industrialization, and chemicalization, which led to the "conclusive victory of developed socialism?"

It is hardly likely that our citizens will believe just like that in a shining future following the inevitable difficulties of the latest transitional period. First, this prophesy is contrary to the obvious facts of day-to-day life and the forecasts of authoritative scientists and research organizations. Second, it sounds less inspiring than the still-remembered promises to build communism or the even fresher promises of a shining future of the times of perestroyka. Third, each time that it is proposed that people accept inevitable "temporary" difficulties in the name of the shining future, they begin from experience to suspect the authorities of deception.

Truly, the liberalization of the economy is designed to release people's entrepreneurial energy from needless state regulation for the purpose of an upturn in overall economic activity. And where the release of this energy has been accompanied by the creation of conditions conducive to the growth of production, there really has been economic upturn. This was the case in Russia following the reforms of Aleksandr II and then Stolypin; this was the case in Germany and Japan after World War II; this was the case in the USSR with the start of the development of the cooperative movement and other forms free enterprise and such is the reality of the past two decades in China or Vietnam, where people's entrepreneurial energy has been skillfully channeled into the creation of new industries, not into a war of all against all for a redivision of property and money.

A stabilization of the economy under normal conditions creates immediate conditions for upturn. Only under our conditions of lack of responsibility and easy superprofits from the seizure of what suddenly became no one's property, the manipulation of tax money, the appropriation of the public's savings, the artificial ratcheting-up of prices, deliberate nonpayments, and other most popular forms of "business" does a decline in inflation simultaneously give rise to a decline in economic activity: The banks lose their super-profits, the nonpayments are not resolved, monopolies accustomed to luxury encounter a sharp narrowing of the market, and so forth. But the authors of the president's message, manifestly attempting to "objectivize" the failures of the economic policy that has been pursued, write: "If the decline in inflation is not being accompanied by an increased decline in production, this means only one thing—the economic crisis is coming to an end." The absurdity of this proposition is clear to anyone familiar with the international experience of successful macroeconomic stabilizations—it is the direct opposite.

The inadequacy of the consequences of stabilization is explained by the fact that the macroeconomic policy pursued with us according to the prescriptions of the IMF was devised not for the specific problems of the reform and structural reorganization of our economy but for the governments of African countries, mired in debt, to control their behavior at least somehow and ensure rational expenditure and the return of the loans they had been granted. This also explains its astonishing primitivism and the reduction of all questions of macroeconomic policy to liberalization and the formal planning of an increase in the money supply based on a trio of exercises from the student's practical course. From the viewpoint of the interests of the IMF what was important was not so much the content of the recommended policy as the techniques of control of their actions realized on its basis. This also explains the choice of planning procedures which are easy to monitor. While setting a strict plan of an increase in the money supply and the liberalization of prices and foreign trade, the IMF simultaneously blocked freedom of action on all other matters of the economic policy of the government, which was now, in fact, under control.

We were no exception to this category of countries favored by IMF credit. Unfortunately, the leadership of our country, lacking sufficient economic knowledge, put its faith in the simple prescriptions of the "Washington consensus," whose native propagandists—yesterday's popularizers of the political economy of socialism—began to implement them actively. In the temptation to build capitalism in a single bound, employing the uncomplicated shock therapy formula (liberalization, privatization, stabilization) they forgot about their own Academy of Sciences, about the national executive of 1,000 years, about commonsense, and about the people, who are having to pay cruelly for the incompetence and hare-brained schemes of leaders and irresponsible overseas advisers.

Perhaps it is not obligatory for the president and the premier to grasp macroeconomics. But schoolchildren even would not have thought up the latest tale about three stages of economic reform with inevitable catastrophe in the first two and have written it into the text of the president's message. Just like the very strange economic policy recommendations, which are manifestly contrary to the goals declared on the part of the president, but, on the other hand, entirely in the spirit of continuation of the "Washington consensus" policy.

This applies, specifically, to the cancellation of export duty on oil and gas, the maintenance of a stable ruble exchange rate, the export of national capital, and the floating of Russian Government securities overseas. The first of these measures will result in the federal budget losing R22 trillion of established revenue (which will mean a corresponding deduction from the expenditure on social needs, research, defense, and so forth) from natural rent and will undoubtedly spur a growth of the price of energy sources and lend new impetus to cost inflation. The second will entail a further decline in the competitiveness of Russia's commodity manufacturers, which has declined twofold in the past year as it is, and will contribute to the further squeeze on Russian goods by imports, which already constitute more than half the consumer market. The third measure means nothing other than the export of capital, which has thus far been recognized by all, the president included, as an obvious evil. The fourth measure signifies the transition to a new stage of increase in the already huge foreign debt. In total these measures will stimulate a further growth of the disparity in prices in the direction of their growth for energy sources and raw material and a relative reduction for imported commodities. They essentially contradict the declarations of a stimulation of the production of high-tech products, preservation of the scientific and technological base of the military-industrial complex, and protection of the domestic market and will also manifestly complicate the accomplishment of the five priority objectives set in this same message.

These same five priority objectives were selected at random, evidently. The first—"assurance of the uninterrupted and full execution of the budget in terms of expenditure"—is the self-evident business of any in any way responsible government. Were it not for the manifold overexpenditure of the budget on items concealing legalized embezzlement of public funds, this objective would be accomplished automatically. The lowering of inflation in budgetary calculations would make it possible to easily overfulfill the revenue plan, even if its rate of collection is appreciably below the planned norms.

The second objective—"advancing a resolution of the housing problem"—has a very naive ring in a situation where, following a 20-fold increase in the past year in the price of mains gas, the charge for municipal services is rising to a height which is beyond the reach of ordinary citizens. Their income is insufficient for maintaining their current poor accommodations—how under these conditions can they think about new ones?

The third objective—"support for small business"—with a real rate of interest of approximately 50 percent and an evolved price disparity making production activity disadvantageous, could give rise only to a sarcastic smile in entrepreneurs.

The fourth objective—"a start on the compensation of the citizens' savings"—prompts the thought that the authors of the message are unfamiliar with the budget act for the current year, which the president has signed and which makes no provision for such spending. It should be recalled also that at the prompting of these "specialists," the president twice rejected a law adopted by the Duma on the protection and restoration of the citizens' savings, which was adopted with an override of the presidential veto.

The fifth objective—"the commissioning of a system of insurance of the citizens' deposits in commercial banks"—cannot be accomplished outside of a system of measures to enhance the stability of the entire banking system, otherwise it could become another fraud in the rescue of hundreds of insolvent banks at the expense of the budget.

Adducing this randomly compiled list of priority objectives, the authors of the message naively believe, evidently, that such problems as the assurance of conditions conducive to the growth of production, an upsurge of investment activity, the imposition of order in the protection of property rights and the administration of public assets and finances, and an increase in the competitiveness of Russian commodities are resolved automatically with the transition to the third stage of the reform, in their classification. But however much you say the word "halva," this does not make your mouth any sweeter, as they say. It is not clear from the text of the message how the transition to growth will be accomplished. On the contrary, it is clear from the federal budget that has already been approved and the experience of its execution in past years and of the actions actually pursued by the government in the current macroeconomic situation that a transition to growth is not to be expected.

Revitalization and upturn, about which the message speaks, are, truly, possible. Just as they were possible in 1993 and 1994 and 1995 also. But just as they remained unrealized earlier, they will not, if the present policy is continued, be realized this year either. However arrogantly the text of the message declares that "historical experience compels us to abandon utopian social engineering" or that "we cannot carve out our future from others' molds," this is, in fact, as before, precisely how matters stand. Both in the government's general economic policy shaped by the recommendations of the IMF and in specific decisions—be it calls from Washington with orders against prevention of the importation into Russia of below-grade chicken pieces and for the elimination of the restrictions on the importation of alcohol established by law or unilateral commitments on the part of the Russian Government not to apply protective measures in foreign trade.

It has to be stated from a reading of the latest presidential message that his advisers have deceived the president on this occasion also. In respect to the actual economic situation, in respect to the key problems of economic policy, and in respect to the necessary measures for surmounting the crisis. This could have been Mr. Yeltsin's personal difficulty, had the payment for this deception not been the impoverishment of tens of millions of Russians and the rapid breakdown of the country's economy, which, judging by the message, will continue this year also, in spite of this document's Manilov-like declarations. Ultimately this is deception of the country, which has been driven into a systemic crisis provoked by flagrant mistakes and from which attempts are being made to conceal the possible ways out of it, the country being pushed further along the path of self-destruction.

Russia: Deputy Warns of Dangers From Communists

964F1766A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Apr 96 No 14, p 11

[Article by Sergey Yushenkov, deputy of the Russian Federation State Duma: "Zyuganov as an Anti-Communist: The leader of the CPRF Has Prepared His Theoretical Stew From Dangerous Products"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is said that life is theater. Not about us. "Our life is a theater of the absurd." This is about us.

How, in fact, can we explain to the world that the main culprits of the collapse of the USSR—the State Emergency Committee types—today sit in parliament in the guise of supporters of the preservation of the USSR? In addition, it is they who are today acting as the principal prosecutors of those who attempted to prevent the swift disintegration of the giant empire. And can the farce played out by the Communists on 15 March in the State Duma in the adoption of the decrees on the virtual cancellation of the Belovezhskaya agreements be called anything other than a performance of the absurd?

Moreover, contemporary political Russian is characterized by all the peculiarities of the theater of the absurd. No attention need be paid to this were the Russian nation more critical of the so-called "mincing words" (L. Likhodeyev's term). But when one of us hears on the television screen, for example, the words of Ye. Kiselev, the popular and influential television anchor and political scientist, about Zyuganov as a social democrat, the Russian individual does not go to the trouble of doubting this assertion. He believes it. Whence the growth of the popularity of the leader of the CPRF.

Where, though, have the myths concerning Mr. Zyuganov's social democratism come from? Mr. Asmolov, who emphasized the featurelessness of the leader of the Communists, enabling the latter to appear as his conversational partner would like at any given moment, is right on this point, I believe. But Zyuganov's books "Strong State" and "Beyond the Horizon" are devoid of featurelessness. They are extraordinarily specific. They affirm very precisely and consistently anticommunist ideology. It is immensely to be regretted that Mr. Zyuganov's anticommunism is based not on the ideas of social democracy but on the ideas of thinly veiled national socialism.

I shall try to illustrate this.

The communist philosophy emanates from the fact that the driving force of societal development is class struggle. With Zyuganov "the principal characters on the stage of world history have always been—since most ancient times—national entities: nations and peoples...."

Since 1917 the struggle in our country, according to Zyuganov, was between state absolutists advocating a revival of the powerful Russian state and cosmopolitans who endeavored to the dictation of the "world's backstage" to bring down the great country. "The first strove to restore the ravaged and paralyzed economy, establish food supply, modernize the economic system, build new plants, and revive the armed forces. The second signed savage orders on general "de- Cossackization," wiped out "hostages" by the thousand, "propagandized execution as a method of education, organized concentration camps, cold-bloodedly killed off millions of people by starvation, and blew up national shrines. The intra-party struggle of these two groupings, sometimes easing, sometimes flaring up with new force, did not cease for a moment, dragged on for many decades, constituted the plot, as it were, of the Soviet period of Russia's history, and to a decisive extent predetermined the dramatic events of its recent years."

Thus are new myths created! Mr. Zyuganov knows full well that one and the same people signed the documents on the restoration of the national economy and the "de-Cossackization," "de-kulakization," and so forth; one and the same people signed the documents on the need for the development of culture and on the destruction of national shrines and so forth. All this Mr. Zyuganov knows, I repeat, full well, but how "subtly" he endeavors by degrees here to whitewash Stalin—the undoubted "leader of the first grouping." Were it not for his death in 1953, an end would have been put to the second grouping! But "there came the 'Khrushchev thaw,' which, despite certain positive results, may with every justification be called a rehearsal for today's 'perestroyka.' As now also, the producers cynically availed themselves at that time of the public credulousness and aspiration to justice."

The leader of the CPRF writes delightedly about Stalin, who "needed just about five to seven years more to have made his 'ideological perestroyka' (whose basis was the "ideology of patriotism"—S.Yu.) irreversible."

It is perfectly understandable why at the State Duma session on 8 March the Communists were reluctant to honor the memory of the millions of victims of the monstrous crimes of the Stalin era in connection with the 40th anniversary of the congress of the CPSU which initiated the de-Stalinization of our country.

The basis of the historical process, according to Marx, is the change of social and political formations. Marx savagely mocked subjectivism and voluntarism in views on societal development. With Zyuganov all the changes in our country are explained not by the most profound crisis of socialism, which had exhausted all possibilities of extra-economic compulsion, but by a "world conspiracy" with the participation of certain Russian politicians. "The body of the leader (Stalin—S.Yu.) had not had time to grow cold in the Mausoleum before his successors turned the ideological course sharply back. The entire 'civilized' West loudly welcomed this maneuver, maintaining a modest silence about how much labor it had cost its politicians, diplomats, special services, and 'agents of influence.'"

Mr. Zyuganov introduces with a very serious expression a mystical transatlantic force in the form of a "conductor," virtually repeating the claims of all Russian nationalists. Ascribed to the "conductor" is a plan which comes in useful for explaining all that is happening. Inasmuch as the "conductor" has to control the "players" by means of a particular force, Democratic Russia is appointed to be this force. It is impossible to read the lines of the latter-day prophet of national socialism about the domination of Democratic Russia without laughing. I know the so-called steering body of this movement well and cannot recall if only one of them being on the Olympus of power, on which, on his own admission, Mr. Zyuganov has sat.

The official ideology of Marxism was highly critical of all kinds of geopolitical concepts, considering them a variety of bourgeois fetishism. This is the characterization of geopolitics in the "Philosophical Encyclopedic Dictionary": "Geopolitics relies on the ideas of racism, the theory of social Darwinism, and Malthusianism and also the concept of 'living space,' 'natural borders,' geographical location.... In the period between the two world wars geopolitics was intensively cultivated in Germany and became the official doctrine of German fascism. The head of the German geopoliticians was General K. Haushofer, founder and editor (1924-1944) of the journal ZEITSCHRIFT FUER GEOPOLITIK, which propagandized the ideas of revanchism and aggression; Haushofer had close ties to the upper stratum of the fascist party." Geopolitical ideas were employed extensively by Hitler also in his book "Mein Kampf," for that matter.

Geopolitics is closely linked with revanchism. This was true as a description of the period of the establishment of fascism in power in Germany, it is true also of the modern period of history in our country. This fact may be discerned very distinctly in the CPRF program. "The geopolitical successor of the Russian Empire was the Soviet Union," the program records. "As a state and social system, it represented an inseparable unity. The main efforts of the internal and external destroyers were directed at discrediting the entire Soviet period of the country's development. The pogrom thugs against socialism hereby played the part of gravediggers of a great state. For this reason the revival of our fatherland and a return to the path of socialism are inseparable." The coincidence of the slogans with which the fascists came to power in Germany and the slogans of the modern CPRF is interesting. The fascists in Germany acted "Against Versailles and National Oppression," "For a Strong Germany, for a Third Reich," "For the Unification of All Germans," and so forth. The CPRF today acts "Against the Belovezhskaya Agreements and Colonial Enslavement," "For the Removal From Power by Legitimate Methods (it is significant that the fascists in Germany employed "legitimate" methods—S.Yu.) of Antipopular Mafiosi-Comprador Circles—the Party of National Betrayal," "For the Reconstitution of a Renewed Union of Soviet Peoples and Assurance of the National Unity of the Russian People," and so on and so forth.

It is interesting that Zyuganov writes sympathetically in the book "Beyond the Horizon" about Spengler and other thinkers who had traditionally been subjected to "flogging" by ideologists of the CPSU. But Zyuganov extols precisely the aspect of the teaching of that same Spengler which was actively employed for their propaganda purposes by Goebbels' cadres.

For Marxism in the Leninist interpretation "all that contributes to the victory of communism is moral." In fact, this formula is essentially a repetition of S. Nechayev's demand. It anticipated the basic principle of Hitler's activity. But Mr. Zyuganov, without a moment's hesitation, makes the "very great discovery" (this is how it is put) that "the principal moral commandments that were recorded in the Moral Code coincided fully with Orthodox ethics, with Biblical ethics."

Christian morals do not accept violence and hatred. Whereas communist morals are based on class hatred and the justification of violence for the achievement of the end, in which man is only a means in actual reality and an end in possibility. The same may also be said about fascist morals, in which pride of place belongs to national and racial hatred and that same violence. The certain semantic coincidence of certain standards and requirements of Christian morals and communist and fascist morals cannot, therefore, be seen as being identical.

The comparative analysis could be continued. But even the adduced examples are sufficient for the conclusion that the Stalinist Zyuganov is an anticommunist of a national-socialist persuasion. To underestimate this fact would be very, very dangerous for national socialism in a communist wrapping would be very attractive for a sizable number of voters. In what way?

Emotional appeal. Propaganda is built on the basis of simple principles: somewhat more weeping and abasement—the people love the aggrieved; there is no need for "unintelligible" intellectual speeches; exclude rational explanations altogether, substituting for them quasi-logic.

A play on national feelings in the name of a "higher justice."

Serious criticism of current practices.

Do the national communists have a chance to establish their dictatorship? Unfortunately, they do. What are the prerequisites for this?

The existence of the largest and best-organized political party.

Domination in the news media. We are not only talking about peripheral publications, for every 10 of which there are only two or three publications of a democratic persuasion, but also about central publications. Whereas the national communists have such mass publications as PRAVDA, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, ZAVTRA, and others, which openly propagandize only "their" views, no democratic party has a single newspaper of its "own."

The situation is approximately the same in the oblast radio and television companies. And central television also has as of late been propagandizing the national Communists increasingly.

The preservation with cardinal changes practically of all the structures of the executive (primarily the power ministries and departments) and the judiciary of a country oriented toward fulfillment of the decisions of the CPSU.

The concentration of power in the majority of oblasts and rayons in the hands of the former party nomenklatura.

The presence of a large number of former party officials in the leadership of the major banks and other commercial entities.

The actual preservation of liberal arts training of a Marxist focus in the system of education.

The preservation in minds of an enormous part of the population of dependency sentiments and orientations toward government assistance.

Are there factors and possibilities counteracting the restoration of the total domination of national communism? I believe so. Pertaining here are:

the power of the president. Despite the multitude of mistakes caused not only by objective but also subjective factors, the president today is, perhaps, the sole guarantor of the prevention of the immediate establishment of a dictatorship of the national communists. True, he is simultaneously by his mistakes contributing to their cohesion and increased strength also.

The most flagrant mistake of the president is the war in Chechnya. An end to the war and the removal from power of those who imposed a power resolution of the conflict in Chechnya could to a certain extent restore some of the lost confidence in the president on the part of a substantial part of the electorate.

The change in the public and individual consciousness in favor of the values of freedom. And despite the drawbacks, the role of an independent press is estimable here.

The appearance of a significant number of property owners recognizing the danger of the accession to power of the national communists.

The recognition by a large part of the democratic and reform forces of the need for unification before the presidential elections.

It is hugely to be regretted that there are as of today very few factors counteracting the accession to power of the national communists. Can we, having forgotten all the grievances and disagreements, prevent a worse scenario of the development of our country? The answer to this question will depend also on how convincingly we can show the electorate the true—national-socialist—essence of the present Communists.

Russia: Paper Urges Public Support for Liberal Tax Code

MK1604121496 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 16 Apr 96 p 1

[Report by Nikolay Ivanov: "Adoption of a Liberal [Tax] Code Postponed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The appeal by Russian taxpayers in support of the liberalization of the tax system, urging an early adoption of a new tax code, is meeting not only with approval but also open opposition in the Russian parliament. Yesterday the Duma Budget and Finance Committee rejected a move to present the code for first reading. As a result, Russian taxpayers supporting the appeal risk losing the hope of ever seeing a stable and liberal tax system in their country. Meanwhile there are equally alarming reports that a new presidential tax edict is being drafted.

Deputy Finance Minister Sergey Shatalov shares KOMMERSANT-DAILY's concern about a future Tax Code. "There is a large group that in principle does not want a Tax Code to be considered," Mr. Shatalov said. "They believe it is necessary to go back to the draft law on the principles of the tax system worked out earlier in the State Duma. When tax legislation has been stable for some 10 years, then we will codify everything and start writing a Tax Code. I am happy that this point of view did not prevail."

In effect the Budget and Finance Committee softly rejected the draft. It was worrying that, in considering the draft of the country's main tax document, the parliamentarians proceeded from totally different assumptions. On one hand, some deputies proposed addressing the problem of terminological contradictions between civil and tax legislation, eliminating ambiguity in the interpretation of its propositions, and clarifying the rights and obligations of tax agencies and taxpayers.

On the other hand, the session was marked by a trend toward excessive itemization, whereby the Tax Code as a whole took a back seat to some of its less important propositions. The session heard some questions suggesting that some committee members were not quite aware of what exactly was being discussed. Other deputies were concerned about only one question: whether the draft provided for privileges to agricultural enterprises. The decision to support it hinged on the answer to that question. All of this can indefinitely protract the adoption of a document that is vital to the national economy. The first part of the draft Tax Code will be discussed in a conciliation committee (comprising representatives of the government, both houses of parliament, and the president) according to a special 19-point list of conceptual propositions. According to Shatalov, even if the proposals by his team are "not the best possible, they will effectively improve the situation, and they should be adopted; there might be solutions ideal from all points of view, but if they are found three years from now, it will be too late." The Russian taxpayers cannot wait either; their support for the appeal is driven by the instinct for self-preservation.

While the adoption of a Tax Code became a more remote prospect yesterday, the approval of the draft presidential edict "On the Main Guidelines of Tax Reform in the Russian Federation and Some Measures To Strengthen Tax Discipline" appears more likely. Finance Ministry experts completed its preparation, and the edict has been sent to the president for signing. In an interview with the FINANCIAL INFORMATION AGENCY an unidentified ministry spokesman described the draft as being geared toward "all-round support for commodity producers and toward alleviating the tax burden for them," but the document is not in fact that unequivocal. While, on one hand, providing for penalty reduction for the failure to pay taxes on time from 0.7 percent to 0.3 percent of the sum overdue for each day of delay, the edict, on the other hand, introduces an invoice system in paying the value-added tax. Thus it closes yet another loophole in the law, which has often been abused by enterprises. Because, according to KOMMERSANT-DAILY sources, there is a threat that after its return to the Kremlin apparat the draft edict will be supplemented with even tougher provisions, today, like never before, it is important that all taxpayers clearly state their attitude to the idea of liberalization of the tax system and support the appeal by representatives of Russian business circles and public figures published in our paper on 2 April.

Therefore we call on our readers to send letters and telegrams personally to the head of state.

Write to: Russian President B.N. Yeltsin, the Kremlin, Moscow.

Military & Nuclear Issues

Russia: Yeltsin: Defense Industry Woes 'Resolved'

MM1504110696 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Apr 96 p 1

[Report by Vitaliy Strugovets: "The Military-Industrial Complex Is the Basis of Industry's Technological Modernization. Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin Visits Energomash Rocket-Building Science and Production Association"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Why Energomash in particular? Of course this was inevitably tied in with the Cosmonautics Day holiday. But the main point lay elsewhere: The Energomash science and production association is today probably the only major Russian association which has not just emerged onto the world market, but is recognized as the undisputed leader in its sphere — the production of liquid-propellant rocket engines. On 12 January of this year the U.S. Lockheed Martin Astronautics company reported that Energomash had won an international tender and its RD-180 engine would be used as the first stage of the commercial Atlas-11AR [codename as transliterated] launch vehicle. Which, in the words of the Russian president, is not just economics but also politics. And finally the third, equally important reason is the head of state's direct handling of the problems of the military-industrial complex. Of which Energomash is a quintessential part.

The events of recent years have literally jeopardized the unique enterprise's very existence. Energomash is unique in that it is a genuine science and production association, based on three pillars: a design bureau, an experimental plant, and a scientific testing base. Or, as they half-jokingly say here, "the mind, the hands, and the heart." And it was the mind, hands, and heart that prevented Energomash from falling apart when, as happened throughout the military-industrial complex, the fixed state order was reduced to practically zero, and when payment for output already handed over was being delayed for months while the price of energy sources was going up by the minute.... But the association did not panic. It was able not only to adapt to the new economic system but also to maintain the leading position of the Russian space rocket sector and the scientific and production potential. And not just maintain it. They spurted forward, ahead of the United States in their sphere of production by at least 10-15 years.

That, Boris Yeltsin said, is the best response to those who consider the military-industrial complex a burden on the economy. On the contrary, the military-industrial complex, he noted, is the basis of the technological modernization of the whole of industry. Not only rocket engines but terrestrial items were shown with pride to the president here. For example, a cream separator. This had been designed at Energomash in a matter of months. At such a high standard that the representatives of a Swedish firm which had been producing separators for almost 100 years threw up their hands.... Or a boiler no bigger than a wardrobe for heating a 40-apartment building. You just install it on the roof, connect it up to the gas, and the apartments are heated. No need for any boiler rooms or communications systems. That, the head of state noted, is conversion in action. And it makes a real impact where work is done on the basis of Energomash's principle: If there is no market, create one; if there is a market, expand it.

However, there was more talk of problems than of successes here. For example, Energomash has to pay out millions of dollars in customs and export duty if it wants to export its output. As a result, funds which are vital not only for development but also for basic wage increases are not reaching the association and its workers. And by the way, something about wages: Boris Yeltsin found out to his astonishment that the people who are building the best rocket engines in the world only earn 300,000 rubles [R] a month. But after all, this kind of situation exists not only at Energomash but practically throughout the military-industrial complex.

It is no accident that the leaders of the country's major defense and space rocket enterprises have appealed to the president to solve as soon as possible the problems of state protection in respect of output from the defense sector of industry, targeted support for its scientific and technical development and modernization, state guarantees for loans, international contracts for high-technology conversion enterprises, and the observance of state order deadlines and funding amounts.

According to Boris Yeltsin, however, these problems can already be considered resolved: The Russian Federation government has ratified a schedule for funding the state order. The head of state has taken it upon himself to monitor its implementation.

Furthermore, the Russian Federation president has given instructions to the Ministry of Finance to pay all debts to enterprises in the space rocket complex within a week, Energomash first among them. In total, the head of state noted, R850 billion has been provided for wages for the defense complex in March alone. The government has also obtained non-budget sources of funding the military-industrial complex to the tune of R2 trillion. By way of additional support for high-technology enterprises, the head of state has instructed the government together with chiefs of the leading rocket-building companies to draw up a draft presidential edict repealing customs and export duties on output involved in international space collaboration.

Russia: Yeltsin Approves Changes to Defense Industry Committee

LD1604102496 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0953 GMT 16 Apr 96

[By Armyom Protasenko]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 16 (Itar-Tass) — "The President has approved the concept for reorganising the State Defence Industry Committee, which is to be started shortly," Russian First Vice-Premier Oleg Soskovets told an enlarged meeting of the Collegium of the State Defence Industry Committee here today. "The military-industrial complex is of great importance for the success of the reforms," he noted. The Russian "defence industry is confronted with the task of implementing the concept of providing new weapons to the army and contributing to the ongoing economic reforms in the country", he added.

"The work of the Russian Government, aimed at consolidating our statehood, is impossible without strengthening the country's defence capacity," Soskovets stressed. Several decisions to back up the country's commodity producers, including defence enterprises, were recently adopted. The First Vice-Premier pinpointed among them the right granted to enterprises to independently tackle the problems of exporting military goods, increasing the export of the production of the Military-Industrial Complex, and expansion of the markets where they could be sold.

Russia: Yeltsin Aide Reports to Army Chiefs on Funding, Supplies

MM1504114996 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Apr 96 p 1

[Report by Aleksandr Pelts: "There Can Be No Russia Without the Army"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday [12 April] the supreme military command of the Russia Armed Forces met with Russian Presidential Chief of Staff Nikolay Yegorov at the Russian Federation Defense Ministry. Nikolay Yegorov made a speech dwelling in detail on issues of state policy toward the Russian Army and the problems involved in funding and supplying it with the latest hardware and arms. "We have already experienced the most difficult and most painful stages of the transitional period, which have also taken their toll on the Army," the chief of staff said.

A detailed report on this meeting will be published in forthcoming issues of the newspaper.

Russia: Arms Exports Expected To Reach $3.5 Billion in 1996

MM1504114896 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1100 GMT 1 Apr 96

[From the "Information and Comment" program: Video report by Igor Vasyukov, identified by caption; figures in brackets denote broadcast time in GMT in hours, minutes, and seconds]

[FBIS Translated Text] [110051] [Announcer Yelena Nefedova to camera] Exports of Russian arms and military equipment will total around $3.5 billion this year. The biggest Russian arms importers are India, China, Malaysia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Turkey. According to "Rosvooruzheniye" General Director Aleksandr Kotelkin, his company accounts for approximately 90 percent of Russian arms exports.

[110112] [Vasyukov over video of Su-27 in hangar] Last year Russian arms exports topped $2.8 billion. The growth, in comparison with 1994, totaled $1.1 billion, or 65 percent. And that at a time when the world arms market is shrinking.

[Aleksandr Kotelkin, general director of "Rosvooruzheniye" State Company, identified by caption] These figures indicate that the Russian arms industry is alive, it is progressing, and this is evident in the world arms markets.

[Vasyukin] It was noted that all these achievements are partly due to the "Rosvooruzheniye" State Company. Last year, within the framework of export projects, the volume of investments by the "Rosvooruzheniye" Company totaled $420 million. More than one-half of this were bank credits underwritten by "Rosvooruzheniye." The company is hoping to continue resolving its problems with the help of banks, despite the fact that credits are frequently taken up for contracts which have not yet been signed.

[Kotelkin] We will continue to rely, among others, on our commercial structures, on our commercial banks. This is because, as a rule, they are more lively, more flexible, and they are already able now to invest money into the future.

[Vasyukin] Among "Rosvooruzheniye's" various spheres of activity, even though it ranks last, is advertising Russian arms. In 1995 more than $5 million was spent for this purpose. The forms of publicity varied greatly. This year the advertising budget will be increased by 50 percent. It is partly thank to this that "Rosvooruzheniye" has been able to gather a sizable protfolio of preliminary contracts.

[Kotelkin] The contract portfolio, including the latest signed contracts, exceeds $7 billion. [110254] [video shows arms display footage interspersed with Kotelkin statements]

Russia: Military Reform Issues Discussed

MM1604094296 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Apr 96 p 2

[Article by Oleg Falichev under the "Observer's Notes" rubric: "Military Reform as a Mirror of the Russian Economy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] I will make the proviso right away that these notes do not claim to be the ultimate truth. Anyhow, that clearly simply does not exist at present when it comes to the thorny path of military reform in Russia. No matter how many lances have been broken recently, there has never been and there is not now any unity of views among politicians, military specialists, and the public regarding the methods, means, and ways of implementing it. Only recently have a few encouraging trends emerged, which for some reason have gone unnoticed by the press. Furthermore, accusations against the Army over the absence of reform have intensified.

In this connection ahead of the fourth anniversary of the formation of the Russian Federation Armed Forces I would like to sum up what has been planned and what has already been carried out along this road. And investigate the real reasons why military reform has begun to falter in some spheres.

As is well known, it was planned that the organizational development of the Russian Armed Forces would consist of three stages. I would remind you that the first stage ended in 1992. During this stage the decrease in the level of combat readiness that had begun after the disintegration of the USSR was stopped. The approaches toward creating groupings of troops and general-purpose forces were revised and the formation of new ones was begun in view of the changed state borders.... Today for some reason we no longer even recall all this. Yet tremendous work was carried out to switch large masses of troops and equipment to new locations. It is without parallel anywhere in the world.

Three directorates of military districts, eight directorates of armies, one army corps, 15 division directorates, and eight military schools were disbanded. The process of cutting large strategic formations and combined units began.

The second stage of the reform took place in 1993-1995. During this stage the strength of the Armed Forces was cut by hundreds of thousands. As of 1 January 1996 they had only 1.7 million men as against 2.8 million in 1992! Multiply that figure by three (the average family size) and you will see the social scale and significance of the transformations.

During this stage we arrived at a most important conclusion — that we cannot have strong troop groupings along the entire border. Therefore the organizational development of the Armed Forces was based on the principle of mobile defense, and implementation of this made it possible to begin forming small but quite mobile forces ready for use wherever a real threat to Russia's security arises.

The General Staff, together with the main staffs of the armed services and Defense Ministry main and central directorates, implemented a whole package of measures for the strategic and operational planning of the use of troops in the new conditions. And the Russian Federation president approved the country's Operations Support Plan. During 1993 and 1994 a new system of Armed Forces combat readiness was elaborated and introduced and the contract method of manpower acquisition for units and combined units was tried out. Finally, the Federal Program for the Development of Arms and Military Equipment was adopted and military-legal reform and the reform of military education began.... It is impossible to list everything.

So those who say that nothing is changing in the Army and Navy and blame the Armed Forces leadership for this are being hypocritical, to put it mildly. They refuse to notice any changes and innovations because the reform of the Armed Forces is merely a pretext for certain political maneuvers, attacks on the defense minister, and pressure on the authorities and on the president.

But if you assess the transformations in the Armed Forces in the light of the financial famine in which they are taking place and of the war in Chechnya, you can only marvel at how much has been done. And done chiefly on the strength of enthusiasm.

Analysis of some articles and comments in the press shows that some authors simply have little idea of the essence of the matter and confuse or deliberately misunderstand the essence of concepts and terms. There are some "specialists" who reduce the entire reform merely to the reduction of the Armed Forces. And, as they see it, reductions will supposedly produce rapid savings. Thus State Duma Deputy A. Arbatov published an article in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA entitled "Sensible Reductions in the Army Will Not Harm Russia." Unfortunately, the article discussed not "sensible" but what you might call total reductions in the Army to 1-1.2 million men. What is this calculation based on? Apparently on...the premises that major threats to Russia may arise only in the medium term (5-10 years) and still more in the long term (10-15 years). But this is tantamount to fortune telling, since there is no politician or country that can provide a total guarantee of Russia's security. But what about new dangers? They already exist aplenty on the borders and even inside Russia.

But the author bolsters his arguments by referring to the country's weak economy. Once we have become a bit richer, he says, we can increase the Armed Forces. This superficially logical argument is nevertheless from the realms of political romanticism. It will be impossible to swiftly restore at a later date what we have destroyed today. It is a question not even of the strength of the Armed Forces, but of the system for training military professionals in general. So it is absolutely incorrect to say that the Defense Ministry is opposed to reductions in the Armed Forces. The discussion is rather about the military department's position regarding the quantitative indicators for the Armed Forces determined by the tasks entrusted to them in the military doctrine. These have already been repeatedly concretized in view of not only the development of the military-political situation but also, I emphasize, the state's military-economic potential.

But if you approach the question scientifically, on the basis of world experience, we need an Army of at least 1.7 million. That is not a figure plucked out of thin air, but one calculated dozens of times by the General Staff. Any further decline in the strength of the Armed Forces, military analysts believe, could reduce the combat potential of high-technology services: the Air Defense Forces, the Air Force, and the Navy. Furthermore, it could necessitate a reorganization of the traditional five-service structure and consequently have an adverse effect on the resolution of tasks and the quality of troop command and control. Finally (and this is the most interesting point) it would entail...substantial new expenditure of financial resources (!). Furthermore, in the common assessment of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry Main Directorate of Military Budget and Finance and the General Staff Operations Main Directorate, the amount may exceed the appropriations required to maintain the unit of servicemen undergoing reduction. Thus in the last four years the Armed Forces have decreased by over 1.1 million men, yet so far the state has not derived any advantage from this. Why?

The point is that this is an expensive process. According to calculations, the expenditure on discharging 1,000 officers, say, already exceeds the possible cost of keeping them in the Army for the next four or five years. After all, in addition to the discharge allowance, the provision of housing to discharged personnel, and their transportation to a new place of residence, expenditure is also required to change the structure and composition of the Armed Forces and to disband or relocate the reduced units.... So unfortunately in the immediate future further reductions in the strength of the Armed Forces will not yield the desired saving on the state scale. That must be understood.

The Defense Ministry is also "under attack" over contract servicemen, although it has to be admitted that the former euphoria among the people over the faster transition of the Armed Forces to contract service is long gone. The slogan "A Professional Army!" apparently once again did not reflect the potential of our economy. A real military professional today wants his difficult, sometimes mortally dangerous work to be fittingly appreciated. But the state is unable to do this. As a result, partly for the aforementioned reasons, over 50,000 contracts have now been dissolved. "It is desirable to have a professional army, of course," the defense minister stressed to journalists a little while ago, "but if Russia had such an Army today the entire country would be working only to support it.... Today we simply cannot afford that kind of expenditure."

So who is to blame for the fact that we still do not have a professional Army? For the fact that the 50-percent manning level of professionals in the Armed Forces projected for the year 2000 is probably no more than a dream? The answer is obvious: The entire country, as Colonel General V. Barynkin, chief of the General Staff Operations Main Directorate, cannot live according to market laws while maintaining the Army according to socialist laws.

However, figuratively speaking, all this is just the tip of the iceberg. To be extremely honest with ourselves, we should answer just two questions: Should the Army reform itself? And are we not substituting reform of the Armed Forces alone for military reform in the country? Unfortunately, confusion of these concepts is very common. Yet military reform and reform of the Army, though interdependent, are different things. Reform of the Army and the Navy is what in fact has been discussed above and is actually being implemented, albeit with certain shortcomings. But we can be said to be only approaching military reform. What does this mean?

Specialists provide various definitions of the term "military reform." I will cite one. It is a "package of measures to transform a country's defense and security system in accordance with contemporary geostrategic, sociopolitical, and economic realities and with fundamental changes in the content, nature, and means of armed struggle." In other words, it is a matter not so much of the Army and Navy as of the whole stage of military organizational development in the country and the creation of new elements of the political and economic systems.... The military not only cannot but should not be responsible for that. Incidentally, this is a point to which the chief of the General Staff drew attention back in 1995. "The implementation of military reform, including reform of the Army," he emphasized in an interview with KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, "is a matter not only for the military but primarily for the state." Therefore it must be resolved within the framework of a unified coordinated process of military organizational development with the support of the entire people and under the control of the president, Security Council, and government.

Unfortunately, we still lack even a unified concept and program for the development of the "power" structures. And likewise a common desire for cooperation. In the last few years the military departments have moved so far away from each other that it is now very very difficult to bring them together again. Each department has its own long-term programs and plans for development, for the building of technical developments and armaments, and for the creation of educational establishments.... Not to mention the resultant differences between the social protection of people in uniform.

As a result of this policy there are effectively two armies in the country today. The first is represented by the Armed Forces, the second by the so-called "other troops." Just what sort of a difference there is between them has been clearly demonstrated by events in Chechnya, which have laid bare the attitude of all organs of state power and the whole of society toward Armed Forces problems. We have seen that the "other troops" are better funded, supplied, and manned....

All this has disrupted the system for the management of military organizational development established over the years. So if we are serious about military reform, a unified program involving the best minds in the Russian Academy of Sciences and the academies of the General Staff and the armed services and independent experts should have been elaborated long ago — right at the start of the transformations — in order to implement it. Debate about ways and methods of military reform has continued for around a year in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. And almost all the opponents — academics, professors, military leaders, have advocated precisely that kind of approach toward resolving the aforementioned problems and the adoption of a new law "On Defense."

A few shifts have emerged here recently. Under the presidential edict "On Military Organizational Development in the Russian Federation" a State Commission on Military Organizational Development in the Russian Federation was set up in 1995. It actively set to work, but the shortcomings in the normative and legal infrastructure have created intractable problems in collaboration among "power" structures. In view of this at the beginning of 1996 the president issued a new edict entrusting the General Staff with the tasks of coordinating the elaboration of and harmonizing projected plans for the organizational development of the Armed Forces and "other troops." In March the General Staff held a conference attended by representatives of interdepartmental working groups, Yu. Baturin, the Russian Federation president's assistant for national security, and L. Rokhlin, chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee. All this shows that the state has at long last realized the sheer complexity and scale of problems of military organizational development.

One final point. Russia, as has repeatedly been noted at the highest level, will have small Armed Forces which are nevertheless sufficient for reliable defense of the country and do not create a military threat to neighboring countries. God grant that this be so. But are we going to be able to implement this given our present financial state and legal infrastructure? By 2005 will our Army and Navy be the way we envisioned them at the very start of the democratic transformations? The answer to these questions is open as long as the behavior of that capricious lady the economy remains unpredictable.

Russia: Official on Funds Needed To Dispose of Nuclear Submarines

LD1504135496 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1234 GMT 15 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 15 (Interfax) — Russia will need about 1.5 trillion rubles to dispose of nuclear submarines and reactors which are no longer in use, a high-ranking Russian official said Monday.

Aleksey Yablokov, head of the Russian Security Council's interagency commission for ecological safety, said at a press conference in Moscow that about 140 nuclear submarines have been decommissioned in Russia, but nuclear fuel has been removed from only 35-40 of them.

Other submarines are still awaiting their turn and their loaded reactors need constant control and energy supplies.

"Basically, these are floating 'Chernobyls' and if something happens to these nuclear submarines, we will have very undesirable consequences," he said.

Yablokov also said that specialists find 50 to 70 dangerous places in Moscow annually where the level of radiation exceeds the norm.

He said there is the danger that some organizations may try to bury radioactive waste in or around the city to save official burial expenses.

Yablokov believes that Russia's nuclear power industry will develop at a moderate pace in the future, seeking to preserve production at the current level.

He said this may be considered as a full defeat of ecologists who have been rallying for a complete ban on nuclear power plants.

Federal Assembly

Russia: Yelytsin Belovezhskaya Denunciation Countermove Viewed

MM1504155596 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Apr 96 p 2

[Article by Natalya Bachurina: "President Allows Duma To Save Face"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After the Duma decrees concerning the Belovezhskaya accords the president sent the parliamentarians his draft law "on ensuring the stability of the Russian Federation legal system and confirming Russia's international commitments." The aim of this legislative initiative is to outline not without corroboration but with the letter of the law the legal unsoundness of the Duma decrees which have put Russia in an ambiguous position.

Let us recall that it was not only the international accords concluded by the Russian Federation since 12 December 1991 which were put in doubt but also the laws adopted since then by the Supreme Soviet and State Duma, since the majority of them contradict the USSR Constitution whose operation, according to the logic of the Duma decrees of 15 March this year, has not ended.

Despite the lengthy debates over the president's draft law they were fruitless. The document submitted was not only not adopted at the first reading but, to all appearances, will be a pretext for diversionary maneuvers for a long time yet. To a rebuke from the floor addressed to the chairman of the committee for legislation and court and legal reform, asking why a draft decree at least had not been prepared on this question, Anatoliy Lukyanov parried: The Duma had given neither his committee nor two others — the committee for security and the international committee — any such instructions.

The only thing was that the Duma had instructed all three committees plus representatives of the factions to elaborate for the next plenary session a joint draft decree on this question on the basis of all opinions and conclusions voiced.

Last Wednesday there was again talk of the nature of the denunciation decrees. It is obvious that the statements by individual deputies about how they are not of a legal nature but exclusively of a moral and ethical and civil and political nature are just words. In form they are normative acts in their entirety, which prompted the president to come out with his legislative initiative, opening up for the Duma a kind of way out of the impasse. But that is one aspect of the matter. For all the deputies' complaints about the content of this draft law, the president's side demonstrated how seriously it treats the Duma decrees — as universally binding for everyone, including the president. Which you cannot say about the Duma itself....

Indeed, A. Lukyanov admitted, the 15 March decree contains legal norms but they are regarded as universally binding only after they have been turned into law, that is when the opinions of the two chambers coincide....

Incidentally, about the upper chamber. As we know, back on 19 March the Federation Council asked the State Duma to return to an examination of these curious decrees and once more to analyze carefully the possible consequences of their adoption. "To our shame," Deputy Yelena Mizulina said, "to this day the State Duma has not examined this question and, however strange it may seem, no one remembers it. It is as though there is no communication at all. This is blatant disrespect for our colleagues from the Federation Council."

The Duma heeded its colleagues' comment. In less than a week in answer to the Federation Council appeal the lower chamber adopted its own appeal — to the upper chamber. Having thanked the senators for the balanced, well-intentioned tone of their message, the Duma deputies again repeated what had already been said repeatedly by individual deputies: "The decrees adopted by the State Duma are primarily of a political nature... and in no way affect the sovereignty of the Russian Federation, still less that of other states."

In rejecting the president's draft law again, the Duma is trying to save face with regard to real integration. In this connection the visit by Belarusian parliamentarians headed by Syamyan Sharetskiy, chairman of the Republic of Belarus Supreme Soviet, at the State Duma's invitation was very well timed. The guests and hosts agreed that bilateral interparliamentary cooperation should be strengthened, there is nothing to divide the two peoples, and relations of friendship and cooperation are traditional for them.

Russia: Duma Opposition Seen Seizing Budget Initiative From Yeltsin

MM1504134496 Moscow FINANSOVYYE IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Apr 96 p 1

[Article by Yevgeniy Vasilchuk: "Parliamentary Opposition Tries To Seize Budget Initiative From President" — received via Internet]

[FBIS Translated Text] The State Duma Budget Committee, without waiting for the government's actions on organizing the 1997 budget process and formulating the 1997 draft budget, has put forward its own legislative initiative. On 7 April the deputies on the committee approved and recommended for adoption by the State Duma the draft law "On the Procedure for the Submission, Examination, and Approval of the Federal Budget for 1997."

A number of proposals in the draft law could substantially change the established balance in the mechanism for the elaboration and implementation of the Russian budget. Its main points have every chance of being adopted by a qualified majority of the State Duma, with the veto of the Federation Council and of the present and future president subsequently being overruled.

In that event the confrontation and confusion in the Russian taxation and budget sphere between the executive and legislative branches of power will be continued for at least four more years.

The State Duma's budget initiative is a speedy and skillful response to the uncertainty displayed by Boris Yeltsin in formulating and making public the "new budget ideology." Yeltsin has not yet made up his mind to put forward legislative initiatives aimed at a switch to a "presidential" system of formulating and implementing the budget.

In the context of Boris Yeltsin's successes in the presidential election race, the parliamentary opposition is beginning to prepare a bridgehead for retreat. No better sphere could be found for this than taxes and the budget.

Theoretically, the proposals of the State Duma Budget committee do not encroach upon the budget prerogatives of the executive. It is only a question of procedural points. While the government, which also has the opportunity for legislative maneuvering on procedural questions, is still obliged to concern itself mainly with the formulation and implementation of the substance of the budget.

The State Duma Budget Committee proposes, for instance, that the presentation of the budget in the first reading should take place with amendments to tax legislation having been approved beforehand. It may seem hard to object to that. But in present conditions the Russian budget will, as a consequence of this, become totally "nonviable" in parliament. Especially if they start pushing it through all the Duma committees as a complete program.

However, that is precisely why the procedural amendments proposed by the Budget Committee are so important. While the government is busy formulating a global constitutional law "On the Fundamentals of the Budget System and the Budget Process in the Russian Federation," the Duma opposition intends to take under the strictest control the actual — not the constitutional — budget process. For next year, 1997, but also, incidentally, in the current year.

In view of the distribution of political forces in the lower chamber of parliament and the rise in Yeltsin's election changes, it seems unlikely that the Duma opposition will underestimate the importance of the innovations proposed by the budget committee. Especially since all of them are almost entirely within the framework of the legislators' sphere of budget responsibility.

And then Russia will have — right now, in 1996 — not the long- awaited presidential budget, but a real parliamentary budget.

Russia: Duma Decree on Extension of Local Legislatures' Powers

MM1604091796 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 16 Apr 96 p 6

[Unattributed report: "The Constitutional Court Will Settle the Dispute" — from the 'Documents' section]

[FBIS Translated Text] The State Duma has adopted the decree "On the Practice of Extending the Powers of Legislative (Representative) Organs of Components of the Russian Federation."

The adopted document states that a two-year term of powers was established for the legislative (representative) organs of Russian Federation components elected during the period from 12 December 1993 through 10 April 1994 in accordance with the Russian Federation president's edict of 22 October 1993.

Since September 1995, however, in accordance with the Russian Federation president's edict of 17 September 1995, legislative (representative) organs of Russian Federation components have been independently adopting decisions to extend their powers for various terms without holding elections. Instances where these decisions are deemed invalid by appropriate courts are already being noted. On 13 March the State Duma proposed to deputies and to legislative (representative) organs of Russian Federation components that they adopt local laws on elections in good time, before their powers expire, and schedule them for 16 June 1996.

By means of its decree the State Duma has entrusted the Committee for Federation Affairs and Regional Policy with preparing a draft State Duma decree on putting to the Russian Federation Constitutional Court a question on whether the Russian President's edict No. 315 of 2 March 1996 "On the Procedure for Postponing Elections to Legislative (Representative) Organs of State Power of Russian Federation Components" complies with the Russian Federation Constitution.

The said committee has been instructed, by way of a legislative initiative, to draw up and submit for the chamber's examination the draft federal law "On Making Amendments and Additions to the Federal Law 'On Basic Guarantees of the Electoral Rights of Citizens of the Russian Federation,'" which is to make provision for assigning guarantees of ensuring citizens' rights to participate in resolving questions of extending the powers of organs of state power.

Regional Affairs

Russia: Yeltsin: No Direct Talks With Dudayev; No Chechen Secession

LD1604120396 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1136 GMT 16 Apr 96

[By Viktor Zhilyakov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KRASNODAR April 16 (Itar-Tass) — President Boris Yeltsin ruled out the possibility of direct peace talks with Chechen separatist leader Dzhokhar Dudayev and made it clear that Chechen secession from Russia was out of question in any case.

"I shall never sit at the negotiating table with Dudayev", Yeltsin said on Tuesday at a meeting in the military township in the southern Krasnodar region and branded the separatist leader as a "bandit".

He added that Dudayev was ready for talks through mediators and said that King Hassan II of Morocco had already joined the process.

But the president stressed that Chechen secession would not be negotiated in any case. "Chechnya will always be within the Russian Federation", he said.

The president also said that the withdrawing federal troops would remain on the Chechen borders until the situation in the rebel republic normalises completely.

Other possible mediators are Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev and the head of the Russian Muslim republic of Tatarstan Mintimer Shaymiyev.

Dudayev also proposed Turkish President Suleyman Demirel as a mediator.

Russia: Yeltsin 'To Do Everything Possible' for Chechen Cease-Fire

LD1504170496 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1548 GMT 15 Apr 96

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" No. 73 of (1066) compiled by Anna Kovalyova, Nikolay Zherebtsov, Andrey Petrovsky, and Boris Yunanov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] President Boris Yeltsin is determined to do everything possible to achieve a cease-fire in Chechnya, President of Kabardino-Balkaria Valeriy Kokov told Interfax on Monday after a meeting with Yeltsin on Saturday.

Kokov said he and Yeltsin discussed issues related to the presidential peace plan for Chechnya. He spoke of being supportive of the idea that Chechnya was an integral part of Russia saying there could be no question of the republic's secession from Russia.

The state commission for a Chechnya settlement meets on Tuesday to discuss allocations for post war reconstruction of the economy and social sphere of that republic.

The commission will hear a report by its Secretary Sergey Stepashin, formerly Russian Security Chief, who has been in Groznyy together with Kremlin national security aide Yuriy Baturin in the last two days to see how the Yeltsin peace plan is being implemented.

Monday marks the start of the Russian pullout from Chechnya. This will be carried out in three phases to be completed later this year.

Initially, 8 out of 14 army and police units will be pulled out from regions under control by the Moscow-backed Chechen government over a period of six weeks. "These will he be moved to mountainous parts of Chechnya, the scene of confrontation between federal troops and rebel units," a government source told Interfax on Monday. Out of the remaining six units, three will be redeployed in Ingushetia, two in Dagestan, and one in the Stavropol region.

Russian troops will be withdrawn to temporary deployment sites on the administrative border with Chechnya over the next phase of five months, he said. The final stage scheduled for November provides for the return of troops to their permanent deployment sites.

However, the source said that one police brigade and one army brigade, about 10,000-strong all in all, would stay on in Chechnya as agreed before.

At the same time, he said the pullout would be carried out schedule if the rebels surrender weapons and there is no provocative attack on Russian troops.

"There will be no peace in Chechnya until the federal forces pull out from the republic. Negotiations will start immediately as soon as they have withdrawn," separatist leader Dzhokhar Dudayev's personal envoy to Russia Vagap Tutakov in an interview with Interfax on Sunday quoted him as saying.

He said Dudayev's main condition for peace talks is an immediate Russian pullout.

"The second condition, though we realize it has little chance of being accepted, is the Russian president must carry out a major government shake up," Vagapov said meaning the dismissal of all power ministers who obstruct regional peace.

He quoted Dudayev as saying there will be no peace in the republic while these people are in power.

He also spoke of Dudayev's respect for Tatarstan President Mintimer Shaymiyev's candidacy as peace broker. "We all trust him," Tutakov said.

At the same time, the rebels are surprised that Shaymiyev named as intermediary by the Russian leader is not vested with authority of providing any guarantees to the Chechen fighters. "Even if he gives any, Shaymiyev will not be able to carry them out which will put any would be agreement to question," the envoy said. "We want to see any intermediary as a guarantor who is able to wield influence on Moscow's position," Tutakov said.

Russia: Grachev: Talks With Dudayev 'Unlikely'

LD1604085796 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 0400 GMT 16 Apr 96

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev is very skeptical about the possibility of talks between Boris Yeltsin and Dzhokhar Dudayev: [video shows Grachev walking across runway; sign reading: Welcome to Urals Military District; Grachev shaking hands with officers, speaking to journalists at airport terminal building]

[begin Grachev recording] The president and the government are making every effort, even as far as going for talks with Dudayev. But, I personally, speaking as one who more or less knows him and assessing the situation which developed following the fighting, think it is hardly likely that this man will be a part of any talks process. [end recording]

Grachev said this during his visit to Yekaterinburg. [video shows correspondent V. Poleyko speaking to camera]

[Poleyko] Half-an-hour before the minister's plane landed the leaders of the region, commanders of the Urals military district, and a large number of generals and officers arrived. [video cuts to show correspondent addressing Sverdlovsk Governor E. Rossel and Yu. Grekov, troop commander of the Urals military district]

What will be the subject of the talks with the defense minister?

[Rossel] Military orders, of course, and maintaining the military-industrial complex.

[Grekov] The most irksome problem which is difficult to solve today in the Urals district, and one which I will clearly not be able to solve by myself without the defense minister, is the construction of housing for officers.

[Poleyko] The defense minister began his visit to Yekaterinburg by laying flowers in memory of the internationalist troops who fought in Afghanistan and he will spend the whole day among the troops.

[begin Grachev recording] The purpose of my visit is to ensure that from yesterday the planned inspection of the armed forces gets under way. [end recording]

Russia: Grachev Discusses Troop Pullout From Chechnya, Peace Talks

LD1504182396 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1730 GMT 15 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] YEKATERINBURG, April 15 (Interfax) — The withdrawal of some of the Russian Defense Ministry troops from Chechnya will begin in late April, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev told Interfax in Yekaterinburg Monday.

The troop pullout is to be carried out proceeding from the situation in Chechnya and the results of the talks, he said.

He said that, in addition to the 205th motor rifle brigade, it had been decided to permanently station in Chechnya a tank regiment, which will be deployed near the village of Shali. "Work is currently underway to gather the tank regiment and prepare places to station its servicemen," said Grachev.

Units from the 205th brigade had already been gathered in places of permanent deployment, at Severny airport and in the suburb of Khankala in the Chechen capital of Groznyy, he said.

The units which were involved in combat operations in southern Chechnya are currently being gathered in deployment areas, said Grachev. Some Defense Ministry units will remain at their present positions, especially near the village of Vedeno, where "die-hard rebels have not handed over their weapons yet," he added. He also said that operations against armed units loyal to Chechen separatist leader Dzhokhar Dudayev continue in the area.

Grachev said he doubts Dudayev's readiness to hold peace talks with federal authorities. "The Russian president, the government, legislative officials and public figures are putting forth efforts to begin talks with Dudayev. But knowing him, I think he is unlikely to agree to talks because he realizes perfectly well what he has done and knows that in any case he will be held fully responsible for it," he said.

Russia: Dudayev Appeals to World Community as Troop Pullout Begins

MK1604093696 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 16 Apr 96 pp 1, 3

[Report by Mikhail Globachev and Dmitriy Maslennikov under the "Chechnya" rubric: "A Redeployment at the Theater of Operations. Yuriy Baturin Supervises the Troop Withdrawal; Dzhokhar Dudayev Appeals to Peoples of the World"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Lieutenant General Vyacheslav Tikhomirov, commander of the joint group of federal forces in Chechnya, announced on Saturday [13 April] that a withdrawal of troops would start on 15 April. At the initial stage — in April-May — 14 units and subunits of the Defense Ministry and the Internal Affairs Ministry of the Russian Federation are due to be pulled out of areas where the situation is stable, primarily in the north of the republic, to the foothills and administrative borders — to Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Stavropol Kray. On Sunday, Yuriy Baturin, presidential adviser, arrived in Groznyy evidently to supervise the withdrawal of troops.

Apparently owing to these developments, about 200 servicemen — given that many units fighting in Chechnya are below strength, this figure could be one-fourth to one-third of a unit's strength — of the Stavropol Cossack Regiment, which is part of the regular troops, said "there is nothing we can do here" and went home. Not only does this incident throw into doubt the statements of many analysts and the atamans themselves to the effect that the North Caucasus Cossacks could become the most reliable shield in the struggle with local ethnic separatism and organized crime, but it also vividly brings to mind the pre-Revolutionary situation of late 1916-early 1917, when entire regiments of the Russian regular army went to their villages, taking weapons with them. [passage omitted]

The NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA editorial board has received a statement of the government of "the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria," which says, in particular, that "Russian aggression against the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria has been stepped up drastically over the past several months, an aggression that has no parallel in the history of mankind in terms of its scale and cruelty. The conflicting parties to this war are incommensurable. The large-scale use of the means of conducting war and means of mass destruction, including those banned by the international community, is stepped up by the Russian side many times after every summit meeting of the "Group of Seven" states with the military-political leadership of Russia."

This is what happened after the Russian president's meeting with the U.S. President, after the visits of the G-7 leaders to Moscow to participate in the celebration of the 50th anniversary of victory over Germany, and after a number of other visits by Western leaders to Moscow, the statement of the Dudayev side points out.

"Moreover, after such meetings representatives of the Russian top political leadership make cynical statements alleging that the heads of the leading states of the world urge them to use all kinds of force to do away with the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, not to end the war with it. For this purpose the Western leaders give the Russian side political and financial assistance..."

"On behalf of the Chechen nation we appeal not to the heads and governments of the G-7 states, but to their peoples, the Vatican, the Islamic world, and all those who hold dear human rights and freedoms — do not let the G-7 summit meeting, scheduled to be held in Moscow in mid-April 1996, take place until the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, blessed by the Creator of Worlds, has been completely liberated from the Russian military, looters, and killers.

"At the same time we must inform the world community that on the eve of every scheduled summit the Russian military-political leadership feverishly creates the semblance of concern over this carnage and of a switch to a peaceful settlement of this conflict, which is what is happening at the moment.

"In connection with yet another campaign for initiating a phony peace settlement of the military conflict the government of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria makes the following statement:

"1. The Russian side has not taken a single specific action or measure aimed at achieving a peaceful settlement of the military conflict.

"2. Since the Russian president announced the cessation of military operations on the entire territory of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria a large-scale military action has been mounted there, which targets exclusively the civilian population and involves the massive use of forces, weapons, and military hardware, including banned equipment.

"3. The government of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, adhering to the principles of international law and assuming high responsibility for the fate of every man, announces its readiness to conduct direct talks for the purpose of a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

"In the negotiating process the Chechen side will adhere to the decision made by the All-Nation Congress of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria; namely, to refrain from holding negotiations with those against whom criminal legal action has been initiated, who are under investigation or stand trial as criminals who have committed grave military crimes against the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and its citizens.

"Allah Akbar!

[signed] "President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria Dzhokhar Dudayev

"Vice President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria Khasan Khazuyev

[dated] "11.04.96"

Russia: Dudayev's Commanders Meet Chechen Party Leaders in Shali

LD1504175496 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1700 GMT 15 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A meeting of Dudayev's field commanders with leaders of the socio-political movements and parties of Chechnya took place in the Chechen village of Shali today. ITAR-TASS reports that a decision was adopted at the meeting to convene an assembly on 18 April of representatives of all the forces that are active in Chechnya and support the immediate cessation of military operations. The location of the meeting will be set later.

Russia: Chechen Rebel Leaders Agree To Hold Peace Forum 18 Apr

LD1504200196 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1942 GMT 15 Apr 96

[By Mikhail Shevtsov and Sharip Asuyev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] SHALI, Chechen Republic, April 15 (Itar-Tass) — Chechen field commanders led by their chief Aslan Maskhadov and the leaders of the republic's public and political parties and movements agreed at their meeting in Shali today to convene a forum of representatives of all Chechen forces seeking to put an end to the war and facilitate direct talks between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Chechen separatist leader Dzhokhar Dudayev.

They elected an organizing committee to prepare the forum, which is expected to work out specific ways to resolve the crisis in Chechnya. The venue of the forum, to be held on April 18, has yet to be determined.

Gersolt Elmurzayev, the chairman of the organizing committee, told journalists at a news conference after the meeting that the forum may become a prologue to a real and lasting peace in Chechnya.

Maskhadov said the main goal of his participation in the meeting was to "do everything possible to stop the war and show the world those who want it to go on."

Russia: Chechnya Commander Says Withdrawn Units May Be Ordered Back

MM1504194096 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 16 Apr 96 p 1

[Report by Pavel Anokhin: "Troops Being Withdrawn, Bandits Not Letting Up"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As envisaged by the presidential plan for settling the crisis in Chechnya, the withdrawal of federal troops from Chechnya began yesterday.

In an interview with a ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI correspondent Lieutenant General Vyacheslav Tikhomirov, commander of the combined grouping of federal troops, reported that 14 troop units and subunits are to be redeployed during the first phase and will be temporarily moved to foothill areas of the republic and its administrative borders. Of these, three military units are being transferred to neighboring Ingushetia, two to Dagestan, and one to Stavropol Kray. "During the first phase the troops will be withdrawn from areas where the situation is stable," he stressed. "If the situation deteriorates, however, these units and subunits could be ordered to stabilize the situation in the republic."

According to INTERFAX, Yuriy Baturin, the Russian Federation president's national security assistant, who will monitor the implementation of the first phase of the troop withdrawal, has arrived in Groznyy.

According to reports from Chechnya, Dudayev bandit formations have attempted to provoke exchanges of fire in a number of population centers.

Russia: Field Commanders To Support Dudayev's Talks With Moscow

LD1504163696 Moscow Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy in Russian 1500 GMT 15 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] [Chechen] field commanders are prepared to back the idea of Dudayev's talks with Moscow. (Mansur Mochi Yakhimchik), vice president of the Chechen Information Center in Krakow, who has met these field commanders, said that for this to happen Dudayev himself should make a fundamental decision.

[begin (Yakhimchik) recording, in Russian] They are highly prepared to defend their motherland and their families to the last Russian soldier, as they say. They do not value their own lives and are ready to fight to the end if necessary. At the same time, they are prepared to support President Dzhokhar Dudayev in any talks that could put an end to the genocide against the Chechen people and grant independence to the Chechen Republic in the future. [end recording]

Russia: Yeltsin Leaves on Visit to Krasnodar, Stavropol Territory

LD1504171896 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1621 GMT 15 Apr 96

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Surzhanskiy]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Moscow, 15 Apr (Itar-Tass) — Russian President Boris Yeltsin today left on a visit to Krasnodar and Stavropol Territory to learn about the socio-economic situation in this region. [passage omitted]

[Moscow INTERFAX in English at 1548 GMT on 15 April carries the following "Presidential Bulletin" item on Yeltsin's visit to the Krasnodar and Stavropol regions:

"President Boris Yeltsin is due to start on a planned tour of South Russia including Krasnodar and Stavropol regions later in the day on Monday.

"The trip planned some time ago is intended to help Yeltsin get a better insight into the economic and social issues of the country's two large territories, presidential aide Anatoliy Korabelshikov told Interfax. He said Yeltsin was going there as the head of state and a presidential candidate.

"The aide said the Russian leader who wants to find more about general mood on the ground will have a series of meetings in the administrative center Krasnodar and several villages in the region. He will be holding a separate meeting with local Cossacks, Korabelshikov said.

"During his tour of Stavropol territory, the Russian president plans to visit the town of Budennovsk, the scene of last June's devastating attack by Chechen rebels, the aide said. He said Yeltsin would be briefed on the pace of reconstruction work there including a local hospital which had been restored by building workers from Moscow at the cost of the federal budget

"The Russian leader is to return to Moscow late on Wednesday.

"Yeltsin's visit could be a turning point in Russia's agrarian policy as he is expected to unveil the main principles of his own vision of Russia's agrarian reform in what is the country's traditional center of farm production, the public relations department for regional parties and groups told Interfax.

"Many say Yeltsin's move can help beat one other trump card by his main rival and leader of the Communist party Gennady Zyuganov who considers rural dwellers as his own electorate.

"Although the region is the main supplier of farm products to Moscow, St Petersburg and the Urals, domestic farm producers are badly hit by increased food imports. Yeltsin may well propose ways of redressing the situation."]

Russia: Yeltsin Welcomed in Krasnodar, Notes Absence of Salutes

LD1504214196 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 2000 GMT 15 Apr 96

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] The presidential plane landed at Krasnodar airport late in the evening. This is the second visit to Kuban by the head of the country. He was probably expecting his welcome on this soil would not be quite traditional. Breaching the protocol, the State Kuban Cossacks' Choir performed "Oh, Kuban, You Are Our Motherland!" — the anthem of this territory — right by the steps of the aircraft. [video shows plane taxiing at airport, people in traditional folk costumes with traditional welcome of bread and salt lined up, Yeltsin waving from the top of the steps and shaking hands with a stewardess, and Yeltsin watching a choir and orchestra perform]

As is traditional in Russia to give Easter eggs at Eastertime, such a gift was presented to Boris Yeltsin by Archbishop (Isidor).

As to the protocol, something was not quite right here.

[begin recording] [Yeltsin] What is the matter? No one is saluting me. What sort of order do you have here, Comrade Commander? No one. [Yeltsin looks around and makes a sweeping gesture with his arm] Strange, this is the first time that I observe such a thing.

[Unidentified female] Good evening, Boris Nikolayevich.

[Yeltsin] The supreme commander has arrived, and no one is saluting him. [end recording] [video shows Yeltsin receiving Easter eggs from a clergyman and Yeltsin surrounded by officials and military]

In the meantime, the All-Kuban Cossacks' host greeted the high-ranking guest in keeping with all the rules of the Cossacks' ritual. [video shows Cossacks lined up to greet Yeltsin, a Cossack saluting Yeltsin, Yeltsin and officials getting into a black limousine, and the car leaving with Yeltsin waving]

Today is the arrival day, and tomorrow the president has a busy program. He will visit a servicemen's village and lay a wreath at the eternal flame there and meet veterans. During the day, Yeltsin will visit the village of Novomyshastovskaya and talk to machine operators and agricultural workers. It looks as if a decree on improving the economic situation in the agro-industrial complex will be signed there tomorrow, since the local administration claims that this region's agriculture is now undergoing a crisis. Toward the evening at the Krasnodar Territory Drama Theatre, Yeltsin will hold a meeting with the Kuban public.

Russia: Grachev Stresses Strategic Importance of Yekaterinburg

LD1604054996 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 0253 GMT 16 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev arrived in Yekaterinburg yesterday. Our correspondent Y. Khutaryanskiy presents a report for Mayak's morning program.

[Khutaryanskiy] Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, who has arrived here, stressed right after his arrival that the interest in the region could be explained by its huge industrial potential. Whereas the growing interest in Uralsk Military District could be explained by the information which he has just announced — and Mayak is possibly reporting this for the first time — Yekaterinburg will turn in future into the main headquarters of a new territorial formation on the basis of Uralsk Military District within the boundaries of the Volga-Ural basin. It will have certain strategic direction. Grachev said that a lot of work will have to be done in the next few years in Uralsk, (?Volga), and Siberian [Military] Districts to reform the Russian armed forces. [passage omitted]

Russia: Grachev's Agenda for Urals Military District Visit Outlined

MM1604082696 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Apr 96 p 1

[Report by Aleksandr Pelts: "Russian Defense Minister in Urals Military District"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The work of Army General Pavel Grachev, Russian Federation defense minister, in the Urals Military District has been planned in the past few days. The aim is for him to get personally acquainted with the real state of affairs among the Urals Military District troops and in the separate air defense corps stationed there. Moreover, the defense minister intends to check out the district troops' combat and mobilization readiness and give practical assistance to the command of the district and of the separate air defense corps and to the leadership of military-industrial complex enterprises in tackling existing problems.

Army Gen. Grachev also intends to meet with the Sverdlovsk Oblast administration, to hear reports from Commanding Officer Colonel General Yuriy Grekov and the commanders of other combined units stationed there, and to work in the units of the Yekaterinburg and Chebarkul garrisons.

Russia: Russian Envoy to Kaliningrad Interviewed

WS1504125396 Kaliningrad STRAZH BALTIKI in Russian 28 Mar 96 p 3

[Interview with Artur Kuznetsov, Russian Federation ambassador to Kaliningrad Oblast, by Yuriy Dmitriyev: "We Are Open to the World"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Three years ago, in March 1993, the Russian Foreign Ministry opened its representative office in Kaliningrad Oblast. The STRAZH BALTIKI correspondent met with Artur Ivanovich Kuznetsov, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of Russia to our region.

[Dmitriyev] **Why is this kind of representative office necessary in Kaliningrad Oblast?**

[Kuznetsov] There are 16 Foreign Ministry representative offices and their two affiliated offices currently operating in Russia. As a rule, they are based in border regions. Requests have been filed to establish several more of such institutions in border cities. In the future, their number is expected to reach 30. This broad diplomatic network is a result of Russia's desire to be open to the rest of the world.

Compared with other Russian regions, international contacts are developing most dynamically in Kaliningrad Oblast. This, of course, is connected with its peculiar position — where an oblast's borders are at the same time state borders.

In the general context of developing international relations in Russia, Kaliningrad Oblast occupies a fairly important place. The council for cooperation between the oblast and Poland's northeastern voivodships is working successfully; the oblast is concluding agreements with Lithuanian regions; relations with Scandinavian states are gaining momentum. It is simply impossible to name all those who would like to cooperate with Kaliningrad Oblast. Our office is involved in most of the international contacts.

International ties require a fine-tuned approach and professional diplomatic skills — something that is also necessary for analyzing the general situation in the region. In addition, the Foreign Ministry would like to get an adequate picture of all developments. For this and a range of other purposes, the Ministry opened a representative office in Kaliningrad Oblast.

[Dmitriyev] **The appointment of a new Russian Foreign Minister did not change the Foreign Ministry's position on the eastward expansion of NATO. Will the Ministry come up with any new proposals in connection with the stationing of a military detachment in Kaliningrad Oblast?**

[Kuznetsov] Although this question does not lie within my competence, I will answer it — not as a diplomat, but as a scientist specializing in geopolitical issues. (I was recently given a certificate of membership in the Russian Social Sciences Academy.) Conflicts begin where diplomacy ends. Diplomats have always had influence on military commanders, but they do not have a final say on military issues. The same thing applies to the stationing of the military detachment in Kaliningrad Oblast. Issues like that are handled by the president's Security Council in the Defense Ministry.

I believe that the detachment will be kept here in its entirety as long as the oblast's neighbors, Poland and Lithuania, will seek NATO membership.

[Dmitriyev] **Scandinavian states view the former Soviet Baltic region as a potential "hot spot" in Europe, implying that Russia continues to threaten them. What is it, an invented myth convenient for certain politicians?...**

[Kuznetsov] This is a very important issue. One needs to talk here about the general situation.

As a rule, conflicts breaking out in the end of the 20th century are not spontaneous. They can be predicted. There is a routine technique for instigating conflicts that is currently based on the clash of civilizations concept. This is the most recent approach to the development of conflicts.

Western thought divides the entire world into two categories of people — "we" and "they." The first group is associated with positive traits, achievements in science and culture, technological progress; while the second one is viewed negatively. However nicely Western politicians may "package" their thoughts, this is an underlying conception. All this is called a problem of psychological identification.

In Russia, unfortunately, the vulgar materialistic approach to tackling most issues, including those connected with international politics, still prevails.

[Kuznetsov] A very famous Western political scientist named Huntington stirred a lot of fuss recently with his work on the identification of civilizations. He believes that identification is a global problem. "We will never understand ourselves unless we understand who we are," he wrote.

It is this psychological approach to resolving problems that serves as a basis for the techniques used to engineer conflicts.

NATO's eastward expansion is an example of such techniques. We see a "near-conflict" situation being created absolutely intentionally. What is this being done for? To prevent a spontaneous process. If a conflict occurs, it should be controllable and protracted, in which case, it is believed, such a conflict is not dangerous. By calling the Baltic states a potential "hot spot," one activates, so to speak, an already tested method — one that was employed when the USSR collapsed; only, it is communists that were called enemies at that time. In my opinion, the main historic developments will take place in southern Europe and Russia. The Baltic region, and the Scandinavian states in particular, will see less dramatic processes.

[Dmitriyev] **Let us go back to the problems of our region. How do you think out relations with Germany will develop? As far as I know, contacts with that country have not made too much progress in Kaliningrad Oblast. Does the Russian leadership have any commitments for Germany regarding the oblast?**

[Kuznetsov] I would say that contacts with Germany receive a balanced treatment in Kaliningrad Oblast. We are trying to maintain parity. For example, German capital is second largest in the oblast after French investments, while the number of joint ventures with Germany is notably lower than with Poland and Lithuania.

At the same time, in Germany itself there are interest groups pressuring the leadership of that country on the Kaliningrad issue. These groups primarily include people born in East Prussia and nationalistic individuals and parties.

All the international agreements that were signed by Germany are fully complied with. The Russian Government has no special commitments for Germany regarding the oblast. But the commitments made to Kaliningrad Oblast residents themselves are a different matter. In my opinion, the Russian Government displays sufficient attention to the oblast.

I analyzed legislative acts of the Russian Federation mentioning Russia's northwestern oblasts. Most of them, 120, were devoted to St. Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast, 112 to Kaliningrad Oblast, 68 to Novgorod Oblast, and 67 to Pskov Oblast. The government issued almost twice as many legislative acts pertaining to our region, whose economic potential is similar to that of Novgorod and Pskov Oblasts, which can be explained by its remoteness and isolation. Kaliningrad Oblast, which obtained a number of economic abatements, needs increased attention on the part of the Russian Government more than any other Russian region.

[Dmitriyev] **Is it likely that the Potsdam Conference decisions may be revised?**

[Kuznetsov] To some degree, they have already been revised. The conference in Potsdam was held without German representatives (Germany was defeated at that time and could not make any decisions). In 1990, four victorious states and two Germanies (Federative and Democratic) signed the Treaty "On the Final Settlement Concerning Germany". The "four plus two" bilateral treaty became a guarantor of the inviolability of borders in this part of Europe. In addition, there are other accords reached by the former Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany on border integrity. No one annulled them, either. So, even if the Potsdam agreements are actually revised by some miracle, there will always be the "four plus two" treaty, which was signed by Germany. But if this treaty also "dies," this would really be a step toward a catastrophe.

[Dmitriyev] **Two major holidays will be celebrated this year — the 300th anniversary of the Russian Navy and the 50th anniversary of Kaliningrad Oblast. Is the Foreign Ministry representative office going to undertake any actions devoted to the above events?**

[Kuznetsov] We, of course, will participate, and already are, in those events. For example, we did what we could to help the bark "Kruzenshtern," which set off on a journey around the world. I would not say that our contribution was significant, but we did not remain inactive. We are also assisting in building a monument to Peter the Great in Baltiysk. We discussed the monument's design with architects. We made a small donation for the monument's construction. But the main work is ahead of us. Being diplomats, we will have to organize a reception of guests and military ships arriving in Kaliningrad next summer to participate in festivities devoted to the 300th anniversary of the Navy.

As for the 50th anniversary of Kaliningrad Oblast, we came up with a proposal to issue a banknote featuring one of the Kaliningrad sights.

Already have we started to prepare for the 300th anniversary of the Great Mission [Velikoye Posolstvo] to be celebrated in 1997-98. We have made a list of planned events devoted to the celebration. Right now, it is being reviewed by the oblast's administration. We will launch active preparations as soon as it is approved.

Russia: Murmansk Officials Interviewed on Local Issues

MM1604100196 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 11 Apr 96 p 2

[Interview with Murmansk Oblast Administration Head Yevgeniy Komarov and Oblast Duma Chairman Pavel Sazhinov by Aleksandr Aleshkin under the "Governor's Hour" rubric; place and date not given: "Seamen Return from Fishing Season Via Spider's Web of Customs"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The editorial office invited Murmansk Oblast Administration Head Yevgeniy Komarov to the now traditional "Governor's Hour." But he said that he would like to meet journalists together with Oblast Duma Chairman Pavel Sazhinov. This rather disrupted the usual framework, but the main thing we were wondering about was whether the two oblast leaders would not start a debate among themselves in the editorial office. "No," Yevgeniy Borisovich [Komarov] said, "in Murmansk the two branches of power are working in harmony."

[Aleshkin] So, the first question. You have flown in to Moscow for the Federation Council sitting, where the situation which has emerged in connection with the denunciation of the Belovezhskaya agreement by the Duma will be discussed, among other things. What stance do you personally take?

[Pavel Sazhinov] This State Duma decree has no legal force and is a political card in the election fight for the presidential post. Integration between the former Union republics, and first and foremost economic integration, is vital. But that is what the President's Staff and the Russian Government have been consistently involved in in recent years within the framework of the CIS.

That is why we have both voted in favor of the famous appeal of the Federation Council, of which we are both members, that the State Duma should revise the adopted decision.

[Aleshkin] Do your sympathies also coincide as regards the candidates for Russian presidential post?

[Yevgeniy Komarov] Definitely. In the current disposition of political forces, there is no alternative to Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin. He has started conducting reforms, and he must be given time to see them through to the end.

[Aleshkin] You support the reform policy being conducted by the president and the government. How are these reforms proceeding in the oblast? Are there any examples of their positive influence on the economy and social sphere?

[Komarov] The main thing that the reforms have given us is the opportunity to seek and find our own solutions to urgent problems. When there is no other solution, of course, we turn to the center for help. But after all, the center is not a milch cow. The reason why we have been given autonomy is so as to be able to fend for ourselves. This is the market!

Here are some examples. The problem of the operation of two power units at the Kola nuclear power station has become acute. According to the recommendations of the IAEA — the International Atomic Energy Agency — it is necessary to carry out expensive preventive operations. The federal treasury has no money for these purposes. What is to be done?

We secured quotas from the government for the sale of nickel, which we produce in the oblast. But the currency earned has not been sufficient. We have started looking for funds elsewhere. Our oblast is a border oblast, and we have been setting up ties with foreign partners for a long time. They have also helped us in this case. The Norwegian Government has been providing financial support for several years.

[Sazhinov] I would like to add something to what Yevgeniy Borisovich has said. A considerable part of the Navy is concentrated in Murmansk Oblast. Ships, including submarines with nuclear fuel on board. Many of them are worn out and are to be scrapped and recycled. Enormous funds are needed for this too. After all, this is a question of observing radiation safety and of the health of present and future generations. We are also attracting foreign investors for these purposes. They too have something to gain — the acquisition of valuable raw materials.

A certain amount of progress has been made, but the problems are such that they can only be solved at federal level.

[Aleshkin] Does the oblast have horizontal economic ties with Federation components?

[Komarov] Of course. Krasnodar and Stavropol Krays, and Ryazan, Tula, Kaluga, and Rostov Oblasts, and other oblasts are our partners. We also maintain mutually advantageous relations with former Union republics, now independent states — Belarus and Moldova.

[Aleshkin] You live beyond the Arctic circle. For the northern oblasts, the problem of [hardship] benefits for the people who live and work there is traditional. And perhaps the most important of these is the opportunity to return "to the mainland" when they retire and obtain facilities in their new location. In the face of the market, have the northerners not lost these benefits?

[Komarov] It has now become far more difficult to solve all these problems. And our needs are greater than our potential to satisfy these. But we are trying to support those who have devoted many years, and sometimes their whole lives, to the revival of the North. Last year we built and bought 200 apartments for pensioners in Leningrad, Yaroslavl, Vologda, and other oblasts.

[Aleshkin] So, are you leading a problem-free existence?

[Komarov] The economic problems characteristic of Russia as a whole are not as bad in Murmansk Oblast. We have for the most part solved the mutual payments problem. A certain revival has appeared in the economy. But life is difficult at the moment, and there are plenty of problems.

Many of these are unfortunately generated not by the internal laws of the market, but frequently by incompetence or just plain arbitrariness by officials at all levels, their arrogance, and refusal to give up their former power. What will this lead to? Here are several examples.

In the oblast there are several so-called closed administrative-territorial formations. Funds for maintaining them come from the federal budget. At the same time, we regularly pay taxes into the federal budget. We say: Is it not better not to send money back and forth, but to channel it towrd its proper destinationd by the shortest route? No matter how much we fight for this, we are unable to secure the obvious solution from the Moscow officials. There is a similar situation, incidentally, as regards the police pay. In our opinion it is stupid to issue their wages...via Moscow.

But the workers in our leading industry — the fishermen — have to get over the highest bureaucratic hurdles. It is well known that Murmansk Oblast has traditionally supplied most of our fish products. The volume is now falling disastrously. This is not just because of the out-of-date [fishing] fleet. The present customs rules have really put the squeeze on the fishermen.

The customs regulations must be changed in such a way as to stimulate the fishermen's labor. Fortunately, such a law has been prepared and is being discussed in the Federatal Assembly chambers.

[Aleshkin] Let us carry on talking about legislation, but at regional level. A great deal is now being said about the representative organs of Federation components sometimes adopting legislative acts which contravene federal ones. This generates crisis situations and local "wars" between the two branches of power. Is the Murmansk Duma guilty of such a thing?

[Sazhinov] No, we do not stray outside the framework of the country's integrated legal area. Laws which the Duma adopts regulate the formation of the local budget, the collection of taxes, and the social infrastructure. They come into being amid discussions, sometimes heated ones, taking into account the opinion not only of the deputies, but also the oblast administration.

We are convinced that both branches of power should act in a coordinated way and in the interests of the population throughout the vertical structure.

Russia: Sverdlovsk Election Defeat Symptomatic of CPRF 'Crisis'

MM1504160596 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 16 Apr 96 p 2

[Report by Yuriy Antipov: "Failure for the Communist Party of the Russian Federation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Elections to the [Sverdlovsk] Oblast Legislative Assembly and local self-government organs were held in Yekaterinburg 14 April.

Victory was secured in the elections, by a considerable margin, by representatives of the "Transformation of the Fatherland" bloc, who, according to preliminary figures, secured 36 percent of the votes. The "Transformation of the Fatherland" bloc is headed by oblast Governor Eduard Rossel. CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation] candidates received only 16 percent of the votes.

In the opinion of Sverdlovsk Oblast administration experts, the elections in Yekaterinburg are in effect a pattern — last year the NDR ["Russia Is Our Home"] defeat in the gubernatorial elections largely anticipated the overall outcome of the federal voting for the State Duma. "Yekaterinburg is a kind of barometer of the political climate in the whole country," in the view of experts of the Urals State University sociology laboratory.

The election results in Yekaterinburg are evidence of a general crisis for the CPRF. This is the fifth major defeat for the Communists in local elections in the past month: The elections to the Altay Kray Legislative Assembly, the municipal elections in the cities of Serpukhovo, Zhukovskiy, and Protvino near Moscow, and the Omsk Legislative Assembly by-elections ended in failure for them.

Economic Issues

Russia: State Duma 'Tries To Block' Yeltsin Land Decree

LD1504121996 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1148 GMT 15 Apr 96

[By Aleksey Filatov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 15 (Itar-Tass) — By its law on land the State Duma tries to block the implementation of the presidential decree "On the implementation of citizens constitutional rights on land". Yuri Linin, Vice-president of the Peasants' economies association, said this to Itar-Tass on Monday.

Linin said that the law which had its first reading in the Duma, while recognising private property on individual plots of land used for gardening and vegetable growing does not permit private property in agriculture as a whole. This is disastrous for farmers, Linin said. They can neither buy more land to enlarge their plots, nor lease land from shareholders in large economies. There is only one road open to farmers — to receive what is their due when withdrawing from an economy.

In such a case it will be pointless to form new farmer's economies as it is impossible to work effectively on small plots. Moreover, if the law is passed in its present form, farmers will have to give up their plots as they will have no prospects for expanding them. Meanwhile, farmers with small plots in Russia account for about 40 per cent.

The Duma law proclaims a variety of forms of economic management while in reality it eliminates of farmer's economies. Only large producers, former collective and state farms, will have an opportunity for work land, Linin said in conclusion.

Russia: Official Says Foreign Debt Poses 'No Threat' to Security

LD1504162796 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1431 GMT 15 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 15 April — Russia's foreign debt, which currently amounts to $120 billion, poses no threat to the country's economic security. This amount includes $103 billion of the debt accrued by the former USSR in the last four years of its existence and $17 billion owed by Russia afterwards. This was stated by Mikhail Kasyanov, deputy finance minister of the Russian Federation, who spoke at the roundtable meeting "On Foreign Credits and Debts of the Russian Federation," which was held by the State Duma Committee for Geopolitics today.

At the same time, he said that about 150 countries of the world owed Russia about $149 billion. The main debate was around ways of speeding up Russia's repayment of debts in connection with the possibility of Russia becoming a member of the Paris Club of creditors.

Kasyanov said that although at present consultations about Russia joining the club had already begun, various ministries and departments were instructed to analyze both positive and negative consequences of this move. This information, he said, will be submitted to members of government and the Russian president, who will take the final decision.

In connection with this, the deputy finance minister said that Russia's main debtors — India, Iran, Iraq and Libya — were not members of the Paris Club of creditors and would never join it. The club, therefore, cannot be used to recover these debts.

Mikhail Sarafanov, deputy minister of foreign economic relations, stressed that Russia had no alternative to joining the Paris Club of creditors, because Russia had limited possibilities of putting pressure on its debtors to speed up the return of debts. He expressed the hope that joining the Paris Club of creditors would make it possible to calculate the sum of the debts to be returned on the basis of the ruble rate fixed by the Russian Central Bank, something with which Russia's debtors disagree.

Russia: Russia Failing To Claim Share of Liquefied Gas Market

MM1604083996 Moscow FINANSOVYYE IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Apr 96 p 2

[Report by Yelena Chepkasova: "Russia May Be Too Late for the Share-out of the Gas Market" — received via Internet]

[FBIS Translated Text] Russian producers of liquefied petroleum gases are losing approximately 30 percent of profits in exporting the gas to Europe. This was stated at a conference in Vienna on "Liquefied Gas: The Road to the Consumer," with the participation of the main producers, shippers, consumers, and traders in liquefied petroleum gases from Europe, Russia, and the CIS countries. In the course of the forum's work the prospects for Russian producers to gain more of the East European market for liquefied gases were also discussed.

As Fuad Uzbekov, chairman of the Russian joint-stock National Gas Company, stated, there is only one way out of the situation that has developed — the coordination of joint efforts by all Russian producers and suppliers of liquefied petroleum gases. Only then will it be possible to avoid dumping-level prices, increase the volume and profitability of Russian exports, and, most importantly, strengthen our positions on the world market.

That is why the idea of creating the "Intergaz" international noncommercial organization, designed to unite all producers of liquefied petroleum gases in Russia and the CIS countries, already has the support of some 60 percent of industrialists.

This is particularly important now, since according to experts' estimates world market demand for liquefied gases will increase steadily in the next few years. Markets for the consumption of these gases will also undergo changes. The most promising markets will be those of China and India and the domestic market in Russia and Eastern Europe.

Russian reserves of propane-butane hydrocarbons in all raw materials sources total 27-28 million tonnes. However, even in the best years the proportion extracted has not been more than 35 percent. At the moment 41 million families in Russia and the CIS countries use natural gas for domestic purposes, while 37 million families use liquefied petroleum gas.

Despite Russia's growing demand for liquefied gas — according to the experts' predictions, by the year 2000 the volume of liquefied gases for domestic consumption is estimated at 10 million tonnes — production declined sharply in the period 1991-1995. Whereas in 1991 8.02 million tonnes were produced, in 1995 the figure was 4.95 million tonnes (down 42.9 percent). This led to a considerable reduction in Russia's share of the total volume of world production of liquefied petroleum gases — from 9 percent in 1988 (the best year for the country's oil and gas industry) to 3.1 percent in 1995.

The volume of world exports of liquefied gases rose significantly, from 33.2 million tonnes in 1991 to 40.5 million tonnes in 1995 (a growth of 4.4 percent a year). Western Europe alone, in the course of 1991-1995, imported 5 million tonnes a year from countries in other regions.

Conversely, Russia's exports of liquefied gases to countries of the near and far abroad fell sharply, beginning in 1991, from 2.1 million tonnes to 0.85 million tonnes in 1995. The steady reduction in exports is having a pernicious effect on producer enterprises. Whereas formerly the cash flow shortage was partially covered by exports, now the constantly increasing prime cost of the product and the lack of export money will bring enterprises to the brink of bankruptcy.

As Vladimir Yudin, president of the Tobolsk Petrochemicals Combine joint-stock company, noted at the Vienna conference, some 40 percent of Russian producers are already prepared to export considerably more liquefied gases than in past years. But Western monopolies, in the form of British Petroleum and Shell, have no interest in an expansion of their Russian competitors' presence on the world market. The major Western oil and gas companies have virtually full control of all production and consumption of liquefied gases. The pricing mechanism is correspondingly under their control too.

Meanwhile the majority of Russian producers, seeking to obtain additional funds to maintain production and not having their own sales outlets, are forced to sell liquefied gas at a price considerably lower than world prices.

International Affairs

Ukraine: NATO's Solana Discusses Issues With Ukraine Leaders

LD1504195996 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1926 GMT 15 Apr 96

[By Mikhail Melnik]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, April 15 (Itar-Tass) - NATO considers Ukraine to be an important and serious partner in maintaining European stability and security, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana told a news conference in Kiev.

Solana pointed out that the alliance would like to deepen cooperation with Ukraine. According to him, he and Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma had a fruitful, open and sincere talk concerning growing Ukraine-NATO relations and Ukrainian participation in the Partnership for Peace Programme.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko told Tass that Ukrainian membership of NATO is out of question as the state is a non-bloc one.

NATO leaders have not yet determined which of the former Soviet allies would enter the alliance first. A decision is expected after Solana winds up an Eastern and Central European tour of states which want to join NATO. He will start the tour on completion of his visit to Ukraine, which is seeking a special relationship with NATO.

According to him, no nuclear weapons will be deployed on the territory on new NATO members.

"Ukraine would not like to be a buffer zone between the military bloc and Russia," first Ukrainian Rada (parliament) deputy speaker Aleksandr Tkachenko told Solana.

Solana, in turn, said NATO cooperation with Ukraine and Russia will follow the lines of peace maintenance, security and stability in Europe.

Relations between NATO and Ukraine should not be confined to the military sphere. There are other fields of common interest including science and technology.

Solana discussed NATO-Ukraine relations during a meeting Prime Minister Vladimir Durdinets [as received] and Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko.

Ukraine's participation in the European security system should be based on cooperation with European institutions and not on bloc opposition, Durdinets stressed.

NATO's expansion should proceed in an evolutionary manner, holding consultations with Ukraine and Russia, Kuchma told Solana.

"Ukraine does not oppose NATO's expansion. However, its new members should be devoid of nuclear weapons," Kuchma said.

It is one of the main conditions Ukraine is setting for the alliance's enlargement, Ukraine's Security Council chairman, Vladimir Gorbulin, quoted the president as saying.

According to Kuchma, this process should go on in an evolutionary and open manner, with all issues being solved with Ukrainian and Russian participation, Gorbulin said.

"(NATO) would like to deepen bilateral cooperation with your country, which is very important for security and stability in Europe," Solana said.

Ukraine aspires for good relations with NATO. In the first place, it seeks cooperation in the political, technical, scientific and information fields, but not in the military sphere, Kuchma said.

According to Gorbulin, that is Ukraine's new approach to cooperation with NATO. However, a special partner status, which Ukraine is eager to obtain, provides for military cooperation as well. Ukraine is looking for ways of practical interaction with NATO, Gorbulin said.

Ukraine is a very important state for European security, Solana said. That is why NATO would like to establish and develop a special relationship with it, he stressed.

Ukraine: NATO Head, Deputy Premier Durdynets Discuss Relations

LD1504192096 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1700 GMT 15 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev — "Stability in Ukraine is a key element in preserving peace in the Central and Eastern European region," NATO Secretary General Javier Solana noted at a meeting today with Vasyl Durdynets, Ukrainian deputy prime minister for state security and emergency situations. He stressed that he considers relations between NATO and Ukraine to be promising and reported that the sides had agreed to set up a NATO information center in Ukraine.

Vasyl Durdynets emphasized that the Ukrainian Government "has a consistent stance regarding NATO" and confirmed Ukraine's willingness to become "an organizational link between East and West."

Vasyl Durdynets expressed the Ukrainian Government's gratitude for the North Atlantic alliance's timely help to Ukraine at the time of the accident in Kharkov's purification works. "This helped to avoid contamination of the water used by over 16 million people," he said.

Vasyl Durdynets said that it was planned to hold joint exercises with NATO subunits on preventing and eliminating technically generated disasters in western Ukraine in autumn of this year.

Ukraine: Solana: Ukraine Has Important Role in European Security

LD1504152496 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1415 GMT 15 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev — NATO is willing to maintain deep cooperation with Ukraine not only in the military sphere but also in the civilian sphere — emergency situations, scientific and technical cooperation — and hopes that Ukraine is also ready to deepen this cooperation, NATO's Secretary-General Javier Solana said at his meeting with Oleksandr Tkachenko, first deputy chairman of the Supreme Council of Ukraine, today.

Solana acknowledged the importance of cooperation within the Partnership for Peace program. He said: "Cooperation on the territory of former Yugoslavia between the military on opposite sides of the barricade is an example of how a collective security system can be built in Europe."

Solana stressed that "in 1996, NATO will continue its strategic dialogue with the countries that are seeking NATO membership." He pointed out the important role of Ukraine and Russia in the process of building a system of security and stability in Europe and stressed that NATO is ready "to construct it in cooperation with them."

Tkachenko said the Ukrainian parliament's attitude toward NATO's eastward movement is "ambiguous". He stressed that Ukraine, as a nonaligned and neutral state, "would not like to find itself on the borderline between NATO and Russia in the future."

Ukraine: Top Kuchma Aide on Cooperation With NATO

WS1604072096 Kiev INTELNEWS in English 0210 GMT 16 Apr 96

[By Viktoria Kulakova, "Special to INTELNEWS"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, April 16 — While Ukraine is interested in closer cooperation with the NATO alliance, it is not yet ready to abandon its official non-aligned status, a senior Ukrainian official said Monday.

Volodymyr Horbulin, secretary of President Leonid Kuchma's national security council, told journalists that the Ukrainian president discussed these issues during Monday's visit by NATO Secretary General Javier Solana.

"The president said that Ukraine would like to see cooperation with NATO — meaning political, scientific-technological, and informational cooperation rather than military cooperation... this is a new thesis," he said.

Horbulin added that after a European-wide system of collective security becomes a reality "Ukraine will really need to change its neutral status. This is a possible variant, but we need to take some time."

Horbulin also reiterated what he called Kuchma's insistence that nuclear weapons not be deployed near Ukrainian borders.

Solana, speaking upon his arrival at Kiev's Boryspil Airport, said that NATO is interested in "deepening relations with Ukraine," and praised Ukraine for its participation in peace-keeping missions in the former Yugoslavia.

Meanwhile, as Kiev's top diplomats admit, not everybody in Ukraine itself is whole-heartedly enthusiastic about NATO membership.

According to Foreign Ministry sources, Ukraine plans to negotiate the creation of a NATO information center in Kiev.

"We want to explain to our people that there is no reasons to be afraid of NATO, and if you want to fear NATO, Parliament is the place for this," said a top Foreign Ministry official requesting anonymity.

Ukraine: Kiev Opposes Nuclear Weapons for New NATO Members

LD1504143996 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1402 GMT 15 Apr 96

[By Mikhail Melnik]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, April 15 (Itar-Tass) — NATO's expansion should proceed in an evolutionary manner, holding consultations with Ukraine and Russia, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma told NATO Secretary General Javier Solana who arrived in Ukraine on a day-long visit on Monday.

"Ukraine does not oppose NATO's expansion. However, its new members should be devoid of nuclear weapons," Kuchma said.

It is one of the main conditions Ukraine is setting for the alliance's enlargement, Ukraine's Security Council chairman, Vladimir Gorbulin, quoted the president as saying.

According to Kuchma, this process should go on in an evolutionary and open manner, with all issues being solved with Ukrainian and Russian participation, Gorbulin said.

Solana agreed with Kuchma on the issue stressing that NATO should enlarge in a cautious and open way, which is very important for the whole of Europe, he said.

Ukraine aspires for good relations with NATO. In the first place, it seeks cooperation in the political, technical, scientific and information fields, but not in the military sphere, Kuchma said.

According to Golbulin, it is Ukraine's new approach to cooperation with NATO. However, a special partner status, which Ukraine is eager to obtain, provides for military cooperation as well. Ukraine is looking for ways of practical interaction with NATO, Gorbulin said.

Ukraine is a very important state for European security, Solana said upon arrival. That is why NATO would like to establish and develop a special relationship with it, he stressed.

Solana arrived in Kiev at the invitation of President Kuchma. The Secretary General started an Eastern and Central European tour of states which want to join NATO, but his first stop is the exception — Ukraine, which just wants special and close relationship with the alliance, Reuters said.

Ukraine: Kiev To Develop Political, Not Military Relations With NATO

LD1504135296 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1234 GMT 15 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, April 15 (Interfax - Ukraine) — Ukraine plans to develop political rather than military relations with NATO, National Security Council Secretary Vladimir Gorbulin quoted President Leonid Kuchma as saying at his meeting with NATO Secretary General Javier Solana in Kiev Monday.

Solana had arrived in Kiev on a one-day official visit this morning.

Ukraine wants to go "towards NATO rather than into NATO," Kuchma told Solana.

The proposed NATO enlargement must be an open and evolutionary process accompanied by consultations with Russia and Ukraine, Kuchma said.

Ukraine believes that the absence of nuclear arms in the neighboring states is one of the essential conditions to the enlargement, Gorbulin quoted Kuchma as saying.

Solana praised Ukraine's cooperation with NATO in former Yugoslavia, saying Ukraine is one of the few countries whose contingents are in both Slavonia and Bosnia.

The talks also touched on Russian-Ukrainian relations and the ongoing election campaign in Russia, Gorbulin said.

Ukraine: NATO Advocates Principle of 'Special Relations'

LD1604092296 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0848 GMT 16 Apr 96

[By Mikhail Melnik]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, April 16 (Itar-Tass) — Ukraine is an important state in terms of European security and NATO would like to create and develop "special relations" between NATO and Ukraine, said NATO Secretary General Javier Solana who was on a one-day visit to Ukraine. The visit was part of a programme of Ukraine's cooperation with NATO.

On Monday [15 April], Solana met Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, vice-Speaker of the Ukrainian parliament Aleksandr Tkachenko, Vice-Premier Vasiliy Durdinets, the Defence and Foreign ministers and the Ambassadors of NATO member-states accredited in Ukraine.

Early on Tuesday, Solana left Ukraine for Lithuania on a one-day visit. During his meeting with Lithuanian leaders in Vilnius Solana will discuss the problem of Lithuania's possible membership in NATO, the implementation of the "Partnership for Peace" programme in Lithuania, problems of NATO's eastward expansion and Russia's stance on this problem.

Tonight, Solana is leaving Lithuania for Estonia.

Ukraine: Russia Suspends Transfer of Sevastopol-Based Ships

LD1604090096 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 0810 GMT 16 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev — Russia has suspended the previously agreed transfer of 54 Sevastopol-based ships and boats to Ukraine until the two countries reach a political settlement on the Black Sea Fleet, sources in the Ukrainian navy told UNIAN. The news was also confirmed by a Black Sea Fleet spokesman.

The ships were due to be handed over to Ukraine under an agreement signed by the Russian and Ukrainian defense ministers at their recent meeting in Tysovets near Lvov. Later, on 9 April, a joint Russo-Ukrainian commission together with representatives of both the Black Sea Fleet and the Ukrainian Navy, agreed details of the transfer and outlined a plan for the ships' temporary joint deployment in Sevastopol.

According to the Black Sea Fleet spokesman, the transfer of ships and facilities based outside Sevastopol, such as those in Feodosiya and Kerch, will continue.

Ukraine: Foreign Minister on Banning Russian Duma Deputy Zatulin

LD1504204096 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian
1830 GMT 15 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev — The Ukrainian Foreign Affairs Ministry has received a statement from the Russian State Duma, requesting a review of the decision to ban former Russian State Duma deputy Konstantin Zatulin from entering Ukraine.

As is well-known, Mr. Zatulin opened the Institute for Diaspora and Integration in Moscow a few days ago, while several weeks ago he visited Kiev for talks on opening a branch of the institute in Ukraine. At the same time he attended the congress of the Civic Congress of Ukraine. The Ukrainian Foreign Affairs Ministry sent an official protest to the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry regarding this.

Ukrainian Foreign Affairs Minister Hennadiy Udovenko has told journalists that the Ukrainian Foreign Affairs Ministry has not yet taken a stance on whether it is necessary to reply to the Russian State Duma's statement. "Any country has the right to ban foreign citizens engaged in activities running counter to that state's interests from entering its territory," Mr. Udovenko noted. According to him, all of Konstantin Zatulin's activities, both as [former] chairman of the [State Duma] Committee for CIS Affairs and Links with Compatriots and as current head of the Institute for Diaspora and Integration, are anti-Ukrainian. For this reason the Ukrainian Foreign Affairs Ministry does not intend to alter its decision to ban Konstantin Zatulin from entering Ukraine.

National Affairs

Ukraine: Tabachnyk Views Constitution, Integration

WS1504122496 Kiev UKRAYINA MOLODA in Ukrainian 9 Apr 96 p 3

["Exclusive" interview with Ukrainian Presidential Administration Head D. Tabachnyk by Svitlana Halata; place and date not given: "A Unification of Centrist Forces Could Preclude Filibustering the Constitution"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **During almost a month, journalistic circles were asking the question: Why has Dmytro Tabachnyk disappeared from political life? It was only yesterday that the presidential administration head appeared in his office again, following a break of almost a month. On the eve of his reappearance, our correspondent visited Dmytro Tabachnyk in the "Feofaniya" treatment-and-health center. She was interested in both his personal health and the "health" of the political situation during his absence.**

[Halata] The working capacity of the presidential administration head has already become proverbial. So, what put you off the beaten track for over a month?

[Tabachnyk] A flu which transformed into pneumonia. I was taken to the treatment center with a high temperature, and the illness gripped me for almost a month.

[Halata] My further questions will be not quite fair since it is hard to demand an analysis of the situation from a man who was absent....

[Tabachnyk] On the contrary, this was a good chance for me to read analytical materials and the press, as well as to view events, so to speak, from aside....

[Halata] Particularly since there were enough "hot" events in Ukraine and around us during this period. How passions swirled around the draft constitution alone! Thus, from aside, how can you assess the current stage of the constitutional process, on which, as everybody knows, the brakes were put "inside," in the Supreme Council, while making procedural "turns"?

[Tabachnyk] By observing efforts of the parliamentary left wing, one can clearly see that an attempt is being made to kill the constitutional process by way of filibustering. It is worth remembering that it was as far back as during the Third Republic in France when the popular saying was born: "If you want to bury some matter, pass it to a parliamentary commission." This refers to Ukraine, as well! A portion of deputies wants to filibuster the constitution and, in this way, to put it aside, hoping that a sudden change may take place, making the wavering representatives of the parliamentary center afraid of some events or outside winds. Therefore, before the presidential elections in Russia, the progress of the constitutional process in Ukraine breeds no optimism. This is beginning to be felt by a considerable portion of deputies (I have recently talked with some of them), and it can already be seen that the tactics of the left wing, oriented toward burying the draft, will provoke a reciprocal reaction: a unification of representatives of centrist, right-centrist, and rightist factions.

[Halata] The centrist deputies are pressing to pass a final parliamentary draft to the president for approval by 13-15 April. And what if the president, too, will not "recognize" the draft?

[Tabachnyk] Such a case is foreseen by a provision in the Constitutional Agreement, which stipulates that a draft of the Basic Law has to be approved by both sides before its adoption. If the draft is mangled beyond recognition, the president may follow the distinct position of the Constitutional Commission, which consists of representatives of both sides and which approved this draft. Redrafting the constitution in parliament will not do any good; it may lead to a deadlock. Aside from this, everybody realizes that it is impossible to write even an appeal, let alone a constitution, by common effort of 400 people.

[Halata] In the event of a deadlock, will it be enough to "unify the efforts of right-centrist factions" in order to find a way out? Or will the president and the administration arrange for some other steps?

[Tabachnyk] The right-centrist efforts will not be enough, but I believe joining the left-centrist, centrist, and right-centrist efforts will be enough to agree on a majority draft in parliament and jointly propose it for a referendum. I cannot even imagine that the constitution may obtain 301 votes in parliament.

[Halata] Not only the right-centrist, but also left forces are becoming more active in parliament. You have surely read the statement in HOLOS UKRAYINY, "Ukraine and the People Are in Danger," have you not?

[Tabachnyk] This statement lies outside the limits of legal consciousness. The appeal "Ukraine and the People Are in Danger" proposes measures that, on the whole, may throw Ukraine back further than Stalin's regime. At any rate, Stalin did not allow the destruction of cooperatives and did not finally forbid individual labor activity. As of now, we are offered nationalization and confiscation!

It is being proposed to confiscate everything that was worked out by people during the recent five to six years and to uproot their will for working and managing on their own in three subsequent generations. How can one explain the absurdity of such a world view to a stall seller, a driver, an employee in a privatized or joint stock company?

It is proposed to confiscate dachas. But people were building them over years, organizing a sort of "Saturday mass work" for their families and friends. We, for example, were building our dacha with our parents over the course of nine years, and this construction involved both my friends and my brother with his fellow students. In general, mutual aid is a characteristic feature of the Ukrainians. I know that after the war the family of our president was living in a dugout: the mother with three kids and a notice of their father's death. The village people got together and built a house for the widow of the soldier Danylo Kuchma....

They want to throw us back almost to the Mesozoic Era. The statement has provoked a shock among rich Ukrainians, and one can only imagine reactions abroad. How can normal people with ideas and money come to an unstable country?

[Halata] In his annual report, Leonid Kuchma said that the Rubicon of reforms had already been crossed and that it was impossible to turn back. Is it really impossible? Is there no danger that some clever hand may sow the slogan "appropriate the appropriated" among the masses, and that these masses may assist in confiscation?

[Tabachnyk] Unfortunately, the 20th century has shown that most primitive slogans, appeals, and psychological strategies get a grip on the masses very quickly, particularly during economic difficulties. Opposing this is a civic duty of all intelligent social classes, of all people possessing a feeling of self-respect and capable of thinking on their own. However, I am sure that Ukraine, with its high level of education and developed entrepreneurial spirit, will be able to oppose these ideas, even if the ideas of getting rich quickly due to "confiscation" and political anarchy are very tempting.

For this reason, we need, as soon as possible, a constitution, which is a symbol, factor, and lever of stability. If adopted by a referendum, it will protect laws that may be changed by a new parliament every four years along with a change in the political climate. It is easier to adapt to and live under one law throughout decades than wait for a new one every four years. This refers directly not only to Western investors, but also tens of millions of our citizens.

[Halata] Of course, the constitution is a factor of stability and a kind of seal under Ukrainian independence. However, we also have the example of Belarus, which had its own Constitution, but this has not prevented Lukashenka from "embracing" Russia. Thus, doesn't everything in history depend on the role of personalities?

[Tabachnyk] I do not think so. For instance, Chile had its Constitution that was crushed by tanks, but life has brought everything back to its proper place. (One can also recall the Germany of 1933, whose Basic Law was more or less European.)

Why is the constitution a guarantor of stability? Because the draft approved by the Constitutional Commission includes a large number of absolutely vital norms direct applicable with regard to human rights — the right to defend one's personal dignity, honor, ownership rights, political beliefs. Incidentally, the chapter on human rights is the strongest as compared to the appropriate chapters of European constitutions in force. This will further the formation of a civilized civic society. Only in such a society is it impossible for one person to ruin a democratic society [as published]. If it comes to ruining statehood, it is the constitution which allows political forces and citizens to defend this statehood. This is a norm of direct applicability, which prevents any authoritarian and totalitarian encroachments by dictators.

[Halata] By the way, to continue with the subject of the constitution and independence — what is your attitude toward the "deepened integration" of Belarus and Russia, and what consequences may this bring for Ukraine?

[Tabachnyk] I think that this process has so many unknown quantities that it is impossible to write and assess any equation. For the time being, we see a scheme of several nested dolls [matroshky] and an extension ladder. The CIS is an association of basic compactness; the second rung is the CIS military-political union; the third rung or store is the "union of the four"; and the fourth store is the union of the Russian Federation and Belarus. However, for the time being, it is unknown where the staircase from the fourth to first, or from first to fourth stores is, and whether the "architects" have not forgotten about it at all. [passage as published]

Similar "integration" will surely add political and social problems to Belarus. These problems may be attenuated a little bit by investment incentives from Russia. But where will Russia find funds? Its patriots are already shouting that Russia is again sustaining somebody for nothing.

For Ukraine, this situation will rather have political consequences, because it will further a serious offensive of the leftist forces. This will give them a possibility to gamble on public opinion by pointing to some partial examples of the positive [aspect of integration] and urging Ukraine to follow the same path.

[Halata] Yeltsin once again failed to visit Ukraine. The preparation of his visit certainly required considerable funds. Who is going to compensate them? And generally: Are our statements about the understanding of the need for rescheduling this visit not due to a lack of state dignity?

[Tabachnyk] I do not think so. As far as I know, the funds have not been spent because it was clear from certain nuances that the visit would not take place. For example, a group that was to prepare the visit did not come. Thus, from the viewpoint of material expenses, Ukrainian taxpayers should not be worried. I would not say that we lack state ambitions. Possibly, a later visit of Yeltsin will help prepare agreements better. In general, rescheduling the highest level visits, even several times, is usual practice. After the successful visit of the Ukrainian president to Switzerland, one can admit that it was rescheduled several times. Likewise, the Austrian president's visit to Kiev was rescheduled several times, as well.

[Halata] The last question: The "Ukrainska Perspektyva" [Ukrainian Perspective] fund painstakingly disseminates half-scandalous rumors about a disappeared edition of your book written jointly with former presidential adviser Dmytro Vydrin. Could you shed some light on this story, please?

[Tabachnyk] It was as early as 1994 when Dmytro Hnatovych [Vydrin] proposed to jointly write a book about the development of Ukraine in recent years and prospects for Eurasia. We have written it. Still, the book was printed not in Finland, as the "Ukrainska Perspektyva" is trying to present, but in the "Lybid" editing house, with a circulation of 3,000 copies. The book, however, appeared with almost 600 grammatical and stylistic errors! Even my initials on the title page were changed — to Dmytro Oleksiyovych. It is not known what the proofreader and editor were looking at. In addition, I personally asked Vydrin to read the proofs carefully. The edition, of course, was withdrawn, and the whole story proved distressing. However, there was no political implication in the edition of the book, as the "Ukrainska Perspektyva" is trying to present (all errors were corrected in the second edition).

Ukraine: Communists Gain Two More Seats in Supreme Council

MM1604082596 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Apr 96 p 2

[Report by Aleksandr Golub: "Communist Party of Ukraine Augments Its Faction"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Lvov — The latest repeat elections to the Ukrainian Supreme Council have taken place in that country. Representatives of seven political parties of various persuasions contested 32 vacant parliamentary seats. As before, there was a low voter turnout. Six achieved their cherished aim. Two of them represent the Communist Party of Ukraine. The rest entered as independent candidates. Another Communist candidate for Leningradskiy District in Sevastopol, having garnered more votes than all the other candidates, reached the second round of voting. Thus, the Communist Party was the only party which managed to augment its faction.

Meanwhile Ukrainian Deputy General Prosecutor Olga Kolinko, who was supported by right-wingers and who got into parliament, and who made her name by falsifying "expose" cases against the Supreme Council leadership, proceeded to break all the laws when running for Lvov. Right in polling places her voters were openly given gifts: vodka, chocolate, coffee, shampoo.... "This is the first time I have come across such a level of electoral law violations and falsification as there was on this occasion in Lvov," PRAVDA's correspondent was told by A. Pokrovskiy, the Ukrainian Supreme Council Secretariat's chief consultant.

Evidently things are really bad with the national democrats if even in "nationally conscious" Lvov they are having to resort to openly bribing voters.

Ukraine: Appeal to Leadership on Behalf of Crimean Tatars

LD1504201196 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1440 GMT 15 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev — In a message to the Ukrainian president, Supreme Council chairman, and prime minister, the Crimean democratic forum for the promotion of the constitutional process in Ukraine points to the drastic reduction in funds allocated by the Ukrainian government to settle the Crimean Tatars returning to Crimea, as well as "the Ukrainian parliament's open disregard for issues vitally important to all of the Crimean Tatar people."

The statement's authors are demanding that the Ukrainian leadership urgently take decisions to grant Ukrainian citizenship to returning Crimean Tatars, create equal conditions for their participation in privatization, and "define the status of the Crimean Tatar nation in Ukraine in legislation."

The forum's participants point to the "opposition to implementation of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers resolution 'On Measures to Resolve Political, Legal, Socioeconomic, and Ethnic Problems in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea'" on the part of Crimea's power structures.

The Crimean democratic forum for the promotion of the constitutional process in Ukraine was set up on 13 April by the leaders of 30 national democratic and Crimean Tatar civic organizations in Crimea.

Tajikistan

Tajikistan: Rakhmanov Talks With Russia's Kulikov on Combatting Crime

LD1604085496 Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan Network in Tajik 0500 GMT 16 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] President Emomali Rakhmanov today received Anatoliy Kulikov, Russia minister of internal affairs, who has come to Dushanbe to participate in a consultation meeting of the heads of CIS interior ministries.

During their conversation they exchanged views mostly on bilateral cooperation and the coordination of anti-crime activities by their law-enforcement bodies.

The president will also receive the heads of interior ministries of other countries today.

Tajikistan: Rebel Leader Denies Split in Movement

LD1504123896 (Clandestine) Voice of Free Tajikistan in Tajik 0600 GMT 15 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Professor Sayed Abdullo Nuri, leader of the Islamic Movement [IMT] of Tajikistan and of the United Opposition Forces, has denied the existence of any [separate] Islamic organizations within the IMT and has said that any dissent from this line constitutes espionage by Tajikistan and Russia. Professor Nuri emphasized this issue in a letter. Recently, an organization, the so-called Society of Devotees of Islam [Jamiyati Fidoiyoni Islom] in Tajikistan announced its formation and said it is part of the IMT.

Our correspondent says that when the IMT was the only [non-communist] political party, the KGB set up the Great Scripture [Savodi A'zam] organization and tried to win over the main Sufis [Islamic mystics divines] of the country to its side. As the Sufis did not support this organization, Great Scripture ceased to exist. Our correspondent says this Society of Devotees of Islam is the very same Great Scripture operating under another name.

In his letter, Professor Nuri spoke of rumors about the existence of a diversity of opinions between the leaders of the IMT, especially regarding alleged differences between himself and his first deputy Haji Akbar Turajonzoda, and said these rumors have no real basis. Professor Nuri said these accusations are the work of the espionage bodies of Tajikistan. I would rather die at the hands of Turajonzoda than give comfort, caresses, and protection to those who are sowing the seeds of animosity, he said.

Turkmenistan

Turkmenistan: President Meets Uzbek Deputy Premier, Approves Route

LD1304153096 Ashgabat TURKMEN PRESS in Russian 0725 GMT 13 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Ashgabat, 11 Apr — President of Turkmenistan Saparmyrat Turkmenbashy met Deputy Prime Minister of Uzbekistan Rustam Yunosov this afternoon. [passage omitted]

Touching on the actual aim of his visit, Rustam Yunosov said that he has presented to the Turkmen head of state a project for building the Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Azerbaijan-Georgia transport route leading to the Black Sea. He called this route very promising for both road and railway communications. Saparmyrat Turkmenbashy and Islam Karimov discussed the possibility of opening this route and signed an intergovernment agreement at the beginning of this year. It was today that the president of Turkmenistan gave the go-ahead for implementation of this project.

Rustam Yunosov also spoke about a quadripartite agreement being prepared for signing by Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, and expressed the hope that a transit route to Poti would open in the near future.

Commenting on the results of implementation of the entire package of agreements signed by Saparmyrat Turkmenbashy and Islam Karimov during their meeting in Chardzhou in January, the deputy head of the Uzbek Government noted that all of them are being implemented with dynamism. Both in Turkmenistan and in Uzbekistan, working groups have been set up to coordinate implementation of these agreements.

Turkmenistan: NATO Commander, Officials Discuss Partnership for Peace

LD1504171096 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1514 GMT 15 Apr 96

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] ASHGABAT, MOSCOW, April 15 (Interfax) — A delegation from the Turkmenistan government and Commander-in-Chief of NATO's Atlantic forces Lieutenant-General John Cheehan [name as received] discussed the possibility of Turkmenistan's troops participating in NATO's Partnership for Peace program today.

Cheehan met with Deputy Prime Minister Batyr Sardzhayev [name as received], who is responsible for the security ministries, Foreign Minister Boris Shikhmuradov, and Defense Minister Danatar Kopekov.

The talks "were mainly focused on familiarizing each other with the situation," Kopekov told Interfax. Turkmenistan was especially interested in whether Turkmen officers would be taught English during the course of the program, as, Kopekov said, that is a must for the further training of personnel in Turkey, Pakistan, and other Central Asiatic countries.

The Defense Ministry has already prepared specific proposals for Turkmenistan's involvement in the Partnership for Peace program, Kopekov said. "These documents are being examined now in the Foreign, Economics, and Finance ministries," he said.

This is the second NATO delegation to visit Turkmenistan in the past 10 days, local observers said. Robert Hunter, the U.S. permanent consul to NATO, held talks with officials April 8 on the Partnership for Peace program, especially on providing humanitarian aid in emergency situations.

Armenia

Armenia: President's Adviser Meets Turkish President, Premier

NC1204203296 Yerevan Armenia's Radio First Program Network in Armenian 1900 GMT 12 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Armenian presidential press service has reported that the president's chief adviser, Zhirayr Liparityan, met with Turkish President Suleyman Demirel and Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz in Ankara today.

Liparityan handed Demirel President Levon Ter-Petrosyan's message of reply.

Turkish Foreign Minister Emre Gonensay was present at the meeting held with Prime Minister Yilmaz.

Armenia: PRC Foreign Minister Arrives for Official Visit

NC1504141196 Yerevan Armenia's Radio First Program Network in Armenian 1300 GMT 15 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A PRC delegation headed by Qian Qichen, deputy prime minister and foreign minister, arrived in Yerevan today for a one-day official visit.

Armenian Foreign Minister Vahan Papazyan and Chinese Ambassador to Armenia (Zhan Pejun) welcomed the guests at Yerevan's Zvartnots Airport. [passage indistinct] Foreign Minister Vahan Papazyan then received Qian Qichen. A report on the meeting will be aired during the next newscast.

Armenia: Chinese Foreign Minister Circulates Statement on Relations

LD1504184696 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1730 GMT 15 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] YEREVAN, April 15 (Interfax) — Deputy Premier of the Chinese State Council and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen arrived in Yerevan, the capital of Armenia, on a two-day official visit Monday.

The Chinese foreign minister and the Armenian leadership will hold talks to consider prospects for the development of bilateral cooperation, an Interfax correspondent reports.

Qian Qichen circulated a statement in Yerevan Monday, saying that he is satisfied with the positive development of Chinese-Armenian relations during the four years and more that have followed the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. He also praised the development of bilateral scientific, technological and cultural cooperation, cooperation in the area of aviation and other spheres.

The Chinese foreign minister said he hoped that his meetings with the Armenian leadership would be fruitful and would contribute to the development of mutual understanding, friendship and cooperation between the two countries.

He Monday met with Armenian Prime Minister Grant Bagratyan and Foreign Minister Vahan Papazyan.

His visit to Armenia will also help prepare for Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan's official visit to China, sources in the Armenian government said. Ter-Petrosyan is expected to visit China in early May 1996. Several bilateral treaties and accords are to be signed during the Armenian president's Chinese visit.

Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan: Defense Ministry Denies Use of Bases in Chechnya War

MM1504140396 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Apr 96 p 1

[Report by Zaur Kadymbekov: "Azerbaijan Cannot Support Gunmen"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Baku — The Azerbaijani Defense Ministry has circulated a statement in connection with a Russian television report on the use of the republic's territory to launch air strikes against populated areas in Chechnya, specifically the villages of Shalazhi and Katyr-Yurt.

The republic Defense Ministry categorically refutes such fabrications and is counting on the fact that in future the Russian Federation mass media will rely on more reliable and respectable sources of information.

It must be added to this that the reports of Russian television programs and newspapers, and even officials' statements that Azerbaijan is giving assistance to Chechen gunmen in the form of weapons and men which are being sent across the border, contradict elementary political logic. The republic, which is waging a struggle for its territorial integrity and against separatism in Nagorno-Karabakh, cannot in any circumstances support the Chechen gunmen who are trying to split up Russia.

Azerbaijan: Extradition Issue of Ex-President Remains Open

NC1504162696 Baku TURAN in English 0705 GMT 15 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku, 15 April 1996, TURAN — Last evening Azerbaijan's Ministers of Interior and National Security, Ramil Usubov and Namik Abbasov, left for Moscow. The purpose of their trip is to settle the issue on extradition of ex-President of Azerbaijan, Ayaz Mutalibov and ex-Defence Minister, Rahim Gaziyev, detained in Moscow to the Azeri authorities. General Prosecutor, Eldar Hasanov, is in Moscow for two days running due to this issue.

Yesterday Azeri President told the journalists that he does not have doubts as to extradition of Mutalibov. However, the source from Russia's Prosecutor's Office told TURAN's correspondent that "extradition of Rahim Gaziyev is possible, but the issue on extradition of Ayaz Mutalibov has not been settled yet." The same source mentioned that "there are no juridical grounds for extradition of Mutalibov."

In this issue the Azerbaijani authorities refer to the agreement between Russia and Azerbaijan on legal assistance. Azerbaijan's law-enforcement bodies report that Ayaz Mytalibov is charged with committing several crimes under articles 167, 169, 188-3, 192, 255-1 of Criminal Code of the country (abuse of power, neglect of duties, organization of violation of public order and exceeding of authority).

Several source report currently Mutalibov is in the hospital of the investigation ward of Moscow's Department of Internal Affairs due to rise of blood pressure.

Azerbaijan: Aliyev-Yilmaz Joint Statement on Solving Regional Problems

NC1604114696 Baku TURAN in English
0642 GMT 15 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku/15.04.96/TURAN—Last evening after the negotiations President Aliyev and Turkey's Prime-Minister, Mesut Yilmaz, signed joint statement. The sides also exchanged notes on entrance of agreement concerning friendship and cooperation between Turkey and Azerbaijan into force.

In the joint statement the sides come out for settlement of problems of the region by peaceful way on the basis of the international law. The document also reflects attitude towards the resolution of Russian Duma to denunciate Belovezh agreement. The resolution of Russian Duma is called "attempt beforehand doomed to reserve the course of history".

The sides are for peaceful settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict within the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group providing for restoration of territorial integrity and Azerbaijan. The importance of strengthening of activity of Turkey, U.S. and Russia in the peacekeeping process within the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group has been stressed as well.

The sides have highly appraised significance of agreement on double route of early Azeri oil. It has been noted that Baku-Supsa pipeline will be the starting point for the oil pipeline to the Turkey's terminal Ceyhan.

The sides are also determined to develop bilateral mutually beneficial relations on all directions of economy.

Azerbaijan: Yilmaz-Aliyev News Conference Covers Pipeline, Karabakh

NC1604114796 Baku TURAN in English
0642 GMT 15 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku/15.04.96/TURAN—"The basic peculiarity of relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey is absolute coincidence and closeness of positions to all regional and international issues. We cooperate and provide assistance to each other in settlement of these issues", President Aliyev said during the press-conference dedicated to results of negotiations completed yesterday in Baku.

Having also stressed coincidence of positions of Turkey and Azerbaijan to settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, President Aliyev once again acknowledged that Baku is ready to give the highest status of autonomy to Nagorno-Karabakh on condition of restoration of territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.

Prime-Minister, Mesut Yilmaz, mentioned that settlement of the conflict based on the principle of territorial integrity of Azerbaijan will be useful for the whole region.

"Baku-Ceyhan pipeline will be the basis of peace and stability in the whole Caucasian region", Mesut Yilmaz says. He said that Ankara wishes Baku-Supsa pipeline to be the starting point for the strategical oil pipeline Baku-Ceyhan and the positions of the sides to this issue coincide.

As far as transport communication between Turkey and Armenia is concerned, the air corridor with Armenia operates now, Mesut Yilmaz said. "The issue related to ground transport communication can be settled positively if Armenia stops aggression and recognizes territorial integrity of Azerbaijan", he noted.

"The wish of the Armenian side to receive the status of independent state for Nagorno-Karabakh does not have perspective", Ankara told the representative of Armenia's President, Zhirayr Liparityan, during his recent visit to Ankara. "We advised to the Armenian side to accept the proposal of Baku on the highest status of Nagorno-Karabakh inside Azerbaijan", Mesut Yilmaz mentioned.

Azerbaijan: Turkish Premier Concludes Visit to Azerbaijan

NC1504194296 Baku Radio Baku Network in Azeri 1600 GMT 15 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz, who is on an official visit to our republic, this morning met the leaders of the political parties and the representatives of the Akhska Turks.

Mesut Yilmaz was presented with an honorary doctoral diploma during the meeting with the faculty and students at the Baku State University, which is named after Mamed-Emin Rasulzade. The Turkish prime minister also visited the residences being built for the diplomats. Mesut Yilmaz attended the inauguration of the Baybank Commercial Bank and the (?transistor company) offices build in Baku by the Turkish business circles. He also met a group of refugees housed in Sabuji district.

Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz concluded his official visit to Azerbaijan [words indistinct] at Bina airport.

The honorable guest was seen off at the airport by President Heydar Aliyev, National Assembly Chairman Rasul Guliyev, Prime Minister Fuad Guliyev, head of the presidential executive staff Ramiz Mehtiyev, and other officials.

Let us recall that a number of documents on broadening bilateral cooperation in the economic, political, social, and other spheres were signed during Mesut Yilmaz's visit to Azerbaijan. These documents will form the foundation for the furtherance of the multifaceted relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey.

Georgia

Georgia: Weekly Interview With Shevardnadze

LD1504153696 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 0512 GMT 15 Apr 96

[Regular weekly studio interview with Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze by Nato Oniani in Tbilisi — live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt]

[Oniani] Greetings, here is an interview with Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze. There were several important events last week and I would like to begin today's interview with the brilliant holiday commemorating Jesus' resurrection. Yesterday the whole of the Orthodox world celebrated the Easter holiday. The Easter Day celebrations last week coincided with the day of the Georgian tongue, which is symbolic. Attention remains centered on 14 April because Georgia narrowly escaped a very big disaster at the time [attempt under the communists to proclaim Russian a state language in Georgia.] One of the participants in the movement yesterday remembered on Georgian television that the then principal of Tbilisi University had calmed the students by saying: Do not worry, students, you can say whatever you like, everything will be fine. Of course he murmured these words to them out of the earshot of others. You have remembered this day on many occasions. The footage of those events is not available for various reasons; at least it has not been available so far. Do you have anything to tell us, something which you have not told us before about that day?

[Shevardnadze] Thank you. Greetings. I would like to once again congratulate our people on the day of the brilliant Easter. I hope that by the will of the Almighty, every Easter will bring new happiness, new success, and strength to Georgia. Today is a day of remembrance. I would like to remember the people who were close to us, the ones who gave their lives for our country, those who paid tribute to Georgia and are no longer with us today.

As for the day of 14 April, it must be noted that it coincided with the beginning of students' spring celebrations. [passage omitted]

I have always considered, and still consider that 14 April is a unique event in Georgian history. I said yesterday that on that day, our people managed to pull down one wall of the [Soviet] empire for Georgia and made a very significant step to independence. This was a true celebration of unity, bravery, and wisdom. I think that I am not exaggerating if I say that I and my colleagues in the leadership in those days were facing a historic aim. Of course, it is with special gratitude that I would like to remember our intelligentsia, and our young people. If anything else should be remembered — and there will be a lot to remember — I would like to ask everyone to find the footage depicting the events of those days, that session of the Supreme Council, and those events which were under way in Rustaveli Avenue. [passage omitted]

[Oniani] Thank you. Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas visited Georgia last week. Economic and communications agreements were signed. Talks were also held in connection with the European-Asian corridor which is significant for the economy first and foremost, but it is also of political significance.

[Shevardnadze] The official visit to Georgia by the Lithuanian president must be viewed as an important one in restoring the new, democratic, and market-oriented economy, as well as in establishing the mutually beneficial, equal, and cultural links with post-Soviet countries.

As a result of the visit, the agreements signed in the fields of trade and the economy, sport and tourism, customs cooperation, and air and automobile transport will undoubtedly have a positive impact on both the Baltic and the Transcaucasus regions. The Lithuanian side agrees with us on that.

My meeting with the presidents of the German firms Martin Bauer and Martin Bauer Middle East was also significant. These firms have signed agreements with Georgia and the implementation of the agreements has already started. They provide for the revival of tea production in Georgia, the delivery of wheat and grain to Georgia, and the development of various fields of agriculture and the food industry. [passage omitted] We cannot ignore the positive signs in the food industry. According to operational information from the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, in the first three months of the current year, excluding bread production, field production was 23 percent higher than the corresponding period in 1995. The production of wine, brandy, champagne, confectionery, sugar, mineral water, beer, nonalcoholic drinks, and other products has grown by 23 percent. This is a considerable and promising change for the better.

Various industries have had rather good results in the first three months of this year. In particular, according to preliminary information by the Department for Socioeconomic Information, except for the power engineering and bread industry sectors, production has grown by 24 percent; and by 5 percent if we include bread and power production. These are fields where it is difficult to talk about growth. The dwindling in the need [as heard] for bread is not dangerous in itself.

Compared with last year's results when we had an unstoppable decline, the above results are quite good. The revival trend in production is evident but the production tempo is still not fast enough if we consider what is outlined in the president's program. Therefore, as of April, we must not allow a drop in the tempo of production, all the more now that power supplies have improved with the onset of spring.

The first signs of this are already appearing — electricity is being fed to the Zestaponi nonferrous metal factory, the Chiatura factory, and the Rustavi metallurgical factory. [passage omitted]

A quite solid systematic economic basis has been prepared in the country for the speeding up of production. The following data is very interesting: private property is gaining its footing; according to the latest data, over 7,100 small and medium-size enterprises have been privatized; over 100,000 people are working in these enterprises and their average wages are four or five times larger than the wages of those working in the state sector; about 900 large enterprises have been floated; over 230,000 people have bought shares; state property worth $210 million is being auctioned; shares worth more than $60 million have already been sold; these figures are expected to go up in the next three months.

According to data from the Tax Inspectorate, in the 1-12 April period, the tax revenue to the budgets of the central and territorial units will be 7.5 million lari, that is, the sum will be 50 million lari since the beginning of 1996.

According to the Customs Department, the state budget received 8.5 million lari between 1 January and 12 April 1996 — equivalent to the state budget revenue for the whole of 1995. In the first 12 days of April alone the budget received nearly 2 million lari. This figure is 1.5 times higher than that of the last month.

According to the Finance Ministry, there has been a particularly positive movement in central budget revenue, which by 1 April without grants amounted to 23.5 million lari. By the end of the second decade [as heard] of April, the figure had risen to 27.5 million lari. The average daily amount of revenue is 385,000 lari, which is 47 percent higher than the first quarter of 1996. [passage omitted]

[Oniani] Batono [polite form of address in Georgian] Eduard, last week another significant date was commemorated — 9 April [in 1989, the Soviet army stormed the square in front of the government building, killing 14 protesters.] This date will probably remain in Georgian history for a long time and it will always be discussed. Then there is the discussion of the Abkhaz issue. You gave your promised address to the Georgian Parliament on 10 April. Before that, parliament had discussed this issue and on Wednesday [17 April], parliament will probably give its final word on the issue. Preceding that [Russian State Duma deputies] Baburin and Lebed had visited Abkhazia. The 18 March agreement on the checking of ships [heading for Abkhazia] is being implemented only partly. Parliament Chairman Zurab Zhvania has announced that the issue of the Russian peacekeepers' withdrawal from the conflict zone may be raised and resolved. Some of the parties, which do not have seats in parliament, have supported this proposal.

[Shevardnadze] I have said a lot in connection with 9 April and I do not need to repeat myself. As for the Abkhaz conflict which was discussed in parliament, I have addressed parliament and this was carried by

Georgian radio and television, when I tried to outline to the listeners the reasons which had triggered off the conflict, and my views on how the conflict may be resolved. I was impressed by parliament's discussion, the competence with which it was held, the deep knowledge of events, and the objectivity of assessments which is characteristic of parliamentary debates on the issue.

[Oniani] And mentioning our mistakes which you also broached in your address by saying that it was very significant that deputies had stressed that.

[Shevardnadze] I think that there is still a lot to say in connection with both our own mistakes and the assessments which we gave [to the Abkhaz events] at the session. This must be discussed further outside the country, in international organizations, in European structures, and in the CIS.

I do not doubt that the adopted resolution will be a good means of speeding up the historic reconciliation of the Georgian and Abkhaz peoples. Neither of us has an alternative apart from reconciliation. I am sure that they will arrive at this conclusion — I mean those who are still aggressively disposed. I hope that parliament will discuss further the problems of both the Abkhaz and Tskhinvali [South Ossetian] regions and make a large contribution to the restoration of Georgia's territorial integrity. I think that parliament shares my view on Abkhazia's special status within a single Georgian state. Subsequently, if this is reflected in parliament's resolution, then this will play a major role in the conflict's settlement, as the problem of defining Abkhazia's status is a key one at negotiations.

[Oniani] Qichen Qian, the vice premier of the State Council of the PRC and foreign minister, will visit Tbilisi tomorrow [16 April]. A considerable length of time has passed since you visited China. Significant steps have been taken since then in connection with the European-Asian corridor and the Silk Road.

[Shevardnadze] The visit by Qichen Qian is a big event and it proves that the Caucasus is also in the focus of the sphere of interests of this gigantic country.

As you know, China is a permanent member of the Security Council and it actively supports Georgia's territorial integrity and its indivisibility, which has been confirmed many times at Security Council sessions during discussions of the Abkhaz conflict.

You remember our visit to the great country, and the warmth with which the Chinese leadership and people greeted our delegation. I do not doubt that Georgia will receive the high official of the PRC with the same warmth. Naturally, businesslike talks will be held. We shall discuss the situation in the European-Asian space within a single continent — I mean I am viewing Europe and Asia as one continent — and the principal issues of economic integration. I think that we shall talk about the prospects of the European-Asian transport corridor, as China has been rather keen on the project lately and, of course, we shall discuss the situation in the Caucasus. We may discuss other things as well but we shall mainly concentrate on the above issues.

[Oniani] This was an interview with the Georgian President, Eduard Shevardnadze. Thank you.

Georgia: Communist Leader Favors New Union With Russia

BR1604095796 Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 13-14 Apr 96 p 7

[Report on interview with Georgian Communist Party leader Panteleymon Georgadze by Vicken Cheterian in Tbilisi; date not given: "Georgian Communists Believe in the Union"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tbilisi — The Georgian Communist Party has regained its self-confidence following the Russian Communists' victory in last year's parliamentary election. And party leader Georgadze has not lost faith in a new Communist union.

Panteleymon Georgadze, white-haired and bearded, received us wearing his Soviet general's uniform.

The leader of the Communist Party of Georgia (GCP) radiates authority.

In his office he sits in front of a big map of the Caucasus region, as though he were about to explain military defense or attack strategies.

"As I see it, the key to the freedom of the Transcaucasus region is a victory for the Russian Communists," he said.

A series of events has again brought the Georgian Communist Party into the limelight. The party had actually dissolved itself after its election defeat at the end of the 1980's, when Zviad Ghamsakhurdia was leading the rapidly advancing Georgian nationalist movement.

Self-Confidence Restored

The GCP was reestablished in 1994 and today represents an important opposition bloc in the country.

The Georgian Communist Party has regained its self-confidence after the Russian Communists' victory in the parliamentary elections last year. On March 15, just a few months before the Russian presidential election in June, the Duma passed a resolution repudiating the Beloveshskaya agreement, which had officially dissolved the Soviet Union.

[Cheterian] But are the different Communist parties outside Russia ready and able to unite in a new Soviet federation?

[Georgadze] This will be a variation on the old Soviet Union. There will be a greater degree of self-government, and the union will be on a voluntary basis. It will probably begin with 2-3 states and others can join later. All the areas now suffering under conflicts — for example, Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Crimea — will be offered membership of the union on exactly the same terms. [Georgadze ends]

Defense Against Separatism

The national question was one of the most important causes of unrest in the last four years up to the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Georgia itself had two secessionist movements, in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Today the Georgian central government has lost control over the two regions.

[Cheterian] Would the GCP under certain circumstances accept Abkhazia and South Ossetia becoming members of a future soviet union instead of joining Georgia?

[Georgadze] Georgia will also be a member of the future union. And remember that Abkhazia only became part of Georgia 10 years after the creation of the Soviet power in 1931. There could well be a transition period, during which war-torn regions would have a special status. [Georgadze ends]

The Soviet Union's formula of "international friendship" functioned well as long as the various ethnic groups accepted the administrative divisions which were dictated from Moscow.

The first time two Soviet Communist parties openly opposed one another was in 1988 when the Supreme Soviet of Nagorno-Karabakh (which was then an Azerbaijan autonomous region where the majority of the population were Armenian) approved a resolution to the effect that Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia should be united.

The decision was rejected by Azerbaijan's Communist Party and by President Gorbachev.

The People's Verdict

[Cheterian] Will the various Communist parties, which are separated by new national borders, be able to agree on solutions to conflicts like those in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and Chechnya? [Cheterian ends]

Georgadze, a former general and second-in-command of the Transcaucasian border guard views the question as follows:

"We are convinced that national issues can only be resolved if you respect the people's verdict and the ideology of the Communist Party."

The Georgian Communist Party is not very interested in discussing areas of conflict.

On the other hand, the Communists have an effective argument when they compare the current social and economic collapse with the full employment and low prices of the Soviet era.

"Reforms are needed. But what is happening now is destruction, not reform. In Kutajisi (the second largest city in Georgia) an automobile factory with 20,000 employees has been closed because it used to have connections with another factory in Saporozhe (Ukraine).

"The new leadership is now looking for assistance in Japan and Italy rather than contacting Saporozhe. And the factory is still closed.

"We would resort to economic reforms like those which the present government has tried, but instead of asking the United States and Germany for help we would turn to Russia, Belarus, and Armenia," Georgadze said.

Political Prostitution

The Georgian Government is composed to a large extent of former Communists.

The president, Eduard Shevardnadze, was himself an important figure in the Georgia of the Soviet era.

He became world famous as Gorbachev's foreign minister, but he had previously been both interior minister and first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party under Brezhnev.

Many of the party cadres still occupy important positions, because Shevardnadze gathered his former colleagues around him when he returned to power in Georgia in 1992.

"I have a very negative opinion of them, because they are actually traitors.

"I call this phenomenon 'political prostitution.' Just imagine if Bill Clinton announced tomorrow that he was a Communist and had been for many years.

"I can well understand that people can change their minds and alter their convictions.

"But I cannot understand that a country's Communist government can be the same as the anti-Communist, procapitalist government.

"That makes no sense.

"If Gennadiy Zyuganov were to win the Russian election, Shevardnadze would no longer be able to work with Russia. It saddens us that Shevardnadze enjoys so little respect in Russia," Georgadze said.

Through the Ballot Box

The Georgian Communists of today are markedly different from the famous Georgian Communists of earlier times, such as Stalin, Ordzhonikidze, and Beria.

"Today's Georgia is shivering and hungry. The Communist Party is having a hard time keeping people off the streets. Everybody wants to hold meetings and demonstrations... but we do not want to provoke," Georgadze said.

Another difference is that the Georgian Communist Party no longer seeks power through revolutionary means but prefers to win an election victory.

Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze was the first foreign president to visit Moscow after the Duma vote.

He called for a CIS summit where the resolution could be discussed.

Shevardnadze called the resolution "a backward step toward a totalitarian regime and a threat to all independent CIS countries."

The Georgian president pointedly canceled his scheduled meeting with the Duma's Communist president, Gennadiy Selezhnev.

Selezhnev said later that in doing so Shevardnadze had endangered the Russian-Georgian government pact and he also criticized Georgia's proposal for a resolution of the conflict in Abkhazia.

The Abkhazian leader, Vladislav Ardzinba, has himself said that Abkhazia will support the rebuilding of the former Soviet Union, provided that Abkhazia is not reincorporated in Georgia.

In this context Ardzinba pointed out that the Abkhazian people had been against breaking up the Soviet Union at the time.

The prospect of a Communist victory is again creating major conflicts on the political map of the Caucasus.

The Georgian Communists are gaining popularity as the nationalist parties fall out of favor.

This has brought about four civil wars in Georgia, and Shevardnadze has become unpopular, because living standards continue to fall for what is by far the largest section of the population.

The big question is whether the Georgian Communist Party can solve the country's current problems if it comes to power.

Georgia: CPA Chief Pleased With Moscow Meetings With Zyuganov

LD1604091296 Sukhumi Republic of Abkhazia Radio in Russian 0338 GMT 16 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Oleg Damenia, chairman of the executive committee of the Communist Party of Abkhazia [CPA], recently visited Moscow where he met with leaders of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation [CPRF]. On his return from Moscow, he was interviewed by our correspondent:

[Begin recording] [Damenia] I stayed in Moscow for about two weeks for some practical and technical work aimed at [words indistinct] between the CPRF and the CPA. [passage indistinct]

I met with leaders of the CPRF, including [Gennadiy] Zyuganov, [words indistinct]. We discussed various issues of common interest, including economic, social and political issues as well as issues relating to education, science, and culture.

[Correspondent] You said that the Russian communist leaders treat Abkhazia's problems with sympathy.

[Damenia] I think that among the Russian parties and movements, our national interests are most fully and fundamentally supported by the CPRF. That is because it unites most intellectual, most educated and clever people. The Russian Communist Party managed to bring together great intellectual potential. The party has powerful cadres. Our national interests — I mean Abkhazia's state interests — coincide with the policies pursued by the CPRF. [end recording]

Georgia: Situation of Russians in Abkhazia Called 'Disastrous'

MM1604094696 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Apr 96 p 2

[Report by Igor Sizov: "Abkhazia's 'Blockade Rations': Two Loaves of Bread"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sochi — Gennadiy Nikitchenko, chairman of the Russian Communities of Abkhazia, held a news conference in Sochi at which he talked about the disastrous situation of the 75,000 Russians living on Abkhazian territory.

He said that the Russians in this republic were in a very grave situation because their families are living in cities and are not associated with the agricultural economy. Former teachers, engineers, scientific workers, physicians, and now pensioners are kept going only by the fact that six times a week they receive free vegetable broth. Their weekly pensions of 2,500 rubles are enough only for two loaves of bread.

Because of the complex situation along Abkhazia's borders there are not enough jobs in the republic. Its famous sanatoriums are empty. The blockade has made it impossible to export citrus fruits, tea, and tobacco. The city of Tkvarchela's pits, which previously delivered coal to Russia's southern regions, have been mothballed. Once again it is primarily Russians who are losing their jobs because of this.

There are not enough textbooks in Russian schools, and children are learning their native language from 10-year-old primers. The closed border with Russia is preventing the development of cultural ties between the Russian people living in Abkhazia and their fellow countrymen. But most importantly, many Russian old people have been simply forgotten in the blockaded republic — life is hard for them and they have nowhere else to go.

Estonia

Estonia: Germany's Kinkel Questions Kallas on Minorities in Estonia

LD1604112796 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 0900 GMT 16 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel told Estonian Foreign Minister Siim Kallas in Bonn that Russia's increasingly frequent threats against Estonia are impermissible and groundless. According to the Estonian Foreign Ministry's press secretary, Kinkel said he will send Kallas a letter in the near future in which he will seek answers about Estonia's policy on minorities. Once Germany has received the answers, it would like to discuss with Russia the situation of minorities in Estonia.

Kinkel also said that he does not support the idea of creating so-called gray zones within European security structures.

Estonia: German Foreign Minister Criticizes Russia's Threats

WS1604104896 Tallinn BNS in English 1000 GMT 16 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tallinn, Apr 16, BNS — Moscow's recent threats against Estonia draw from accusations that are lacking grounds, German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel told his visiting Estonian counterpart Siim Kallas Monday.

Kinkel said Bonn had regularly given Russia to understand that threats against Estonia were impermissible and groundless.

Kinkel said he would send a letter to Kallas soon, asking Tallinn to answer his questions about Estonia's policy on ethnic minorities. After receiving the answers Bonn would seek a discussion of the Estonian ethnic minorities situation with Moscow, the Estonian Foreign Ministry press secretary told BNS.

Kinkel said that Germany, too, wanted to avoid creating "grey" areas in the European security architecture. He said Estonia is able to join the European Union sooner than NATO and that Germany fully and strongly supports Estonia's accession to the EU.

Briefly discussed at the meeting were bilateral relations between Estonia and Germany.

During a speech at the German Foreign Political Society later on Monday, Kallas said statements by top European politicians were failing to dismiss fears that a new division accord, similar to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, could be concluded in Europe. He said one of the problems which Estonia saw was the number of public statements and speculation on who is on NATO's "in" and "out" list. "NATO members should realize that any statement which may cast doubt on Baltic membership to NATO only increases Russia's perception that the Baltics are within their 'sphere,'" Kallas said.

On Tuesday Kallas is scheduled to meet the president of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, Otto Graf Lambsdorff, and the foreign policy leader of the ruling coalition's CDU/CSU faction, Karl Lamers. The foreign minister is due back in Tallinn later Tuesday.

Estonia: Kallas Expresses Optimism in Address to German Society

WS1604084996 Tallinn Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Release in English 1331 GMT 15 Apr 96

[Speech by Estonian Foreign Minister Siim Kallas to the German Society for Foreign Policy, in Bad Godesberg on 15 April]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Dear Ladies and Gentlemen, I stand before you at a time of great optimism and progress for the future course of Europe. It is also a time of concerns and uncertainties as Europe moves into the next millennium. This view is mixed not only in the established democracies of Europe, but also in the re-established democracies of formerly Soviet occupied states such as Estonia.

The positive view of Europe is one which welcomes the opportunities created by the end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism. It highlights the reunification of countries like Germany and the restoration of others like Estonia. It rejoices in the opportunity to promote democracy and free-markets where these principles were once denied. It embraces competition, trade and investment with newly free states and pursues the wealth this may bring. Most of all, it seeks to consolidate and expand our common European values through enlargement of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

The negative view of Europe is one which laments over the problems created by the demise of the Cold War. It is nostalgic for the clear and predictable system of the Cold War. It views human rights with scorn and as a nuisance. It feeds Euro-sceptics and perceives competition as a threat to the economy. It recoils at the prospect of NATO enlargement and seeks stability through submission.

Estonia's view of Europe's future is a mix of optimism laced with uncertainty. In our optimism, we seek to promote democracy and free-markets, enhance European security and safeguard our independence. We are optimistic that these goals can be reached. In our uncertainty, we remain vigilant and mindful of the obstacles and opposition that Estonia, and Europe, will face in reaching our goals.

Regardless of which view you hold, one thing is certain: this year and the next five years present us with the opportunity to forge the Europe of our choosing. Estonia is working to create its future for its own benefit and the benefit of others. If we do not create our future, others will. For example, Sergey Karaganov and others on Russia's Foreign and Defence Policy Committee recently compiled a report that highlighted the year 2005 as the target date for the restoration of the former Soviet Union. The only issue we could agree on in the paper is that the next five years are key to either the success or failure of consolidating Europe or restoring the Soviet Union.

In order to look at where Europe is going, I would like to briefly take a look at where Europe has been. In 1876 Chancellor Otto von Bismarck commented that "Whoever speaks of Europe is wrong: it is a geographical concept."

At that time Bismarck was correct — Europe was just a geographical concept, with nation-states calculating their position in terms of balance of power politics and crude notions of imperialism. The Baltic region, with its strategic access to the Baltic Sea and its vulnerability to the Great Powers, was a geographic card that was traded by Kaisers, Kings and Czars alike. The view of Europe as simple geography to be divided at will carried over into our century, and resulted in the division of Europe between Molotov and Ribbentropp. With the stroke of a pen, the fates of Estonia and others were sealed for the next fifty years.

What emerged after World War II was a Europe divided not only along geographical lines, but along the principles of democracy and free-market versus the old notion of imperialism and expansion masked as communism. Nowhere was the division as striking as here in Germany, where a wall divided families, friends, and a nation. But not only geography and ideology divided Europe, our visions of Europe divided us as well.

Now, after the Cold War, the forced and then enforced division of Europe has ended. The institutions created to promote democracy, stability and prosperity in the continent has changed our view of Europe. It is not a simple geographical identity as Bismarck stated, it is a European family of nations whose identity is based on democracy and the rule of law. But the family portrait is not complete.

In order to achieve our idealistic goals of a unified Europe, we must realistically assess and address threats which may divide Europe. Stability or instability in Europe, and especially in the young democracies of Europe, remains linked to two interrelated factors. The first is the fate of Russia and its path of progress — whether backward to communism and confrontation, or forwards to democracy and co-operation. The second is the integration of Central European democracies into European institutions — specifically, the European Union and NATO.

Russia remains on a rocky and winding road toward establishing the principles promoted by European states. Although Russia has progressed, the likelihood that Russia might be forced or hijacked off the road to Europe increases daily.

The distance between Russia and Europe continues to increase as pessimism and nostalgia for the past increases. Democracy in Russia has taken root in the form of parliamentary elections, but these elections have resulted in decidedly undemocratic forces coming to power. Market reforms are slowly being implemented but a halt to privatisation and the nationalisation of private property is being sought by communists.

Russia's human rights record is strife with violations, from the expulsion of Caucasians from Moscow to the carpetbombing of civilian targets in Chechnya. The fighting in Chechnya has lasted for over one year and yet the sounds of gunfire and shelling continues to be met with silence in Western capitals. It appears that fear of offending President Yeltsin is greater than the fear of discrediting human rights norms. The ongoing war in Chechnya also reflects a culture of war within the political and military elite, where problems are best resolved by force instead of negotiation. I hope that the withdrawal of troops as announced by President Yeltsin is a sincere effort to end the conflict and not a hollow election pledge.

Respect for international law and international agreements are also being compromised — threats are made to scrap the CFE and SALT treaties, cornerstones of arms control and confidence building in Europe.

Until a few years ago, Russian statements regarding the "near abroad" were dismissed as aimed for "internal consumption". Now, the psychology of revanchism is in place. Statements for "internal consumption" are replaced by plans for the external consumption of neighbouring states. An Institute on the Near Abroad opened last week to promote these policies. We also cannot be blind to the recent annulment of the Belovezh Accords by the Russian Duma and the integration of Belarus with Russia as the first steps in this process.

We would like Estonia's relations with Russia to be based on positive engagement, good-neighbourly relations, a respect for sovereignty and a clearly articulated and publicly recognised acceptance of Estonia's continuing independence. Unfortunately, Moscow does not appear to share our principles. Russia still refuses to come to terms with its actions in World War Two and remains convinced that the occupation of Estonia was voluntary. If Estonia's occupation continues to be defined as "voluntary," what will be the methods and means used by Russia to achieve the "voluntary" reunion of neighbouring states? Russia also refuses to recognise the Tartu Peace Treaty as the basis of Estonia's statehood. Border negotiations threaten to be stalled due to this issue.

Allegations of human rights violations in Estonia are aired by Russia despite contradictory findings by international organisations. In order to twist our arm, Russia has placed double tariffs on Estonian goods crossing the border. Moreover, the secular dispute within the orthodox church is being deliberately politicised by Moscow. Statements and policy papers that imply Estonia falling under Moscow's control do not relieve our suspicions.

Estonia's commitment to European values and its own national interest is causing concern in Russia. Recently, the chief of the Baltic affairs division of the Foreign Ministry Sergey Prikhodko stated that relations with Estonia are deteriorating because we are "openly slighting Russia's interests as a great country." Estonia cannot and will not compromise its sovereignty for the dubious interests of Russia.

Despite these hurdles, Estonia remains open to improving relations with our largest neighbour. Better relations are in our interest as well as Russia's, but to use an old cliche, it takes two to tango. During my six months as foreign minister, Estonia's conciliatory steps forward are countered by Russia taking two steps backwards. Estonia recently ratified the Estonia-Russia withdrawal agreement, which provides social guarantees to Russian military pensioners in Estonia, we have also ratified the European Convention on Human Rights and have distributed Aliens' Passports to non- citizens living in Estonia. In our border negotiations, we have accepted the present administrative border as the de facto border, thus ceding territory of the pre-war Estonia. The response to our compromises is, unfortunately, a list of new demands. It is hard to see what more Estonia can do if the other partner does not want to dance.

I can only hope that Russia will begin to view Estonia as a state within Europe and not a bezirk [German word for small administrative unit] within an empire. Germany has an historical obligation to make this clear to Russia. As Germany now recognises the injustice caused by dividing Europe, Germany should not create new injustices by drawing new dividing lines across the continent. In setting policies for both EU and NATO enlargement, Wolfgang Schauble recently stated that Germany should not provoke Russia. I believe that German support for our independence will not provoke Russia, but promote a dialogue between Estonia and Russia based on respect. What will harm Russia are attempts by Moscow to limit, if not extinguish, our sovereignty.

The second factor in the stability of Europe, and a determining factor in shaping the Europe of the 21st Century is the enlargement of the European Union and NATO.

During the debate surrounding EU and NATO enlargement, attention has focused on central Europe and the Visegrad countries. However, European security is not only tied with the security of central and southern Europe. The region of northern Europe is also in need of a clear strategy to anchor the Baltic states to the West, especially during NATO expansion. The borders separating the Baltic states and Russia are already beginning to shape the region as the "Berlin" of the nineties, where the diverging views of East and West collide. While Estonia is appreciative of the many high-profile meetings and statements of support from Europe's leaders, I am concerned that the policy falls short at the bureaucratic level. The only way to prevent a new Berlin is by demonstrating European solidarity, at both the decision-making and working level, for the integration and independence of the Baltic states.

Estonia has a strategy for the region. We seek to become one of the first states to move quickly on accession negotiations, which we hope will begin with all associate members after the close of the Intergovernmental Conference. We believe that this is both a realistic and pragmatic decision based on our present ties to the Union and our readiness to join the Union.

Despite the fact that Estonia is not yet an EU member, our liberal trade policy characterised by virtually no tariff or non-tariff barriers and our favourable investment climate is already linking Estonia's economy together with EU members. Presently, two-thirds of Estonia's imports and over one-half of Estonia's exports are with EU member states:

— Our main trading partners are Finland and Sweden;
— Germany is the third highest exporter of goods to Estonia;
— Finland and Sweden are also our top investors; Germany ranks seventh.

— Estonia ranks third among Central European states in foreign direct investments per capita.

During a time of growing Euro-scepticism, these facts make Estonia a "Euro-realist":

— we realistically view our future as tied to the EU.

Estonia's unwavering economic reforms and financial discipline also places Estonia before other states in our ability to meet membership criteria.

— Our estimated GDP growth for 1996 is projected at six per cent.
— Estonia's currency, the kroon, remains pegged to the Deutschmark and has been stable since its introduction in 1992. We do not have to struggle to meet monetary requirements
— we have met virtually all of them.
— Farm subsidies have been eliminated. Over forty thousand farmers who comprise only four per cent of our work force already compete in a free-market.
— Estonian law requires a balanced state budget.
— The official unemployment rate is slightly above two per cent.
— Foreign debt is only eight per cent of GDP, making Estonia the least indebted state in Central Europe.

The EU has already recognised our success by allowing Estonia to be the first state to gain associate status without a transition period. In addition to these factors, our small size, liberal economy and lack of subsidies makes Estonia easier for the EU to welcome than larger, less prepared and potentially expensive applicant countries.

Some may argue that entry of one Baltic state without the others weakens, instead of strengthens, regional security and co-operation. I believe that this is furthest from the truth. One Baltic state within a European institution, no matter which one it is, is better than three states stranded in a "grey" zone of interest. Membership of one Baltic state will also support the entry process for the others. It is much easier to open the door for membership when one is inside, as opposed to all three pushing from outside. EU enlargement to the Baltic states would send a clear message to Moscow that the Baltics belong, as we rightly do, in the West. I prefer this form of preventive diplomacy to Russia's version of preventive diplomacy which is "join us before we join you!"

Expanding the EU border along Russia indirectly supports the reform process within Russia as well. Not only would Russia come into greater contact with EU forces and principles, Estonia could serve as an example that market reforms can and do thrive in a former command economy. The signal that the Baltics are firmly within European structures also strengthens the democratic forces in Russia by denying hard-liners an opportunity to meddle in the Baltics. Instead of the Baltics becoming a military buffer zone between West and East, our region should be the front line of economic and democratic forces. As the former head of the Bank of Estonia and the present foreign minister, I am a strong proponent of the mantra "make business, not war."

In integrating the Baltic states and unifying Europe, economic unions and economic interests alone are not a substitute for "hard" security guarantees. For this reason Estonia continues to work toward NATO membership using all means available to strengthen and expand our ties.

We are active participants in the Partnership for Peace process, through which we quietly yet consistently march toward membership. Foreign military advisors from NATO states continue to assist Estonia in building and shaping our defence forces and structures to meet NATO standards. Presently, there are 5 German advisors in Estonia while over fifteen members of the Estonian defence forces study in Germany.

In seeking NATO membership, Estonia does not want to be security consumer, but a security provider as well. The recent fighting and the present peace implementation in Bosnia-Herzegovina proves to us that European security is indivisible. Our forces are alongside other NATO soldiers in Bosnia-Herzegovina to maintain the fragile peace. We believe that this is a commitment Estonia, as a part of Europe, must meet. An example of our effort to further collective peacekeeping and strengthen regional co-operation is the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion, soon to be fully operational. We will continue to do our part in strengthening European security and we hope that other European states will, in return, assist us in strengthening our regional security.

We are solid supporters of NATO enlargement. But we also believe that enlargement must strengthen the security of Europe as a whole and not occur at the expense of another region. Our dual-track approach to both the EU and NATO seeks to address this potential problem. Another problem which we see is the number of public statements and speculation on who is on NATO's "in" and "out" list. NATO members should realise that any statement which may cast doubt on Baltic membership to NATO only increases Russia's perception that the Baltics are within their "sphere". Sometimes silence is golden.

I would like to conclude by restating that the opportunity to shape Europe into more than a geographical term is before us. Europe has emerged as a family of nations which seeks to secure peace and prosperity under one roof. Estonia, along with other post-Soviet countries, is now making its way back into this family not as a distant relative seeking financial benefits, but as a lost son returning home from a war that for us lasted fifty years longer. As family, we are willing to take on the responsibilities, commitments and rules of the household.

Our means of returning to Europe are the EU and NATO. These two institutions are the pillars of stability for Europe, protecting Europe from both itself and outside threats. Now these institutions may be used not only to protect emerging democracies, but to protect Russia from its dangerous, expansionist tendencies as well.

Complacency at this time of action will guarantee that the pessimistic outlook toward Europe will prevail. Action and decisiveness will prolong and lengthen the period of democratic and economic wealth Western Europe has enjoyed for the past fifty years.

Estonia: Defense Minister Discusses National Defense Policies

WS1604103896 Tallinn ETA in English 0759 GMT 16 Apr 96

[From 16 Apr, SONUMILEHT, p.4 ; "News Bulletin" No. 74]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The government has reached an understanding about the necessity to improve the state's defence capability and an extensive programme of arms purchases is consequently being formulated, Defence Minister Andrus Oovel announced at the Riigikogu [parliament] yesterday.

Oovel answered an inquiry by MP Liia Hanni about state arms purchase plans and air defence. The minister admitted that the air defence is practically nonexistent at present. The 50 units of 23- millimetre anti-aircraft cannon received from Israel were found to be unserviceable, but at least 40 are to be repaired with Finnish aid. Another fifty units are to be received by summer. Oovel added that there are no contracts about further purchases at present. The minister described briefly main types of anti-aircraft weapons and stressed that Estonia can afford only portable missiles and light cannon.

This year's defence budget has allocated 179 million kroons to arms purchases, 132 million being meant for the payment for the Israeli weapons.

Oovel further explained the basic principles of the defence concept and declared that infantry and anti-tank weapons will remain a priority, according to a plan for 1996-1999. He enumerated small arms, mines, mortars, recoilless guns and bazookas as the main weapons to be purchases under the plan. The existent supply is sufficient for 22,000 men, Oovel announced.

Hanni also inquired about coastal defence and Oovel explained that there will be no specialised troops for that service. Coastal defence will be handled by the land forces and territorial units armed with Israeli MAPATS anti-tank missiles, he said.

Latvia

Latvia: Czech President Havel Arrives in Riga for Talks

LD1404175096 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1740 GMT 14 Apr 96

[By Galina Kuchina]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] RIGA, April 14 (Itar-Tass) — Czech President Vaclav Havel, touring the Baltic states, arrived in the Latvian capital Riga today.

He is to meet on Monday the Latvian president, parliament chairman, prime minister, Riga mayor and men of letters and arts.

Havel's talks will be parallelled by meetings between leaders of Latvian and Czech ministries who are to sign accords on free trade, international shipments and auto transport.

Prior to the visit, Havel said in an interview with the Latvian newspaper Diena that by going on tour of the Baltic states he wanted to show his sympathy, solidarity and the deepening of Czech relations with them.

Latvia: Free Trade Pact Signed With Czech Republic

WS1504131196 Tallinn BNS in English 1011 GMT 15 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Riga, Apr 15, BNS — A free trade accord between Latvia and the Czech Republic was signed Monday by Latvian Foreign Minister Valdis Birkavs and Czech Industry and Trade Minister Vladimir Dlouhy.

The agreement was concluded during Czech President Vaclav Havel's first official trip to the Baltic country, which began Sunday.

On Sunday, Havel and the Czech government delegation toured Riga's old town and listened to organ music in the Riga Dome Church.

Beginning with Monday, Havel will have talks with Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis, parliament Speaker Ilga Kreituse and members of the government.

Havel will leave Riga April 16 to continue his Baltic trip in Lithuania and Estonia.

Latvia and the Czech republic signed in 1993 agreements on trade and economic relations, cooperation in science and technology, promotion and protection of mutual investments, and avoidance of double taxation.

A visa-free regime in travel between the countries was introduced in 1994.

"We are not so close (to the EU) as the Czech Republic because they started earlier," The ASSOCIATED PRESS quoted Latvian Foreign Minister Valdis Birkavs as saying, "So we want to use their experience for our accession to the EU and NATO."

Latvia: President Comments on Talks With Czech Counterpart

LD1504143096 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1301 GMT 15 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The presidents of the Czech Republic and Latvia on 15 April laid flowers at the Monument of Freedom. The presidents also had a brief meeting with Latvian people who had gathered there. Latvian President Ulmanis was asked to comment on the outcome of his talks with Vaclav Havel.

[Begin Ulmanis recording] We agreed that we would discuss many things that directly concern our place in the EU and perhaps not so much [words indistinct] economy, because the prime ministers will meet in several weeks to tackle those issues much more specifically. Our subject is security and ensuring that 1940 never (?happens again). Many issues [words indistinct] procedure and the possibility of joining the EU and [words indistinct] European institutions for our two countries, as well as relations with Russia. [end recording]

Latvia: Czech President Havel Continues Talks With Ulmanis

LD1504191596 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1700 GMT 15 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Czech President Vaclav Havel is continuing his visit to Latvia.

[Correspondent] Talks took place today between Czech President Vaclav Havel and Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis. Ministers of the two countries held separate meetings at the same time. Foreign Minister Valdis Birkavs had talks with Czech Deputy Foreign Minister Helena Bambasova, while Economy Minister Guntars Krasts met Vladimir Dlouhy, Czech industry and trade minister. Talks were also held between the culture ministers of the two countries, Ojars Sparitis and Pavel Tigrid. After that, there were bilateral talks between the presidents and the official delegations of the two countries.

Vaclav Havel stressed that the visit is the first in the new history of the two countries and it attests to the Czech Republic's liking of and solidarity with the Baltic states' struggle for independence. Ulmanis and Havel discussed issues related to the shaping of a new order in Europe. The presidents stressed that Latvia and the Czech Republic have no alternative to membership of NATO and that they have the right to decide themselves which organization to join. Simultaneously with NATO enlargement, relations with Russia should also be developed. Russia, for its part, should respect the identity of other countries.

A free trade accord between the Czech Republic and Latvia was signed at the end of the talks. The Czech Republic is the first central European country with which Latvia has signed such an agreement.

In addition, Vaclav Havel met representatives of Latvia's creative intelligentsia at the Latvian Culture Fund's arts center in Jurmala. The Czech president asked questions about changes in Latvian culture after the collapse of Socialism. He stressed that it is in the state's interests to support education and culture. This, however, should not be done in a centralized manner; rather, funds should be granted for the most essential things, while the rest should be raised in other ways, for example, with the help of an appropriate taxation policy.

The Czech president also met today Latvian Parliament Speaker Ilga Kreituse and Prime Minister Andris Skele.

Latvia: Minister Favors Simultaneous Entry of Baltics Into EU, NATO

WS1504131496 Tallinn BNS in English 1300 GMT 15 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Riga, Apr 15, BNS — The three Baltic countries should join the European Union and NATO at the same time regardless of possible differences in their development, the Latvian foreign minister said.

The admission of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia "should take place approximately at the same time," said Latvian Foreign Minister Valdis Birkavs.

"I would like to see the three Baltic states as full-fledged members of the EU and NATO as soon as possible. (...) The differences are not so big that we could not be admitted to the EU all together," Birkavs told BNS.

The minister praised the economic development of Estonia but he said that it was not a reason for it to be enrolled to the EU before Latvia and Lithuania.

Latvia should learn from Estonia how to attract foreign investments. At the same time, Latvia has better infrastructure, more progressive social protection laws, lower inflation, Birkavs noted.

Lithuania

Lithuania: President Opens Joint Session of Baltic Assembly

LD1504134896 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1234 GMT 15 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vilnius, April 15 (Interfax) — Lithuania is interested in the deepening of democracy in Russia, the country's integration in international economic organizations and active involvement in the settlement of world problems, Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas told the opening of a joint session of the Baltic Assembly and the Nordic Council in Vilnius Monday.

He told members of parliament from three Baltic and five Nordic countries that Lithuania's reserved and pragmatic policy in its relations with Russia are a demonstration of friendliness and cooperation, not confrontation.

However, "Some tendencies in the Russian Duma do not promote neighborly relations," the president said. He accounted them to the upcoming elections and voiced hope relations with Russia would remain constructive after the elections.

Brazauskas praised the efforts of Nordic countries mediating the integration of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in the European Union and helping form a joint Baltic peacekeeping battalion.

"Lithuania intends to consistently pursue a policy of Baltic cooperation," he said, adding that only a coordinated policy and cooperation will help the three countries join the EU and NATO together and overcome the difficulties involved in the integration process.

Lithuania: Bulgarian Cabinet Boycotts Brazauskas' Speech on NATO

WS1204091396 Tallinn BNS in English
1300 GMT 11 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sofia, Apr 11, BNS — The socialist government of Bulgaria ignored Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas' speech in the parliament, in which the Lithuanian leader spoke out strongly in favor of NATO expansion.

Brazauskas said not a single member of the government had been in the hall during his speech, though the presence of Cabinet members is usual in honor of a foreign head of state.

On the second day of his official visit to Bulgaria, Brazauskas indicated that membership in NATO and the EU were strategic goals for Lithuania Thursday at parliament, stressing that he saw no other alternative to guarantee security and economic development.

At a press conference held later, Brazauskas refused to comment on the conduct of the Bulgarian government, saying that it would not be tactful of him to discuss the internal affairs of another country.

Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev at the same press conference regretted the conduct of the government, but said that it was not directed concretely at Lithuania and was the result of internal political struggle.

Bulgaria's government is dominated by former communists and is strongly inclined toward closer ties with Russia, while the anti-communist president speaks out for integration into NATO.

Zhelev at a press conference very positively responded to Brazauskas's firm view of NATO expansion and favorably assessed his account of Lithuania's experience with economic reform.

Lithuania: Defense Minister Quits LDDP, Wants To Remain in Cabinet

LD1604091496 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 0500 GMT 16 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] After leaving the LDDP [Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party], a minister wishes to retain his post in the cabinet; LDDP leader Ceslovas Jursenas urges National Defense Minister Linas Linkevicius to give up his post — such is the headline of an article by Ramune Sakalauskaite in the LIETUVOS RYTAS daily newspaper.

After leaving the LDDP, the minister of national defense must leave the cabinet, too, said Ceslovas Jursenas, acting head of the LDDP and chairman of the Seimas [parliament] yesterday, while commenting on a letter of resignation he received from Linas Linkevicius on Sunday. [words indistinct]

According to Jursenas, the Seimas is dominated by a majority of LDDP members, the cabinet is headed by a member of the LDDP, so it would be only natural if Linkevicius were to resign from his post in the cabinet. After yesterday's discussion on the subject with President Brazauskas and Prime Minister Stankevicius, Jursenas believes that the president and the head of the government also have an unfavorable opinion about this step of Linas Linkevicius, the newspaper said.

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